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Introduction 
The intent ion of this study is to examine the development 
and role of ind igenous military forces in Papua New Guinea . 
The study is based on a diversity of sources . In 1965-66 
and 197 1-7 2 I served with the Australian Army in Papua New 
Guinea and these two periods provide the background for 
some of the views that are expressed . During the 
preparat ion of the study in 19 7 3-7 4 ,  about three months were 
spent in PNG conducting field research which included visit s  
t o  most parts of the country an d  d i scuss ions with members of 
the Papua New Guinea Defence Force and with PNG government 
officials and politicians . In add it ion to drawing on 
material contained in previously published references and 
Australian and PNG Government Archives ,  I was granted limit ed 
access to the writ ten records of the PNG Defence Force and 
its forerunner , the PNG Joint Force , and was p ermitted to 
conduct two att itude surveys involving serving members of 
the Defence Force and PNG Public Service . 
In spite of the sources of informat ion that were 
available to me there were , nonetheless , considerable 
problems in regard to access to other relevant material . 
Because the study deals with current events the complete 
public record was not open and this has entailed reliance , 
in places , on published material , press reports and oral 
evidence .  Secondly , a s  the study discusses defence problems 
and contemporary relat ions between the Australian and PNG 
governments there are matters that st ill remain secret . For 
these reasons there are imposing difficult ies in attempt ing 
to present a definit ive account of more recent events . An 
assoc iat ed d ifficulty is the documentation of sources of 
informat ion . In cases where there might be possib ilit ies of 
official or personal embarrassment , were the informants 
ident ified , they have been kept anonymous . 
Furthermore , as this was written before Papua New Guinea 
became independent it is inevit able that aspects of the 
account are incomplete (events beyond May 197 4 have not been 
included) . Although it might have been better from the point 
of view of historical completeness to have undertaken the 
study after independence , advantages do exist in its present 
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timing . Many trend s in Papua New Guinea ' s  political and 
military affair s are unmistakable , if not actually 
irreversible and , accord ingly , the study may provide a basis 
for the analysis of  future event s as well as having some 
predict ive value . The material might also serve as a 
starting point for further research . 1 
The s tudy contains a number of unifying themes ; it is 
also writ ten against the background of the contemporary 
crisis in c ivil-military relations and the dominant polit ical 
role of the mil itary over a large part of the Third World . 
The principal theme o f  the study is the relationship of 
armed forces , in the past , present and future , to  the Papua 
New Guinean polity . The existence of armed forces in PNG , 
as is the case in all new states , generates problems which 
extend beyond a consideration of their des ignated , formal 
roles . The ex ist ence of the PNG Defence Force may have 
qu ite unintended consequences in the future and it will 
almost certainly exhibit complex interrelationships with 
PNG ' s  internal polit ical syst em and it s relat ions with other 
states . These interrelat ionships are discussed in the last 
two chapters in terms of civil-mil itary relat ions , the 
polit ical role of the PNG milit ary and the impl icat ions for 
st rategic policy and ext ernal relat ion s .  The Third World 
background is , at times , dealt with explicitly , especially 
in regard to Trop ical Africa which seems to of fer useful 
comparisons with PNG ' s  status as a small developing country 
about to gain independence .  But even where comparison with 
the Third World and African states is not explicit , my 
approach is influenced by comparat ive cons iderations . The 
study attempts to identify what is spec ial to Papua New 
Guinea and what is common to the experience of other new 
states . Useful comparisons are ident ified in relation to 
colonial military policy , the devolution of military power , 
the problems of int ernal and external security and military 
polit ics . 
The historical account of the development o f  military 
forces in PNG from the emergence of a ' constabulary 
trad it ion ' to the establishment of national armed forces 
reveals a pattern of development in which Au st ralian 
strateg ic imperat ives have predominat ed . In spit e  of pre­
World War II init iatives which aimed at the establishment 
under lo cal ordinances of territorially-based forces on the 
Brit ish colonial pattern , the forces raised in PNG dur ing 
1 Researchers should also consult P .  Colebatch , 197 4 .  
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and after World War I were integral units of the Australian 
Army and Navy , raised , commanded and paid for from Australia. 
This linkage between Australian strategic obj ect ives and 
military expansion in PNG was again highlighted in the 
1960s dur ing the period of Confrontation with Indonesia .  
Only when Australia embarked on an era of rap id decolon­
isat ion after 1969 and the Indonesia ' threat ' was seen to 
recede did the nexus between Australian and PNG defence 
cons iderations weaken . Military policy in PNG then b ecame 
increas ingly directed towards the needs of an independent 
state.  This process o f  the transfer of military power to 
PNG was also facilitated by strateg ic reappraisal and 
d isengagement on the part of Australia. 
Because of PNG ' s  proximity to Australia , the trad it ional 
views that were held regarding PNG ' s  s trategic importance 
and a pattern of centralised rule from Canberra rather than 
a degree of colonial autonomy , military development in PNG , 
unt il very late in the day , suf fered from a lack of policy 
direct ion and adminis trative control in PNG . The study 
argues that this pattern of military development , which is 
contrasted with British colonial practice favouring the 
establishment of colonial forces subj ect to lo cal control , 
may have profound implicat ions for post-independence civil­
military relat ions . 
Another theme that is developed in the first two chapters 
is the interaction between Australian and Papua New Guinean 
approaches to defence questions . The study concludes that 
for a variety of reasons the actual course since 197 2  of 
military policy-making under a Papua New Guinean government 
has differed remarkably little from earlier Australian 
expec tat ions . Radical defence options such as a s ingle , 
combined police and defence force , a much smaller force , 
or a ' p eople ' s  army ' option were quickly d iscarded and , to  
that extent , the PNG defence policy-making process may be  
seen largely as a leg itimat ion of earlier Australian 
planning decisions . 
An analysis of the compo sit ion and functioning of the 
Defence Force on the eve of independence shows that , whilst 
it is able to meet the roles foreseen by the PNG government , 
its military capability is limited , principally by a lack of 
certain types of air support and a shortage of infantry . It 
would , therefore , requ ire external assistance in the event 
of other than quite minor secur ity problems . Questions of 
rapid officer localisation , mil itary professionalism and 
ethnic divers ity within the Defence Force point to 
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organisational tensions which , if coupled with social 
instab ility in PNG , may have serious operational and 
polit ical implicat ions . 
In regard to Papua New Guinea ' s  .national s ecurity , special 
prob lems are seen for PNG , as a small stat e ,  in relat ing its 
armed forces to external defence contingencies in the 
context of an asymmetric s trateg ic environment in which its 
neighbours are either many t imes more powerful or 
inconsequent ially small .  For this reason diplomacy and the 
support of allies are seen as vital components in PNG ' s  
future nat ional s ecurity . Although relations with Indonesia 
may provide an important source of concern , internal 
security problems are likely to be more important . 
Polit ical ins tab ility , radical systemic change and a lack o f  
political authority may give rise t o  violence as a means o f  
articulat ing and achieving polit ical demands in PNG . If  
this occurs the Defence Force may b ecome deeply involved in 
maintaining domest ic order . Short-term internal security 
problems may arise from tribal fight ing and secession , 
whereas in the longer-term future the polit ical problems 
generated by increased economic inequality , urban over­
population and rising expectations as a result of western 
educat ion and rapid social change may lead to the emergence 
of radical polit ical movement s  connnit t ed to the use o f  
violence . 
In the conclud ing chapter on civil-mil itary relations 
which draws on the experience of the Third World , and black 
Africa in particular , it is argued that the future involve­
ment o f  the Defence Force in PNG polit ics may b e  largely 
inevitable.  A pattern of civil-military relations is , 
therefore , prescribed which , by seeking to contain the 
polit ical role of the Defence Force , might permit the 
survival of c ivilian-controlled government in Papua New 
Guinea . The integration of c ivil and military spheres of 
activity and the institutionalisat ion o f  a limited military 
involvement in PNG polit ics are reconnnended . 
Chapter 1 
The development of indigenous military forces 
in Papua New Guinea up to 1969 
The beginnings 
The constabulary tradition 
The indigenous military forces in Papua New Guinea derive 
in a direct and continuous manner from the infantry unit s 
raised during World War I I .  I t  is , however , possible to 
discern an earlier tradition o f  hearing arms in the para­
military native constabularies .  Armed constabularies manned 
by Papua New Guineans were raised in the early colonial 
period in both Papua (then British New Guinea) and German 
New Guinea. These forces were quite unlike the so-called 
' kin ' police of western nat ions in both their role and 
method of operat ion . 
The Constabulary in Brit ish New Gu inea had been formed 
in 1890 on para-military lines and initially manned by 
twelve Solomon Islanders and two Fij ians (Hastings ,  1969 : 48) . 
In German New Guinea under Hahl , the native Constabulary 
was modelled on the Brit ish para-military lines and trained 
in rifle shooting and drill (Biskup , 1969 : 83 ) . The 
Constabularies in both colonies were armed with rifles and 
command ed by European officers and colonial o fficials and 
they performed vital roles in the colonial regimes . They 
assisted in the exploration of the interior and helped 
colonial field officers in the extens ion of adminis trative 
control and the enforcement o f  ' law and order ' ,  often by 
punitive means . Quite frequently their role , in the early 
days o f  ' pacificat ion ' , involved the destruct ion o f  
villages and armed clashes with natives (Hastings, 1969 : 48; 
Biskup , 1969) . 
In Australian-admini stered Papua during the long 
Lieutenant-Governorship of Sir Hubert Murray the Constabulary 
continued to be run on para-military lines , although the 
approach to pacification was , by then , less violent . In 
German New Guinea the para-military t radit ion was more 
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closely observed . At the t ime o f  the German capitulation to 
the Australian forces in 1914 , the nat ive Constabulary in 
New Guinea numbered about one thousand men and was commanded 
by a regular army captain .  There was also a special unit , 
125 men strong , known as the Expedit ion Troop , which was 
trained for bush warfare and commanded by an army lieutenant .  
Under the Aust ralian mil itary administration from 1914 to 
1921 the C.Onstabulary continued to be regarded and used as 
a mil itary force . Rowley remarks that : ' Such an att itude 
was quite in accord with German precedent and with the 
trad i tions and training of the native police ' . 1 
In both t erritories , the roles which were allotted to the 
constabularies in defence planning in the int er-war period 
clearly showed the extent to which they were seen as para­
mil itary forces . By this time the Papua New Guinean members 
of thes e forces had proved themselves to be generally loyal 
and reliable coercive instruments of the colonial admin is­
trat ion . They had , furthermore , demons trated the ability of 
Papua New Guineans to absorb military training and operate 
in d isciplined bod ies . A ' constabulary tradit ion ' had thus 
b een born . 
The rais ing o f  actual military unit s in PNG seems to have 
f irst been sugges ted by Murray in Papua in 1913 . The idea 
was not ,  however , pursued by him or the Connnonwealth 
Government during the war that followed . Further suggestions 
of rais ing PNG mil itary units do not appear to have aris en 
unt il Australian defence contingency planning took place in 
the two territories during the 193 0s . As will be seen 
lat er , this planning , although quite elaborate , foundered 
largely because of legal complicat ions . The result was a 
lack of effective defence preparat ion s ,  especially in regard 
to indigenous troops , when PNG was invaded by the Japanese 
in 1942 . 
Defence planning and indigenous military forces 
Aust ralian at titudes toward the island of New Guinea ,  
even before Australia b ecame a nat ion , had b een influenced 
primarily by strateg ic and defence considerat ions . The 
strategic re lat ionship of the island to the Australian 
cont inent had led to the Queensland Government ' s  illegal 
annexat ion of Papua , result ing in it s proclamation as a 
1Rowley , 1958 : 2 06-7 . As examples o f  para-military 
employment during the war , Rowley c ites the guarding o f  
Bita Paka radio station and garrison duty a t  Vanimo . 
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Brit ish Protectorate in 1884 . 2 Later , after World War I, 
the Australian Prime Minister , W. M. Hughes ,  was able to 
consolidate Australia ' s  1914 conquest of German New Guinea 
under the provis ions of a Leag�e of Nations Mand ate . In 
Hughes ' s  op inion New Guinea was vital to Australia ' s  future 
security because ' any strong power controlling New Guinea 
controlled Australia and that if Australia did not control 
the territory she could not feel safe ' . 3 Nonetheless , 
because o f  the restrictive terms o f  the Mandate , Australia ' s  
defence powers in New Guinea were limit ed and she was forced 
to be content with a ' dog-in-the-manger ' policy there , that 
is , one of merely keep ing o ther powers out of New Guinea . 
In spite o f  the perceived strateg ic importance o f  PNG 
it was not until some time after World War I ,  during 192 8-
29 , that active defence planning for the Commonwealth War 
Book led to the consideration of local defence measures in 
Papua and New Guinea. Eventually , in 193 0 , the 
Administrator of New Guinea and the Lieutenant-Governor of 
Papua were charged with the preparation and execut ion o f  
defence schemes for their territories . 4 They were told 
that although it might be impos sible for the territories 
effectively to resist an enemy attack because o f  their 
meagre defence resources there were fields in which valuable 
preparations could be made . These fields included 
intell ig ence , the protection of vulnerable points , 
censorship , control o f  aliens and detention of enemy 
shipping . In relation to New Guinea , which was administered 
under the League of Nations Mandate , it was noted that only 
local defence measures were permissible and military bases 
2Mayo , 1969 : 17 and passim. At the t ime the Australian 
colonies were d issatisfied that the whole of eastern New 
Guinea had not b een claimed , so leaving the way open for 
a German presence . No doub t Queenslanders were st ill 
impressed by Captain John Moresby ' s  opinion of April 1873 
(at Port Moresby) that 'occupat ion of this area by any 
foreign marit ime power • • • would be a standing menace to 
Queensland ' (Van der Veur , 1966 : 15 ) . 
3 cited by David Lloyd George , The Truth about the Peace 
Treaties , Vol . l ,  London , 1938 , pp . 519-20 , and quoted in 
Hudson , 1 97 0 : 161 . 
4commonwealth Archives Office (CAO) , MP7 29 / 6 , Files 
16 /401/187 and 16/401 / 81 .  
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could not be constructed . 5 
The Administ rations in both t erritories were given no 
specific instructions about the milit ary training of 
Europeans or natives as a part of the defence preparations . 
In relation to Papua New Guinean natives , this was probably 
owing to Australian scep ticism concerning the reliab ility 
of native un it s .  In 1924 a study of the de fence of New 
Guinea by a sub-committ ee o f  the Aust ralian Defence Council 
had recommended that the native constabularies should be 
given military training . Subs equently , however , the Council 
was advis ed that captured German documents had strongly 
crit icised the stability of native units when under fire 
and therefore ' thes e troops do not seem to be worth the 
expense ' . 6 The proposal was then dropped . 
Apart from scept icism in Australia concerning the value 
of native units ,  Australian defence policy in regard to 
New Guinea was seen to be severely restricted by the 
provis ion of the C Class League of Nations Mandate which 
Aust ral ia had b een granted in 192 0 .  Under Article 4 of the 
Mandate : 
The military training of the natives , otherwise than 
for the purposes of internal police and the local 
defence of the Territory , shall be prohibited .  
Furthermore , no military o r  naval bases shall be 
established , or fortifications erected in the 
Territory . 
Unlike the Territory of Papua , where Australia ' s  defence 
powers were absolute , her defence powers in New Guinea were 
thus limited to local defence only . Australian Government 
sens it ivity even in regard to her legitimate powers of local 
defence in the Mandated Territory of New Guinea inhib it ed 
realist ic and effective local defence preparations right up 
to the onset of World War II . During the whole o f  the 
int er-war period Australia continued to interpret her right s  
in relat ion to local defence in an extremely restric ted 
manner .  
Paradoxically , there was at the same time considerable 
awarenes s  of the s t rategic importance o f  New Guinea in 
5 CAO , MP72 9 / 6 ,  File 16 /40 /187 , Connnonwealth War Book , Paper 
No . 2 ,  Aust ralian Territories Defence Schemes . 
6cAO , MP7 2 9 / 2 , File 1851/2 / 211 , Counc il o f  Defence Agenda 
No . 13/1924 . 
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relat ion to Aus tralia and the potential o f  New Guinea to 
provide an enemy with an o ffens ive ' springboard ' .  The 1924 
Defence Collllc il sub-commit tee ' s  study of New Guinea defence 
had drawn at tention , with cons iderable foresight , to the 
s ignificance to New Guinea in enemy operat ions against 
Australia : 
In the case o f  an oversea operat ion by the enemy 
it is essential that steps  b e  taken to obtain safe 
anchorages for the troopships and an advanced base 
But in whatever form of at tack that is being examined 
it is certain that the seizure by the enemy o f  a safe 
harbour among the islands is an essential preliminary 
step . Our possible enemy must be aware o f  this , and 
it is likely that he will occupy suitable islands 
early in the war • • •  It is likely that he will take 
advantage of the opening phase of the war , before 
our defensive measures are fully developed • • •  7 
In 192 8 ,  there was further informed public discussion of 
the strateg ic importance of New Guinea and s imilar con­
clus ions were reached as to New Guinea ' s  strateg ic 
significance , again with amaz ing percipience . In a paper 
writt en by a ' Naval Expert '  it was argued that : 
The most vital and valuable part o f  Australia is it s 
eastern seaboard (e . g .  Newcastle , Sydney , etc . ) and 
the ne�rest means of approach to that part of 
Australia from the north is via the islands • • •  
The proximity of the Japanese Mandated Islands -
which can be used as an int ermediate base - to the 
Au stralian Mandated Islands - is not generally 
realised . The distance from Truk in the Caroline 
Islands to Rabaul is only eight hundred miles 
(Eggleston , 192 8 : 95 ) . 
In the light of these commonly held s trategic assessments 
and since strateg ic defensive measures were not permitted 
under the Mandate provis ions , there would s eem to have been 
good ground s for , at least , taking realistic local defens ive 
measures .  Such local defensive measures in PNG might well 
have made it more difficult than it was in the event for the 
Japanese to occupy and control parts of New Guinea in 1942 . 
Although they were never to b e  realised , quite ambit ious 
7 cAO , MP7 29 /2 , File 185 1/2 /211 , Report of sub-commit tee on 
New Guinea Defence , Agenda 13 /192 4 .  
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plans were in fact laid in the Mandated Territory of New 
Guinea during 193 0  for local defens ive measures . These 
plans involved the establishment in the war stage of a 
proposed de fence scheme o f  a European rifle battalion, 
eight companies of conscripted New Guinea nat ive infantry , 
and a native labour bat talion . The 193 0  scheme had been 
drawn up by the New Guinea Superintendent of Police and 
Distric t Inspector , Lieutenant-Colonel John Walstab . 
Walstab ' s  plan was eventually forwarded to Canb erra in 
January 1933 by the New Guinea Administrator , Brigadier 
General E . A. Wisdom. 8 
Administrator Wisdom enthus ias tically endorsed Walstab ' s  
defence proposals and no ted in a covering letter to the 
Australian Prime Minis ter that , apart from New Guinea ' s  
strategic value to  Aus tralia , its increas ing economic 
s ignificance (as a producer o f  gold , raw materials and 
foodstuf fs)  made it an attract ive target to a potential 
8 Lt-Col . John Walstab , DSO (1885-1957 ) ,  was given the task 
of preparing the NG Defence Scheme because of both his 
military and New Guinea experience . A Gall ipoli veteran 
and former AIF battalion connnander , he evidently possessed 
an imaginat ive military mind. Wals tab envisaged that it 
was necessary to plan beyond the pas s ive de fence measures 
originally called for in the Connnonwealth War Book plans . 
Resi stance to large-scale enemy attack should take the form 
of guerrilla operations with small mobile columns of nat ive 
troops led and s tiffened by European officers and machine 
gun teams . These columns would operate in the interior, 
l ive off the land and harass the invaders in control o f  the 
urban centres . They could only be defeated , he argued , 
'when the enemy had so es tablished himself in the country 
as to be able to enlis t and u se the armed nat ives against 
them ' . Wals tab ' s  concept of  military operations in PNG was 
influenced by two things :  his own extensive knowledge of 
the country ' s  terrain as a result of lead ing police patrols 
and his appraisal of the successful guerrilla campaigns in 
East Africa of the German general , Von Lettow Verbeck , 
during World War I .  Verbeck had very successfully employed 
nat ive troop s led by German officers. ( CAO , MP729/ 6 ,  File 
16/401/ 187, Letter by Walstab to the Administrator , 11 
April 1930 . )  
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enemy. 9 By Sep tember 1934 the Australian Defence Department 
had complet ed its review of the Wisdom/Walstab scheme and 
decided that the measures for the ra1s1ng of native and 
European military forces would be omitted from the bas ic 
defence scheme , but included in a further separate s cheme to 
be known as the Z Scheme which would cover defensive measures 
and armed res istance in time of war . The revised New Guinea 
Defence Scheme of 1934 was eventually promulgated in 1937 in 
the form of a Blue Book ent itled ' The Mandated Territory of 
New Guinea Defence Scheme ' .  
It was no t unt il May 193 9 , after another lengthy delay 
indicating the pace of trop ical adminis tration , that the Z 
Scheme proposals were forwarded to Canberra by the 
Adminis trator ( then Brigadier-General Sir Walter McNicoll) . 
It was proposed that two small European militia battalions 
should be raised and ,  together with the native C.Onstabulary , 
should form the peacetime organisat ional bas is of a New 
Guinea Field Force . 10 In the s econd phase of the Z Scheme , 
it was planned that in t ime of war this force would be 
increased to some 4 , 7 00 combatant native and European 
troops . The full-s ized Field Force was to consist of a New 
Guinea Native Infantry Regiment of three bat talions , a 
headquarters battalion o f  guerrilla warfare parties and 
mobile wireless observation units . The first native 
battalion would be formed from NG C.Ons tabulary personnel . A 
NG Native Labour Corps of four battalions was also planned . 
It was intended that the Field Force would be raised 
init ially from volunteers and then , if necessary , by 
conscript ion . Legislation to enact the scheme was to be 
provided for by a ' New Guinea (Local Defence) Nat ive Forces ' 
Ord inance ,  which would p ermit the raising of native military 
forces for the local defence of New Guinea. Amendment to 
the Aus tralian Defence Act was also envisaged . The scheme 
also provided that a third European specialist/headquarters 
9 CAO , MP7 2 9 / 6 ,  File 16/401/ 187 , Wisdom to the Prime 
Minister , Jan . 1933; Secretary , Defence Department to 
Secretary , Prime Minis ter ' s  Department , 7 Sept . 1934; File 
16 / 401 / 81 , Secretary , Defence Department to Secretary , 
Prime Minister ' s  Department , 6 Feb . 1935 . 
lOCAO , MP72 9 / 6 , File 16 / 401/ 187 , McNicoll to Secretary , 
Prime Minister ' s  Department , 2 0  April 193 9 , enclosing 
Walstab ' s  Z Scheme proposals; and CAO , CRS A518 , CF 
16/2 / 1 , File Summary , Territory of New Guinea , Defence 
Scheme dated 8 May 1941.  
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battalion would be raised in wartime .  Of the two peacet ime 
milit ia battalion s one was to be based on Rabaul , and the 
second on Wau , which had b een accepted as the pivotal point 
of NG defence because of the strategic vulnerability of the 
New Guinea Islands . 
Although the European volunteer battalion ( the New Guinea 
Volunteer Rifles - NGVR) was eventually authorised in 
Sep tember 193 9 , the proposals contained in the Z Scheme for 
the development of native units were not implemented . The 
scheme suffered a lingering demise .  Clouded by legal 
uncertainties and legislat ive problems , it was neither 
accep ted nor rej ected at the outbreak of war and the great 
local defence poten tial of the Z Scheme was thus never 
realised . 11 
The legal uncertaint ies which hampered the implementation 
of the Z Scheme in New Guinea applied to Papua as well as 
challenging the operat ion of the bas ic defence schemes in 
both t erritories in relation to the use of the Constabularies 
in a military role in t imes of emergency . In November 1940 
the Australian Attorney-General argued that the proj ected 
use of the Papuan and New Guinean nat ive Constabularies for 
defence purposes was illegal in view of the ext ension of the 
Defence Act to both territories from July 1939 . This 
decis ion created a further measure of uncertainty in the 
de fence schemes and , as the legal issues were not resolved 
before the Japanese invasion , reduced their viab ility in a 
way which revealed an extraord inary degree o f  administrative 
inept itude. 12 
Turning to the Papuan defence plans , its 1937 Defence 
Scheme provided for a guerrilla defence role for the 
Constabulary . Port Moresby was seen by the Lieutenant­
Governor , Murray , as both the key to the domination of Papua 
and the mos t  suitable invasion base for operations against 
Aus tralia and was , therefore , the focus o f  the defence 
preparat ions . It was intended , however ,  that if Moresby did 
fall , res is tance would be continued against the enemy by the 
CQnstabulary act ing in a guerrilla role . District rosters 
11see McNicoll , 1969 : 129 also CAO ,  CRS , A518 ,  File CF 16/2/1, 
Prime Minister ' s  Department Summary , 8 May 1941 , and 
Au st ralian War Memorial (AWM) File 243 / 5/25 . 
12cAO , CRS 2663 , File 243 /5 / 2 5 , Letter o f  7 Aug . 1941 from 
8 th Mil itary Dis trict ; and CAO , CRS A5 18 , File 16/2 / 1 , 
Letter o f  16 Dec . 1941 from Secretary , Department of 
Defence Co-ord ination . 
of Europeans and Papuans suitable for military service were 
maintained after April 1937 but there were then no actual 
plans , as in New Guinea , for the formation of native 
military units . 13 
9 
As the prospect of war appeared more imminent the Papuan 
Lieutenant-Governor , in July 1939 , proposed the formation o f  
a Volunteer Defence Corps which might have included both 
Europeans and Papuans . A special Papuan ordinance to  
establish this force was prepared but Murray was informed 
that the extension of the provisions of the Defence Act to 
Papua , from July 1939 , removed the prerogative of the Papuan 
Legislative Council to legislate for a Defence Force . The 
plans for the Volunteer Defence Corp s were shelved and the 
initiative for further defence preparations passed to the 
Australian Government . 14 
World War I I  
The p relude to the development of indigenous military units 
Although the planning for indigenous military units 
appeared more advanced in New Guinea , it was in Papua that 
the firs t unit - the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB)  - was 
actually raised in June 1940 . PIB was raised with an 
initial establishment of 2 officers , 5 warrant officers and 
12 8 Papuan other rank. This es tablishment was expanded to 
a full battalion in February 1941.  The first Connnanding 
Officer was seconded from the Papuan Constabulary and most 
of  the first recruits were C.Onstabulary memb ers . Prior 
service in the Constabulary counted for pay purposes and 
NCOs were appointed from amongs t  former senior policemen . 
Platoon Connnanders in PIB were at first European warrant 
officers though the appointments were upgraded to lieutenant 
rank in October 194 1 .  Conditions o f  service were initially 
aligned with those of the C.Ons tabuly�Y but the troop s were subj ect to Aus tralian Military Law. 
13cAO , MP729/6 ,  File 16/401/206 , Secret Despatch , Murray to 
the Minister in charge of Territories , 27 April 1937 . 
14cAO , CRS A518 , File CF 16/2/1 , Territory of Papua , Defence 
Units Memo 24 Oct . 1939 . 
15cAO , MP7 2 9 , File 1/121 and File 6/129 , Let ter from ' 
Connnandant 8th Military Dis trict of  30 Oct .  1941.  
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The proposal to form the unit initially came from the 
Australian Defence Department and the suggestion was 
enthusiastically taken up by the Papuan Lieutenant-Governor.  
Murray saw that a military unit would enab le him to release 
numbers of the Cons tabulary from the growing number of  
security and guard du ties around Port Moresby , thus allowing 
them to be reass igned to normal police dut ies which were 
b eing neglected . 16 The formation of  PIB at this time 
co incided with gathering concern at the unsatis factory s tate 
of Port Moresby ' s  de fences and ,  in particular , the lack of 
any infantry troop s for local defensive tasks . 
As the training and expansion of  the P IB in Port Moresby 
proceeded and the risk of war increased , there was , rather 
strangely , no gathering enthusiasm in New Guinea for the 
establishment of a native military unit . In Feb ruary 1941 , 
the Australian War Cabinet did direct that the question of  
rais ing a native infantry battalion in New Guinea was to be  
examined , at the same time agreeing to the dispatch of an 
AIF battalion to Rabaul to s treng then the defences there 
against the possibility of Japanese or German attack. 17 
Emphas is ing the distinctly s eparate characters of  the two 
pre-1942 territories , the New Guinea Adminis tration , after 
protracted cons iderat ion , rej ected the Australian proposal 
for the formation of a native battalion , even though the 
PIB had by then b een in exis tence in Papua for over six 
months , contained more than three hundred men and was 
operat ing suc cessfully . 
Admini strator McNicoll , no longer influenced by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Wals tab ' s  advocacy of indigenous forces 
(Wals tab had left New Guinea in May 19 40) , 18 accep ted the 
advice of his ' experienced Director of Native Affair s , Mr 
R. Melros e ' . Melrose recommended against the formation of  
nat ive unit s es sentially because they would be of dubious 
loyalty , not having ' the slightest concep t of  patriotism in 
its wider sense ' .  The Adminis trator ' s  opinion was supported 
by the military commander in Port Moresby , Brigad ier Basil 
Morris . The matter was finally closed in September 194 1  
when the Director of  Military Operations at Army 
16cAO , CRS A518 , File CF 16/2/1 , Murray to the Minister in 
charge of Territories , 13 Oct. 193 9 and 7 Nov . 193 9 .  
17Hasluck , 197 0 : 67 0 ;  War Cabinet Minute 816 of  1 8  Feb . 1941 . 
The attack by German raiders on Nauru in December 1940 
probably prompted this concern for Rabaul ' s  security . 
18Milit ary Secretary Records , Army Headquarters , Canberra . 
Headquarters noted that  the ques tion of training a native 
battalion in New Guinea had b een examined and rej ected and 
the Cab inet had been advised accordingly . 19 
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The failure to form native military unit s in New Guinea 
during 1941 was to prove crucial . The swift onset of the 
Japanese invasion early in 1942 , the subsequent lo ss of 
control over the areas of recruitment in New Guinea and the 
confusion g enerated by the invasion removed the opportunity 
of forming a New Guinea battalion for some time and it was 
not unt il March 1944 that one was eventually raised . By 
that t ime ,  the worth of the PIB which by then contained both 
Papuans and New Guineans had b een demonstrated in several 
campaigns . 
With the benefit of hinds ight the history of defence 
planning in regard to indigenous forces in both Papua and New 
Guinea may be s een as a combination o f  qu ite notable fore­
sight and imag ination on the one hand and on the other , 
administrative sloth and , until very late in the day , a lack 
of any sense of urgency . In New Guinea the involvement o f  
New Guineans in defence preparat ion had been prevented not 
only by fears of violat ing the League of Nations Mandate20  
but also by deep-seated suspicion about the loyalty of the 
indigenous inhab it ant s , a suspicion which was quite clearly 
19cAO , MP7 29 / 6 , File 16 /401/485 , Letter from GOC Northern 
Command to Military Board , 15 Sep t .  1941 ; Sydney Morning 
He�ald (SMH), 2 6  Oct . 19 72 , article by Peter Hastings ; and 
CAO ,  MP7 29 / 6 , File 16/401/202 . 
20rhe quest ion of the legality of defence preparat ions under 
the Mandate should have b een , but was no t , finally settled 
in September/ October 1938 . At that time the Prime 
Mini ster sought the legal opinion of the Solicitor-General 
as to the legality of exist ing defence preparations in New 
Guinea and Nauru . The Solic itor-General af firmed the 
right to provide for local defence , which in the case of 
Nauru included the formation of a peacetime defence force . 
It would seem to follow logically that a native-manned 
local defence force in NG could have been raised without 
breaching the terms of the Mandate (a further parallel 
already existed in t erms of the defence force established 
by the British in the mandated ex-German colony of 
Tanganyika) . (CAO , MP72 9 / 6 , File 16 /401/206 , Solicitor­
General to Attorney-General ' s  Department , 2 9  Sept . 1938 
and Acting Prime Minister to Minister for Defence , 12 
Oct .  193 8 . ) 
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based on ethnic prejudice . 2 1  
Pre-war planning had identified the likely obj ectives o f  
an enemy campaign in PNG - the seizing of ports an d  popu ­
lat ion centres - as well as proposing the most ef fective 
local defence strategy of withdrawal into the interior and 
waging guerrilla warfare . But because of the failure to 
organise the indigenous population for self-defence , both 
t errito ries were unprepared when the attacks came . The 
pot ential military contribution of a properly organised , 
well-l ed force of ind igenous troops at this t ime was 
sugges ted by incident s at Rabaul after the Japanese landings 
when s everal hundred NG police had to be prevented by the 
European off icers from attacking the Japanes e . 2 2  It might 
be argued in retrospect that the Australian failure to 
provide for the adequate lo cal defence of New Guinea and her 
protection agains t invas ion was as much a derelic tion of the 
Mandate responsibilit ies as that posed by a hypothetic al 
charge that Australia had incorporated New Guinea into her 
strategic defence system. 
Expans ion and d isbandment of the wartime Pacific Island s  
Reg iment 
It is not intended to recount here the military record 
of the PNG military unit s dur ing the war period.  Only the 
more important aspects of that period are discussed , those 
which relate to the decision s taken at the end of the war to 
d isband the unit s . 23 The wartime period of the native 
military units was marked by a growing acceptance , af ter an 
uncertain s tart ,  of the value of the Papua New Guinean 
infantryman in the sp ecialised military roles of 
2 1cAO ,  MP7 2 9 / 6 , File 16/401 / 2 02 . 
2 2Hasluck , 197 0 : 67 6 .  European officers reported that they 
had ' a  devil of a j ob stopping the native police from 
making an at tack ' on the Japanes e .  There were 300 in the 
group . Inst ead , the police were ordered to bury their 
rifles and ammunit ion and d isperse .  (Evidence of Warran t  
Officer A. M. Sinclair before the Army Court of Inquiry 
convened to report on the Japanese landings . )  
23A history of the wartime PIB and New Guinea Infantry 
Battalions (NGIB) of the PIR has been written by Captain 
Trevor McQuinn , Royal Australian Army Education Corps 
(unpublished MS) . For a summary o f  the wartime period see 
Granter , 197 0 .  
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reconnaissance and long-range patrolling , roles for which 
European troops were not well suited . There was also  a 
belief that the increasing use of natives in these roles 
would save Aust ralian manpower and casualties . On the o ther 
hand , problems experienced in the control and discipline of 
nat ive units led to s teadily mount ing crit icism of them, 
crit ic ism which was finally to result in their postwar 
disbandment . In f act the controversy which arose over the 
value of native unit s was init iated in the early Papuan 
campaigns of 1942 . 
The operational.performance o f  the PIB in the Kokoda 
campaign was uneven . Whilst elements of the bat talion 
provided useful early warning o f  the Japanese and delayed 
them,  other groups of the PIB had ' gone bush ' at crucial 
moment s . 24 In particular , elements of the PIB that had 
been cut off in the Kumusi River area were for a time 
without adequate European leadership and ' many discreditable 
incidents had occurred ' . 25 As a result o f  the PIB conduct 
in this campaign , Aus tralian Land Headquarters ordered the 
PIB to be disbanded . On this occasion , Maj or-General 
Morris , then Commander NG Force , later one of the PIB and 
PIR' s sternest crit ics , wrote to General Blarney at Land 
Headquarters and argued that ins tead of being disbanded , the 
unit should be withdrawn from op erat ions , ret rained and 
reorganised . Blarney agreed to Morr·is ' s proposai. 2 6  The 
uneven showing o f  the unit was to  be explained in terms of 
a lack o f  thorough and realistic training before being 
24 PIB was deployed to the north coast of Papua in June 1942 
after several months of prosaic labouring and quarrying 
duties in Port Moresby , during which t ime little military 
training could be conducted .  Elements o f  PIB made first 
contact with the Japanese on 23 July 1942 and , after a 
series of skirmishes ,  the maj or part of the unit withdrew 
over the Kokoda trail to Port Moresby . Large elements of 
the force were , however ,  ' cut off ' in the Kumus i and Waria 
River areas. (PIB War Diary, August 1940-April 1945 . 
AWM , A2663 , File 8/4/4 . ) 
25AWM , A26 63 , File 419 /5 /22 , Letter by Maj or General B .  
Morris , General Off icer Commanding (GOC) ANGAU (Australian 
New Guinea Adminis trat ive Unit ) to HQ NG Force , 11 Aug . 
1943 . Morris had been Commander NG Force at the time of 
the incidents . Also , personal interview with General 
Morris , October 1974 . 
2 6 Interview with General Morris , September 19 73 . 
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connnit ted to action and a lack of sound officer leadership 
in some quarters . In short , the unit was untrained and 
unprepared , rather than the soldiers being in some way 
racially unsuit ed to the j ob of infantry soldiering.  
Although init ially formed two years be fore it  went into 
action , the greater part of this t ime had been spent either 
in the preparation and manning of static defens ive posit ions 
in Port Moresby , or in providing labour ing parties . The 
Command ing Of f.icer frequently complained in his War Diary 
during this period that there was inadequate scope for 
carrying on with essential mil itary training . 27 
Af ter a period of consolidat ion and experience o f  more 
succes sful military employment of the PIB in sub sequent 
campaigns , it was eventually decided to form a New Guinea 
battalion in Novemb er 1943 . Training of P IB recruit s was 
further improved by the establishment of a PIB training 
depot at Bis iatabu on the Sogeri plateau east of Port 
Moresby in April 1943 . The words of the rais ing instruc tion 
were reminiscent of the years of prewar defence planning : 
The Constabulary of the Territory o f  New Guinea 
received military training in peace t ime and it is 
considered that many natives from this service 
should be available . 28 
The new unit , known as First Battalion , New Guinea Infantry 
Bat talion (lNGIB) , was finally raised in March 1944 from a 
cadre of experienced New Guinean soldiers who had been 
serving with the PIB. 2 9  At this time it was dec ided that 
Papuans and New Guineans would henceforth serve in separate 
units . This policy was short-sight ed and turned out to be 
both unpopular and disruptive , leading to disciplinary 
problems in the new unit s that were formed. The decision to 
detach the New Guineans from the PIB was not only sad news 
to officers and men , but in the new NGIB unit s former PIB 
soldiers rebelled against new customs such as the order that 
NCO rank would be worn on lap-laps rather than shirts (as in 
PIB) and the policy of split ting up men from the same 
village (Barrett , 1969 :495) . 
Af ter the formation o f  lNGIB , the expansion of the native 
2 7 AWM, A2 663 , File 8/4 /4 . 
28AWM, HQ NG Force War Diary , Ins truction G . 5343 SD of 9 
Nov. 1943 . 
2 9The unit was raised at Wampit in the Markham Valley . 
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units took place as rap idly as decisions could be taken and 
recruit s gained from recaptured territory . 2NGIB was raised 
in Sept ember 1944 and in November 1944 a special regimental 
headquarters , known as Headquarters Pacific Islands 
Regiment {PIR) , was raised to administer the native infantry 
battalion s .  This headquarters had administrative , but no 
operational , control over the battalions . 3 0  A PIR training 
depot was established at Lae in March 1945 and 3NGIB was 
raised in August 1945 - too late to take part in the war . 
4NGIB was authorised in May 1945 but plans for its estab­
lishment were cancelled with the Japanese collapse . 3 1  
General Blarney had also approved the format ion of another 
nat ive unit , a Papuan Maintenance Company , Royal Australian 
Engineers , in order to save Australian manpower ,  but these 
plans were s crapped with the cessation o f  hostilit ies . 32 
Actual recruitment for the NGIB battalions during this 
period of rapid expans ion was greatly slowed by an acute 
shortag e of native labour.  This was caused by the heavy 
manpower demands of ANGAU , wartime dislocation and the 
inaccessibility to recruitment of the populous highlands 
region of the country . 3 3  
B y  the time o f  the Japanese surrender the units of PIR 
that had been ac tually engaged in operat ions - PIB , lNGIB 
and 2NGIB - had gained a considerable military reputation . 
They had taken part in every maj or campaign in PNG with the 
except ion of Milne Bay and had accounted for an impressive 
total o f  enemy dead at slight cost to themselves . 3 4 This 
performance won for the Papua New Guinean soldier a 
generally high regard as a brave and skilful j ungle fighter , 
espec ially adept in reconnaissance of enemy posit ions , 
anbushing and aggress ive long-rang e patrolling . For 
example the Commander of US 167 Infantry Regiment after the 
Tambu Bay/ Salamaua operat ions in 1943 wrote :  
30AWM , Blarney Papers ,  File 32-3 1 .  
3 1AWM, Blarney Papers , File 32-3 1  
32AWM , Blarney Papers ,  File 32-3 . Approved in July 1945 . 
33 AWM , Blarney Papers ,  File 32-3 1 .  
34PIR units were responsible for a to tal of 2209 enemy 
dead for the lo ss of only 63 Australian and PNG servicemen. 
That is for each member of PIR killed , PNG soldiers had 
killed 35 enemy soldiers . 23 individual . decorations for 
bravery were· awarded to PIR units during the war . See 
Granter , 197 0 : 13 .  
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The troops o f  our regimen t  • • •  have developed an 
unusual respect and admiration for their [ PIB] 
prowes s  and soldierly qualit ies • • •  Operating in 
twos and threes with our patrols and leading small 
units along the tracks , I feel that the PIB saved 
us many casualties and enabled us to move and obtain 
information in places which would have otherwise 
been inaccessible to European troops . 
The contribution of the PIR in the Bougainville campaign in 
1945 was described as follows : 
The PIR contributed in no small way to the success of 
op erat ions • • •  these native soldiers employed their 
int imate knowledge of the j ungle to surprise and 
outwit the Japanese and , using modern weapons , fought 
with characteristic bravery and inflic ted many 
casualties on the enemy (McQuinn , unpublished MS . ) .  
There were , nonetheless , some senior Aus tralian connnanders 
who were crit ical of PIR operational performance and who 
believed that native units were afraid of artillery and , 
generally , racially unsuited to set-piece types of military 
op erations , as opposed to patrolling tasks . 35  These views 
appear to have been effect ively countered by the success ful 
u se of the NGIB troop s in the Maprik area during 1945 in 
set-piece attacks employing artillery and mortar fire 
support (McQuinn , MS . ) .  It was argued by supporters of 
nat ive troops that most incidents of un satisfactory perform­
ance by the P IR unit s could usually be attributed to poor 
European leadership and , more impor tantly , the tactical 
misemployment of the native units in ' dribs and drabs ' in 
support of Australian units , rather than as complete unit s 
under the control o f  their own regimental officers . 
Whilst the operat ional capabilities and performance o f  
P I R  were the primary interest of the Australian field head­
quarters , it was the ill-dis cipline when out of the line and 
the relat ionship of the PNG soldier to the native population 
that commanded the attention of ANGAU . ANGAU was responsible 
for the administration of the civil populat ion in PNG and 
it was principally staffed by the native affairs officers of 
the prewar administration s .  It was , therefore , closely 
involved with the impac t of the PIR on the population and 
35nuring the Bougainville campaign 13 Brigade alleged that 
PIR troops feared artillery and would not accompany 
artillery forward observation o fficers on patrols 
(McQuinn , unpublished MS . ) .  
more concerned with the longer-term effects of the war on 
the postwar government o f  PNG than were other elements of 
the Australian Army in PNG . 
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It appears that ANGAU viewed the development of native 
military unit s with disquiet only until the formation o f  
3NGIB was mooted in early 1945 . This attitude changed in 
March 1945 when the GOC ANGAIJ , Maj or-General Morris , wrote 
to the GOC Fir st Australian Army , Lieutenant-General Sturdee, 
strongly crit icising the system of recruitment and 
inadequate training of PIR troops . To the letter , Morris 
appended a damaging report by his principal Native Affairs 
Adviser which called for the disbandment of PIR units . 36  
This report , by  Lieutenant-Colonel J . H .  Jones , listed 
numerous incidents o f  civil m isbehaviour by PIR troops . 
Jones argued that it was ANGAU's responsib ility to poin t  out 
the postwar implications o f  training natives as soldier s .  
' The maintenance o f  native battalions i s  wrong in principle 
• • •  
nat ives were not suffic iently developed mentally to be 
entrusted with a knowledge of modern weapons • • • Australia ' s  
task was not j ust to win the war but ensure the future 
welfare and advancement of Papua New Guineans ' .  Jones 
believed that the native units j eopardised these obj ectives . 
Unles s  disbanded , the PIR would encourage antagonism between 
the civil population and soldiers . This would lead to a 
loss o f  respect for law and order and serious postwar 
con sequences for orderly government . 3 7  
Jones was able t o  substantiate these charges with cons id­
erable evidence of conf lic t between the PIR and the Police 
at Annanberg in the Sep ik district in February 194538 and 
numerous incidents of rape and p illage by P IR troops in the 
Madang3 9  and Huon Gulf areas . An ANGAIJ investigation of 
complaints of PIB misbehaviour in the Madang area during the 
36AWM A2 663 , File 419 / 5 / 6 , Report by Maj or-General Morris 
to GOC First Australian Army , March 1945 . 
37 Ibid . Report by Lieutenant-Colonel J . H .  Jones . 
38 rbid . An Annanberg a platoon of lNGIB had f ired on a 
detachment of PNG police after a soldier had b een arrested 
for allegedly rap ing the wife of a policeman . The soldier 
was ' released ' and the police did no t return the army fire. 
It was alleged that NGIB Europeans in the area took no 
action to intervene in the affray . 
39rb id . Report by Maj or J . H. McDonald , Legal Officer , HQ 
ANGAIJ. 
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Lae-Ramu campaign (2 1 June - 4 Augus t 1944) found that 
hatives in the district were terrified of PIB men and 
several whole villages were afraid to sleep in their 
villages at night because of the numerous act s of rape , 
looting and assault commit ted by the P IR ' . 52 complaints of 
alleged rape were recorded. The inves tigat ing officer was 
informed by P IB that four soldiers had each been fined £1 by 
their Officer Conmanding for the of fence of rape and that no 
further action had been taken b ecau se the money had b een 
g iven to the husbands of the raped women and all were 
satisfied! In the Huon Gulf area Jones cited Maj or H . L . R. 
Niall who observed that the PIR had terrified villages and 
molested women in the Lae area in the latter half o f  1943 . 
Niall remarked ' The natives must [ sic] prefer to have the 
enemy in occupation as the women folk were then safe ' . 
General Sturdee replied in April 1945 to these allegations 
and Morris ' s  recommendat ions for the -PIR in terms which 
indicated a rather ruthles s approach to questions of native 
welfare . 40 S turdee conceded that the arming of nat ives 
would create po stwar problems for PNG but he cons idered 
that this burden would have to be borne in PNG , as it would 
be in other countries where fighting had taken place . PIR 
units had saved Australian lives and would prove economical 
for mopping-up operat ions . Sturdee observed,  cynically , 
that rape was no t peculiar to native soldiers and besides , 
in his view the allegat ions o f  misconduct were largely 
unproven . He did ' not regard the incidence of misbehaviour 
in P IR as unsat isfactory ' . 41 
This exchange between ANGAU and First Army clearly showed 
that ANGAU ' s  concern was based on the long-term postwar 
implicat ions of the PIR, whereas Sturdee and his staff were 
primarily occup ied , as might be expected in the case of a 
fight ing formation , with the j ob-at-hand of defeat ing the 
Japanese.  In 1973 , it was Maj or-General Morris ' s  
reco llect ion that ' First Army would have preferred to see 
fifty native casualties in order to save an Australian life ' .  
Consequently ,  ANGAU disagreed with First Army on the employ­
ment o f  native troops (personal connnunication , Sep t .  197 3 ) . 
Lieutenant-General Sturdee was apparently not concerned that 
a reputation amongst the local people for rape , pillage and 
disorder might be a dangerous basis on which to develop 
4oAWM , A2 663 , File 419 / 5 / 6 ,  Letter to GOC ANGAU from GOC 
First Au stralian Army , 2 Apr il 1945 . 
41Ib id . 
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postwar indigenous PNG military forces , nor was he concerned 
that P IR regimental o fficers appeared to treat the 
' indiscretions ' of their troops with a cons iderable measure 
of indulgence .  To First Army , P IR troops were merely a 
useful resource in defeat ing the enemy . 
At the end o f  hostilit ies , Maj or-General Morris and ANGAU 
returned once again to the quest ion of the disbandment of 
the PIR. During June/July 1945 there had been further 
serious problems of PIR ill-discipline and Morris believed 
that there were no longer operational imperat ives which 
j ustified the maintenance o f  the Regiment . After one 
serious incident at Jacquinot Bay , New Britain , elements of 
an NGIB battalion were d isarmed . A sub sequent inquiry 
revealed that the PIR did no t respect the police and held 
scant regard for the native population .  Morris drew 
att en tion to the adverse effect ' many hundreds of untrained 
nat ive sold iery were having [ sic] on the economic develop­
ment and life of PNG • • •  native memb ers of the NGIB continue 
to b e  a source of trouble and are becoming more and more 
arrogant in their bearing and b ehaviour ' .  The exist ing 
PIR unit s had ' got  off on the wrong foot ' .  If native unit s 
were required in p eace time then the correct course was for 
the unit s to be formed de nova . Morris believed that 
nat ive units could be succes sfully raised , provided that 
they received suitable training and were commanded by 
European officers who were able to inculcate adequate 
standards of discipline . 42 
In mit igat ion of P IR behaviour at this t ime it may be 
said that the PIR were gravely dissatisfied with their pay 
and cond it ions which compared invidiously with those of 
Australian servicemen . The disparity was seen to be unfair 
because P IR fought alongs ide Australian unit s and bore the 
same risks . Becau se they had fought alongside Europeans 
Papua New Guinean sold iers were less impressed by claims of 
European ' superiority ' . They wanted a better deal from 
their ' masters ' .  In addit ion , PIR troops during this period 
were at t imes poorly led by a fatigued and understrength 
European contingent in the battalions . 43 
42 AWM, A2 663 , File 419 /5 / 6 , Letter to GOC First Army from 
GOC ANGAU , 15 Sep t .  1945 . 
43ANGAU War Diary , July 1945 , AWM, A2 663 , File 419 /5 /6 , 
McQuinn , ms . and Long , 1963 : 2 62-5 . 
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General Morris ' s  arguments for the disbandment o f  the PIR 
finally won the day . Morris was informed by S turdee , after 
consultation with General Blamey , that the po stwar demobil­
isation of the PIR units would be delayed so that the 
standard o f  discipline and civic responsib ility in the PIR 
could first be raised to a sat is factory level before the 
soldiers were returned to village life . It  was argued that 
prompt d isbandment on the other hand would be likely to lead 
to the unrest which ANGAU feared . In this way , the ult imate 
disbandment of the PIR was accepted . 44 In January 1946 there 
was st ill a to tal of some 2 300 Papua New Guineans serving in 
the PIR ,  only slightly less than its peak strength o f  245 9 
in April 1945 , but demobilisat ion did take place later in 
194 6 .  HQ PIR was disbanded in June 1946 and the last nat ive 
troops had been demobilised and returned to their villages 
by the end of that year . 
The decision by the Army to disband these llllits was 
strongly supported by the first po stwar civil Administrator , 
Colonel J . K. Murray . In May 1 94 6 , Murray wrote to the 
Minister for Territories referring to rumours that the PIR 
would , after all , not be disbanded and sought his assurance 
that the decision to disband the PIR had not been reversed . 
Murray was told that there had b een no change o f  policy . 
Disbandment o f  the nat ive military units was a victory for 
those in ANGAU and elsewhere who saw native troops as a 
potentially dangerous , destab ilising and unruly element 
within indigenous PNG society . 45 The worrying record o f  PIR 
misbehaviour had made the ANGAU case for disbandment a 
persuas ive one in the po stwar period and furthermore , apart 
from the need to achieve postwar defence economies , there 
was no apparent defence threat to j ustify the maintenance o f  
the force. 4 6  I f  the need were t o  arise in the future it 
might be best if a fresh start were to be made , as had been 
recommended by Maj or-General Morris . 
44AWM, A2663 , File 419/5 / 6 .  
45Morris believed that mo s t  o f  the ANGAU Nat ive Affairs 
o fficers he spoke to during the war were opposed to the 
concept o f  nat ive military units (personal communication , 
Sept . 1973) . 
46 Although there may not have been a defence ' threat ' at 
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This review o f  the wartime PIR experience raises the 
quest ion of the contribut ion nat ive units made to the total 
war effort as well as the impact which these unit s had on 
the nat ion ' s  future . The military contribut ion to the Allied 
war effort by the PIR was minor but not insignificant . 
Taken with the contribut ions o f  those Papua New Guineans 
who served with the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB ) , the 
Police and as ANGAU workers , it forms the basis of a 
considerable tradition o f  national defence . 4 7  The war was , 
in effect , the first time that the people o f  Papua New 
Guinea had been organised and had reacted as a single 
nat ion . To some extent the PIR may be seen as a symbol o f  
an incipient nationalism and an early demonstrat ion o f  
cultural integrat ion in PNG. The potent ial benefits of 
the integrat ion which might have been obtained were limited 
during the war by the decis ion to segregate Papuan from New 
Guinean within the PIR and later by the decision to disband 
the force . The integration of Papuan and New Guinean within 
the same unit in the early days of the PIB had been seen as 
a pioneering success . A fo rmer European member of the PIR 
4 6 (continued) 
this t ime , B ritain had suggested a postwar role for 
indigenous Pacific Islands military and naval forces 
during 1944-45 . It was argued by the British that 
indigenous garrison troops would be able to contribute to 
their own territorial integrity and at the same time reduce 
Brit ish , Australian and New Zealanq defence costs  and 
manpower burdens . The Brit ish suggestion received a 
lukewarm response in Canberra and the issue was dropped 
(CAO , A989 , File 735/ 321/ 7 ) . 
47A total o f  4409 Papua New Guineans served in the military 
units o f  the PIR and AIB (1 31 were killed and 201 wounded) . 
A total o f  1100 were serving with the AIB in March 1945 
and it was estimated that this organisation had killed 
over 5 000 enemy s�ldiers in the course of it s operations 
behind the enemy ' s  lines and in contested areas . In all 
categories of assistance it was estimated that 49 , 500. 
Papua New Guineans had direct ly helped the Australian and 
Allied war effort in PNG. (CAO , MP729 , File 251/1 /1889 , 
Department o f  Army to Department of External Territories , 
8 Jan .  1946 and AWM Blarney Papers , File 5 6 : 2 , Allied 
Intelligence Bureau . ) 
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has writt en : 
An outstanding feature o f  the PIB had b een the way 
in which men from all parts of Papua and New Guinea 
had fought s ide by side • • •  Many of those who found 
themselves in action together had scarcely heard of 
one another ' s  places . Here was the earliest example 
of a unity which is today sought after and talked 
about , but no t yet achieved to the extent that it 
was by the soldiers of PIB (Barrett , 1969 : 4 9 5 ) . 
It is of course true that even in the PIB and NGIB unit s 
later in the war , which segregated Papuan from New Guinean , 
there was considerable intermixing of men from many 
Districts within each of the P IR unit s .  In April 1945 the 
ethnic composit ion of PIR was reported to be as follows : 
PaEua New Guinea 
Fly 128 Manus 2 2  
Moresby 58 Bougainville 3 9  
Tuf i 27  Madang 2 10 
Purari 47 New Britain 618 
Samarai 95 Moro be 65 
Mambare 188 Sep ik 517 
Lakekamu 253 New Ireland 18 
Trobriand Islands 31 Huon 146 
(McQuinn , ms . )  
Apart from the nat ionalist tradit ion which the PIR helped 
to establish during the war period , the PIR unit s also 
provided a cadre of experienced soldiers and NCOs which 
formed the basis of the postwar P IR battalion when it was 
re-established . This group was able to pass on some of the 
mil itary tradit ions which Papua New Guinean soldiers had 
established in war . In this way they formed a perhaps vital 
ingredient in the ethos of the postwar force . It is true 
nonetheles s  that the Papua New Guinean experience in the 
wartime PIR was clo sely linked with the Australians who 
served with them. The PIR was a typical colonial military 
force in which the ' black ' bayonets were led and controlled 
by Europeans and there were l imit s therefore to what Papua 
New Guinean soldiers could claim as their ' own '  trad it ion 
even within PIR. Both in training and operat ions cons ider­
able reliance was placed on the role of Australian officers 
and NCOs . There were PNG section commanders , platoon 
sergeants and company warrant officers ; however , there was a 
' counterpart system '  with both Aust ralian and PNG NCOs 
sharing responsib ilit ies at platoon level and above . All-
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Papua New Guinean sub-unit patrols were certainly sent out 
on operations and were o ften very successful . The PIR had 
at least shown the ability of men from the different areas 
of Papua and New Guinea to live and work together in a 
relatively harmonious manner .  
The wartime period o f  the P I R  was to prove signif icant in 
a further respect in the future development o f  indigenous 
force s .  The wartime units had been an integral part of the 
Australian Army and their native members were subj ect to 
Australian Military Regulat ions and Orders . 48 This 
precedent was followed in 1951 when the force was 
re-established , leading to later problems in PNG c ivil­
military relations . An alternative pattern of development 
might have been found in the prewar proposals for locally­
raised forces and, in particular , the proposal for the 
establishment o f  a Territories of Papua and New Guinea 
Defence Force . As it turned out , the postwar pattern o f  
military development in PNG was to b e  largely de termined by 
the past . Ano ther aspect of the history of wartime PIR 
units to reoccur later was the oppos it ion to native 
military units on the part o f  ANGAU officers which would 
re-emerge within both the Civil Administration in PNG and 
the Department of Territories . This postwar opposition to 
the PIR was , in large measure , based on the experience of 
the wartime PIR and it s disciplinary troubles . 
The postwar re-establishment 
and development o f  the PIR, 
1951-62 
In November 1950 Army Headquarters in Melbourne ordered 
the reactivation of the Pacific Islands Regiment as a single 
battalion force of the Australian Army . The first Papua New 
Guinean troops were enlisted in early 1951 and by August 
1952 the unit was up to it s full strength with a headquarters 
48 This issue was raised by GOC ANGAU in June 1944 . General 
Morris strongly represen ted to General Blarney that the PIR 
should be placed under local regulations similar to those 
controlling the constabulary , rather than remain under 
Australian Military Regulat ions . Blarney referred the 
matter to the Adj utant General but there was no change to 
the status of the PIR (AWM, Blarney Papers , File 32�31 , 
June 1944 ) . 
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and principal base at Taurama Barracks , Port Moresby on the 
former site of an Australian wartime General Hospital 
previous ly known as Eggys ' Corner . Company outstations were 
later to be es tablished in 1952 at Vanimo on the north coast 
adj acent to the Dutch/PNG border and in 1954 on Manus 
Island . The Manus Island outstation was later moved to 
Wewak in 1962 . 
Background to the re-es tablishment 
The Australian government ' s  decis ion to re-es tablish an 
indigenous military force in PNG was the result of increasing 
interes t  in the external and internal security of the 
region . There was concern at the time about the prospects 
o f  internal subvers ion within PNG and , within some quarters , 
a fear of PNG becoming a ' second Malaya • . 49  Australia was 
also influenced by heightened tension between a recently­
independent Indonesia and the Netherlands over the future 
of Du tch New Guinea (now Irian Jaya) . The problems of 
Indones ian/Dutch relat ions had apparently led to a fear of 
communist- , or Indones ian nat ionalist-inspired , subversion 
in PNG emanating from Dutch New Guinea . Thes e  views were 
to be s een in contemporary newspaper reports and articles 
and reflected in ministerial s tatement s .  
An article written in 1950 by Lieutenant-Colonel F . P . 
Serong (later Brigadier and an acknowledged counter­
insurgency warfare expert of the Vietnam war) provides an 
ind ication of the military view of the problem. Serong 
wrote : ' The weakness of the Du tch in New Guinea ,  the 
Comnrunist boil-over in Asia and the all too apparent 
ins tab ility of the Indonesian Government have caused grave 
concern among the res idents of Australian New Guinea ' .  He 
saw two dangers : the likelihood of communis t inf iltration 
from an Indonesian-held Wes t  New Guinea and the dangers of 
subversion o f  the nat ive population by the Chinese community 
within PNG , many elements of which , he claimed , were 
' s trongly communis t ' . The colonel proposed a battalion-
s trong force of nat ive troop s to seal the land border : 
49  
We visualis e an enemy whose immed iate obj ec t i� by 
entering across the land frontier or in small 
coastal ves sels , to contact and spread political 
disaffection among the nat ive peoples , with the 
See front page art icles in the SMH on 14 May and 6 Augus t  
1950 .  
ultimate aim of precipitating an uprising against 
the white population • • • 
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Colonel Serong concluded , however ,  that ' the first line of 
defence of Aus tralian New Guinea lies at the western end of 
Dutch New Guinea and the maintenance of the Dutch in their 
pos it ion by political action should be one of our maj or 
strategic aims ' ( Serong , 1950 : 7 , 9 , 15) . 
The view of the Au stralian government at this time was 
that PNG and indeed the whole of the New Guinea island was 
vital to Australian s ecurity and was the last ring of 
defence against aggression . The memory o f  the Japanese 
invasion of PNG was still fresh in Aus tralian minds .  The 
s trategically vital nexus between PNG and Australia , in the 
wake of World War II , was moreover common ground between the 
maj or Australian political parties . Speaking in relat ion to 
the United Nations Trus teeship granted to Aus tralia over New 
Guinea , Labor Prime Minis ter Chifley had observed in August 
1946 that : ' The territory of New Guinea • • •  is of such 
importance to the safety of this country that nothing but 
absolute control could be accepted by any Australian 
government ' ( Tomaset t i ,  1970 : 5 ,  quoting from CPD Vol. 188 , 7 
Aug . 194 6 , p . 3 853 ) . 
In March 1950 , S ir Percy Spender in a ministerial 
statement on foreign policy reaffirmed this view of New 
Guinea ' s  strategic importance . He told the House o f  
Representatives that the Liberal-Country Party government 
b elieved that New Guinea was an absolutely essential link in 
the chain o f  Australian defence and defence preparat ions in 
PNG would s erve Aus tralian s ecurity interests as well as 
those of the people of PNG ( see Spender , 1972 : 3 20) . 
In this environment of fear o f  subversion and a belief in 
the nexus between the defence of PNG and the Australian 
mainland the government on 1 June 1950 announced its defence 
plans for PNG. Approval had b een given for the formation o f  
a PNG Division of the RAN ,  A European unit , open to 
vo lunt eers o f  both territories , would be re-formed as the 
Papua New Guinea Volunteer Rifles (PNGVR) and the establish­
ment of a native regiment as a part of the Australian 
Military Forces was also under consideration . The Minister 
for Territories added : ' It is most important that the 
Territories should be kep t free of subversive influences , 
and s teps will be taken by legislation and otherwise to see 
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that they are no t exposed t o  this menace ' . 50  
The PIR battalion was react ivated without a sub sequent 
announcement in Parliament . In PNG the decision to form the 
battalion was generally welcomed by the Civil Administration 
and the expatriate connnunity , although with some reservation� 
Some leading Europeans in PNG were still sceptical about the 
value of native troops and the memories of the d isciplinary 
problems in the PIB and NGIB were still fresh in the minds 
o f  old Papua New Guinea hands . In part icular there was 
concern that the PIR would fos ter dangerously liberal and 
disrup tive racial relat ionship s between Papua New Guinean 
and Aus tralian soldiers . Some expatriates saw the wartime 
spirit of mateship and the ' elder brother/younger bro ther ' 
type o f  relationship which suffused dealings between 
Australian and PNG servicemen as seriously undermining the 
tradit ional mas ta/boi relationship of the postwar period -
which many believed could now be re-established . There was 
also lo cal concern that , becau se the PIR would be officered 
by Australian Army officers , they would no t be suf ficiently 
expert in what was seen as the highly eso teric bus ines s  o f  
' handling natives ' 5 1  
Problems of development 
With the re-establishment of the PIR there appears to 
have b een no considerat ion of  it s forming the nucleus of the 
defenc e force of a future independent nation .  Rather , the 
P IR was s een as an adj unc t to Aus tralia ' s  defence capacity 
and as the first line of Aus tralian defence in PNG . It was 
of course unlikely at that t ime that the PIR would have been 
seen in any other terms . The ultimate future of the 
territories had not been determined and political independ­
ence lay in the far distant future ; if at all . 
5oP . C. Spender , in Commonweal th Parliamen tary Debate s (CPD) , 
Vol . 208 , 1 June 1950 , p . 3652 . 
5 1The first Officer Connnanding of the new unit was thoroughly 
briefed by the PNG Adminis tration and expatriate civilians 
on the need to maintain ' correct ' racial relat ionships . 
For example , he was advised no t to allow his European NCOs 
to unload s tores at the wharf because of the ' poor ' 
example it would create in front o f  black Papua New 
Guineans {personal communication , Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. J .  
Shields , 4 Dec .  1973 ) . 
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The roles allocated to the reactivated PIR batt alion 
re flected the experience that had been gained from the 
employment of PIR unit s during war , as well as reflecting 
the belief that PIR would , as before , operate as part of a 
larger Aus tralian force . One o f  the peacetime roles lis ted 
for the PIR battalion clearly d id take account of the contem­
porary fear of subversion and internal disorder . The PIR 
was to assist the civil administration to maintain law and 
order if it b ecame necessary . 52  
During the 1950s and until 1962 , the PIR underwent a 
gradual process of consolidat ion . Younger and better 
educated soldiers were trained for more specialised j obs 
within the battalion such as clerks , storemen and signaller� 
At the same time PNG NCOs developed in experience and abil ity 
and the unit slowly improved its standard of training and 
efficiency as a military organisation . The number of Papua 
New Guineans in it gradually increased from 390  in June 
1952 to 695 by June 1963 . 53 
There were , however ,  serious setbacks to this development 
caused by ill-discipline . Significant inc idents of disorder 
took place within PIR in 1952 , 1957 and 1961 which involved 
questions concerning the degree of tribal integrat ion within 
PIR and the extent to which PNG soldiers were amenable to 
military discipline under the cond itions of  peacet ime 
soldiering . 
In December 1952 about twenty Kerema soldiers were 
discharged from the Army after brawling with New Guinean 
sold iers at Taurama Barracks . Iron bars , sharpened stakes , 
bayonets and barbed wire 'whip s ' were confiscated after the 
fight ing.  The Keremas believed that they were being treated 
52 see To Find a Path, The History of the PIR., no author , 
unpublished lPIR unit precis . The roles of the units 
were listed as follows : 
In Peace . Patrolling . To provide a basis on which 
other units could be formed . If required , to as sist 
the civil adminis tration to maintain law and order . 
In War . Garrison duty and advisory unit to unit s 
from the mainland of Australia . Fighting as a unit 
to delay the enemy . Medium range reconnaissance 
fight ing in Company sub-units in all phases of war . 
53see Defence Report Z9 7 3 , Table 1. By 1962 the Aust ralian 
component o f  PIR was 7 4  officers and NCOs . 
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unfairly by the Europeans within the unit and , in turn , some 
Europeans who had war time New Guinea Infantry Battalion 
experience believed that the Kerema soldiers (Papuans)  were 
arrogant , untrustworthy troublemakers .  In another view the 
origin of the d isorder lay in the divis ions amongst the 
European staff between the old PIB and NGIB hands and the 
younger of ficers (personal comnrunicat ion , Dec . 1972 ) . A 
report completed af ter the inc ident observed that further 
disturbances would cont inue to occur until dis cipline and 
espri t de corps overcame tribal affiliations . The report 
rej ected the idea of banning Keremas from PIR in the 
future . 5 4 
Kerema soldiers were again the principal par ticipants in 
another serious incident of ill-d iscipline in 1957 . On 
Sunday , 15 December , two hundred soldiers marched on Koki 
market from Taurama . The raid , which had been launched 
without the knowledge of  any of  the European staf f , was 
intended as a reprisal by Kerema soldiers and others on a 
group of  civilian Keremas who had beaten up PIR soldiers 
(and the Australian Reg imental Sergeant Maj or who had gone 
to their assistance )  the previous afternoon at the market .  
The soldiers ' rampage through Koki and and adj oining Badil i 
villages was eventually quelled by Aust ralian officers and 
NCOs and loyal PNG NCOs . In the sequel to this incident , a 
civil court convened at Taurama Barracks the following day 
to  try the off enders was overturned in uproar by sold iers 
outraged at the severity of a sentence handed down by the 
magistrate.  Eventually , 154 soldiers were punished , 15 
were discharged from the Army , whilst only 4 were 
subsequently convicted of rioting and imprisoned by the PNG 
Supreme Cour t . 55  
5 41PIR Archive Files , 1953 .  
55 1PIR Unit Archive File . The decision to hold the civil 
trial at Taurama was unwise.  Inadequate precautions were 
taken to maintain order and , in add ition , the proceedings 
were a travesty of j ust ice which incited the soldiers to 
take action . Charges were no t read out ,  defendants were 
tried in group s of twenty and the cour t proceedings were 
conduc ted in the English language which was not fully 
understood . Following the overthrowing of the magistrat� s 
court , 7 1  soldiers were tried for contempt of  court ; of  
these , 60 were commit ted for tr ial before the Supreme 
Court for riot ing . In the trial before Justice Go re , 
only 4 were subsequently convic ted . Just ice Gore 
commented that the incident was an outrageous and 
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In January 1961, after a series of incident s concerned 
with dissatis fact ion over pay and other rumours , some eighty 
soldiers left Taurama in order to march to Bomana civil 
gaol , to demonstrate for the release of seven r ing leaders 
in a pay dispute who had b een arrested earlier , or be gaoled 
with them .  The military demonstrators broke through a force 
of one hundred police en route , at Boroko . The d isturbance 
was eventually quelled and a number of soldiers were sent to 
Bomana to j o in those previously arrested .  Forty-five 
sold iers , mainly younger men from the New Guinea Islands 
districts , were later d is charged from the Army as a result 
of this inciden t . 56 
The 1957 and 1961 incident s both generated cons iderable 
reac tion in PNG amongst the Administration and European 
population , and in Australia at the polit ical and defence 
planning levels . Af ter the 1957 riot the PNG Administration 
called for clo ser liaison between the civil administrat ion 
and the PIR,  and the lengthening of the tours of duty of 
Aus tralian officer s  with the P IR. 57  
55 (continued ) 
alarming af fair and the sold iers had arrogated to them­
selves a pos it ion above the c ivil authority . The Jud ge 
testily observed that ' the Crown had no t been fortif ied in 
its efforts to get convict ions by the Army ' . 
5 61PIR Unit Archive File . A pay rise had been promised and 
long await ed .  At this t ime a new civil ian labour award o f  
twenty shillings per week was announced . In the soldiers ' 
view their own seven shillings per week compared very 
unfavourably . Bes ides this aspect , there was discontent 
over inequality with Australian rates of pay , pay being 
received monthly rather than fortnightly , the absence of a 
pension scheme , and a rumour o f  opposit ion , led by padres , 
to the introduction of soft mattresses for the indigenous 
troops . The discontent smouldered during the normally 
inact ive New Year period ; the command ing officer learnt of 
' strike ' plann ing and incarcerated seven of the leaders in 
an attempt to prevent such act ion . 
57 PNG Nat ional Archives , ADS , File 1/17 /1. At the t ime of 
the riot the Ac ting Administrator (Mr J . T .  Gunther) 
recommended that an experienced PNG Administration officer 
be appointed to command the P IR. ( This proposal was not 
pursued . )  Gunther considered that the PNG Administration 
should be given a larger responsib ility in regard to the 
Force ' s  developmen t .  
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The non-o ffic ial European reaction in PNG to the 1957 and 
1961 inc idents was alarmist and host ile to the PIR. In 1957 
the Port Moresby Advisory Counc illors called for the removal 
o f  PIR from the Port Moresby town area and salutary 
' showing-the-flag ' vis its by Australian troop s .  Another 
propo sal , which was subsequently rej ected by the Council , 
called for the matching of PIR, man for man , by Austral ian 
troops , ' b ased on the Brit ish experience in India ' (Courier , 
3 0  Dec . 1957 ) . In 1961 there was another call for the 
matching of indigenous unit s  with Australian troops whilst 
ano ther group of  expatriates called for the disbandment of 
PIR and the strengthening of the Police . 58  
After the 1961  incident which was viewed more seriously 
by the Adminis tration b ecau se of the public con flict with 
the Police , Mr J . T . Gunther , as Acting Administrator , again 
called for the appointment of  an experienced Native Affairs 
officer as Cormnanding Of ficer of the PIR. Gunther informed 
the Army that ' some senior , experienced Administration 
officers recormnend that the unit be disbanded and started 
anew 1 . 5 9  The Army agreed to the appointment of  a Civil 
Administrat ion off icial as temporary liaison o ff icer to the 
PIR and his report of the incident was st rongly crit ical of 
the Australian Army ' s  administrat ion of  the PIR. 
Many people have been living in a ' fools parad ise ' 
by thinking that the troop s o f  PIR have b een fully 
and completely indoctrinated with that vital 
soldierly quality of complete and instant obed ience 
to the orders of  a superior officer . 
That sort o f  d iscipline which is mental dis cipl ine 
rather than a physic al one can only be achieved in 
troops whose background and environment makes them 
sus cep t ible to such restraints • • •  
Within the PIR we are dealing with men who have no 
warrior trad it ion whatever . The ext ent of their 
fight ing lay in the treacherous sneak at tack , or 
5 8south Pacific Pos t , 6 Jan .  1961 and Radio 9PA News Tran� 
s crip t 13 Jan . 1961 on lPIR Un it Archive File . The Kokopo 
Town Advisory Council , on the Gazelle Peninsula , moved a 
mo tion suggesting to the Administrator that the PIR be 
d isbanded . 
59PNG National Archives , ADS , File 1/ 17 / 1 , Acting 
Administrator to Secretary , Dep artment of Territories , 
7 Dec . 1961 . 
in some s imulated battle in connection with tribal 
or clan ceremonial • • •  
Many of the present European members of PIR have 
had little or no experience of Native cond it ions 
here , nor of the men whom they have to control • • •  
The above adds to the urgent necess ity of re­
evaluat ing the disciplinary and training methods 
that are used with the P IR • • •  
Their prof iciency and skill at arms , drill and 
j ungle craft is not in doub t .  It is in the civil 
responsibilit ies and disciplines of a soldier that 
they will re�uire the most careful and concentrated 
instruct ion . 0 
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Both these incidents exposed a serious lack of profession­
alism in the military administration of the PIR. As a 
result o f  the 1957 affair certain policy changes were 
instituted . In future greater emphasis was to be placed on 
contact between officers and men , native customs were more 
keenly s tudied by European officers and Europeans in the 
battalion were required to master Pidgin , the unit l ingua 
franca . A new policy of selecting younger , bet ter suited 
offic ers for service with PIR was also adopted . 61 
The 1961 incident led to a more wide-ranging review of 
the future of the PIR. The Commanding Off icer of the 
battalion reported that independence for PNG was now being 
discussed and he called for the commis sioning o f  PNG 
off icers who could contribute to a stable PNG that was well 
disposed towards Australia . He argued that it would be 
wrong to cons ider the PIR purely as a milit ary unit without 
recognising the wide polit ical and social ramifications of 
armed forces in newly independent states . 
This view of the future importance of the P IR evoked a 
sympathetic respons e in Australian defence circles . It was 
believed that it wae now time to take stock of military 
pol icy in PNG. PIR would be a vital element in the future 
of the country with a tremendous potential for good and a 
stable influence in a young coun try struggling with the 
problems of self-government . The PIR could become a 
training ground for national leaders in PNG and the country 
60 rbid . Report by Mr M. B . B .  Orken , Acting Dist rict Office r ,  
Rabaul and Liaison Off icer t o  P I R ,  24  Dec .  1961 . 
611P IR Archive File. 
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would benefit from the influence of former soldiers when 
they returned to their village homes . 
This rather uncritical att itude towards the contribution 
of the PIR and a future ' PNG Army ' to the stab ility of PNG 
begged quest ions about the potentially negative contributions 
o f  any army to polit ical stability through interference in 
the polit ical system. This issue was not taken up by the 
Army which believed that the P IR' s previous disciplinary 
problems had largely been the result o f  poor condit ions of 
servic e and inevitable ' growing pains ' .  It was believed 
that sound development policies in the future would ensure 
that the Army in PNG made a positive contr ibution to the 
nation ' s stability . 62 For this reason there is an 
increasing emphasis by the Army after 1961 on improving all 
aspects of service conditions in the PIR, ranging from pay 
to dres s , equipment and rations . These improvements in 
condit ions of service were to occur within the Army in PNG 
at a tempo which outpaced improvements in the condit ions of 
the PNG Police . This pattern of development , which was 
accentuated with the rapid infus ion o f  defence funds during 
the ' Confrontation build-up ' ,  conflicted with the under­
stand ing reached at the time of the re-es tablishment of the 
PIR that there would be parity between Police and Army 
condit ions in order ' to pres erve the economic b alance o f  the 
nat ive community ' , and produced d isparit ies which exist to 
this day . 
The considerable pro fes sional interest of the Australian 
Army leadership in the PIR' s development , more pronounced 
in certain officers , was probably the result of the personal 
exper ience which many officers had in PNG during the war .  
The years o f military service which most 8enior officers had 
spent in PNG during war with Japan generated a greater 
degree of interest than in many other sect ions of the 
Australian community in the future of PNG as a na tion . The 
interest in PNG ' s future was complemented by a professional 
interest in contemporary political events of Africa , as seen 
from a military perspec tive . It was understandable that the 
military , who have been seen as a profes sional group who 
t radit ionally emphasise the repetit ive nature of history and 
what can be learnt from it , wou ld turn to the con tempo rary 
examples of decolonisat ion in Afric a  ( see Huntington , 
1957 : 7 9 ) . It might be said , therefore , that whilst many 
Australians involved in the development of PNG still saw the 
62 Army Headquarters Memorandum of 2 Feb . 1961.  
country ' s  pattern of futu re development as sui generis, it 
was in the nature of the military ' s  approach to see PNG ' s 
fu ture in terms of the political change in Africa and 
elsewhere . 
It is no t surpr is ing therefore that Army planning for 
the future in PNG tended to outstrip the tempo of change 
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in other government sectors and anticipated the actual 
course of development of the Force in PNG after 1962 as a 
result of Indonesian Confron tat ion policies . In 1960 the 
newly appointed Commander o f  the PNG Military District was 
invit ed to prepare plans for the future development o f  his 
Force and he was later given the task of designing the shape 
of an eventual PNG Army based on a three-battalion force . 
The resultant plans called for a br igade group force to be 
developed from the PIR nucleus within either five or eight 
years from the commencement of expans ion . It was envisaged 
that the ' PNG Army ' would be based on austere scales of 
equipment and accommodat ion suited to the economic resources 
and stage of development of the country .  These 1962 
proposals went forward to Army Headquarters and provided a 
bas is for subsequent de fence planning in PNG , but in the 
rapid expans ion of PNG ' s  defence forces after 1963 it is 
evident that the thrust of this early report towards 
simpl icity , economy and military austerity was overlooked 
(personal communication , 25 Nov. 1973 ) . 
Although Army planning for the long-term future o f  the 
Army in PNG awaited strategic imperatives before it was 
implemented , other practical development measures were 
init iated . In particular , there was increased emphasis 
placed on the training of Papua New Guineans to replace 
Australian servicemen . Af ter 1961 it was decided to pursue 
the localisation of senior NCOs within PIR with greater 
vigour . Even so this took time and it was not until 1965 
that the first PNG warrant off icers were appointed . 63 
Progress was also slow in the training of PNG officers . In 
August 1960 the Military Board decided that suitably 
qualif ied Papua New Guineans should be commis sioned as 
Aust ralian Army officers for service in the PIR, but it was 
not until January 1963 that the first two PNG cand idates 
commenced training at the Officer Cadet S chool , Portsea in 
63until 1965 the senior NCOs served as Top Sergeant 
understud ies to Australian warrant officers . 
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Victoria . 64 This delay was due to  the lack o f  educationally 
qualified volunteers as well as some measure of adminis­
trative inact ion . As will be seen later , the failure to 
produce adequate numbers of officers in these early years 
led to a shortage of experienced local officers able to 
replace Australians at the senior level in the present day 
PNG Defence Force . 
Although the Army ' s  att itude to the prospec ts of change 
in PNG and the need to plan for the future might be described 
as ' realistic ' ,  it also seems clear that the Army continued 
to see the PIR as very much an adj unct to Aust ralia ' s  
military capability , in both peace and war . The Australian 
milit ary ' s  po stwar experience with the PIR had confirmed 
its earlier respect for the effectivenes s of PNG troops in 
cer tain roles . At the same t ime this experience tended to 
confirm some of the earlier cultural prej udices . In 1962 
the PIR Commanding Officer was ordered by Army Headquarters 
to report on the capabilities of the PIR soldier for a 
study which was being conducted by the Department of Defence 
on the future role of the PIR. His report highlight ed the 
problems within the Army of the transit ion from a tradit ional 
to a westernised society . Australian praise o f  the military 
skills of the PIR soldier as a j ungle fighter was unstinting; 
the limitations of the PNG soldier were seen , principally , 
in cultural terms : 
In his present stage of development , the Pacific 
Islander i s  a simple soldier .  With a few 
except ions in the unit at p resent , he is close to 
his primit ive tradit ions . Because of the limited 
service of the native only a thin veneer separates 
the soldier and the villager in him. He requires 
leadership at all times • • •  Soldiers are st ill 
apprehensive of the lo cal wit chdoctor or sp iritman 
even after 15 years service • • •  
[ In terms of ] fight ing ability • • •  It would be in 
these types of operations - haras sing operations , 
guerrilla type operations and delaying operations -
64Austra Zia in Facts and Figures� No . 7 2 ,  Dec . 1961 . These 
two , E . R. Dire and B . P .  Lowa , later became the two most 
s enior PNG officers in the PNG Defence Force , having 
graduated as Second Lieutenants in December 1963 . In 
September 197 5  Dire was appointed Defence Force Commander 
in the rank of brigadier-general . Lowa res igned from the 
Defence Force earlier in 1975  as a colonel . 
that the maximum value of the PI as a soldier would 
be obtained . His skill at swift movement over long 
distances , over rugged coun try , concealment , sense 
of d irection and self-sufficiency would be best 
brought out in these operation s .  His - ability to 
live off the land and endure hardship s of exposure 
and a long time in the j ungle gives him a decided 
advantage over the European soldier . 65  
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The observat ion of the Papua New Guinean sold ier during 
training and especially dur ing arduous ' showing-the-flag ' 
patrolling o f  the PNG inter ior produced a considerable 
measure of profess ional respect amongst Australian officers 
for the PNG soldier . At this t ime the PIR maintained a busy 
program of pat rolling in addit ion to it s routine training 
act ivit ies . These pat rols frequently involved feats of 
physical hardship and endurance . In 1962 the PIR reported 
that a total of twelve patrols ,  each of platoon strength 
and not less than one month ' s  duration , had b een moun ted 
dur ing the previous twelve-month period . Four of these 
patrols had been along the PNG/Dutch border .  The growing 
mil itary repute of the PIR also  seems to have led to 
incipient not ions amongst the military and others that , at 
least for the present , the PIR was the ' Australian Gurkha ' ,  
guarding Aust ralia ' s strategic frontier .  This att itude may 
even have been an underlying factor in the dec isions taken 
to expand the PNG forces in 1963 as a result of Confrontat ion. 
PNG forces were , af ter all , economical to maintain as well 
as being conveniently located . At least this approach to 
PNG defence forces may b e  seen to be symbolically 
rep resented in the regimental af filiat ion which took place 
between the PIR and a Brit ish Gurkha regiment during the 
early part of the period . 66 Arguments for the expans ion of 
the PIR were , however ,  soon to be effec tively reinforced by 
the events in Indonesia and the cons equent de fence threat 
which was seen to both PNG and Australia . 
65Letter of 4 April 1962 . Pacific Islander (PI)  is (and 
was still in January 197 4 )  official Defence terminology 
for indigenous Papua New Guinean servicemen . 
66The P IR became ' affiliated ' with 7 th Duke of Edinburgh ' s  
Own Gurkha Rifles in November 1954 . Exchanges of officers 
for tours of duty with the affiliated regiment have taken 
place s ince 1962 . 
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Indonesian confrontation and the expansion 
of the PNG Army , 1962-69 
In December 1961 Indonesia intensified its long-stand ing 
campaign to gain Dutch West New Guinea when Pres ident 
Sukarno issued his connnand for the liberat ion of West Irian 
by force . The Indonesian mili tary and diplomatic o ffensive , 
ass is ted by American diplomat ic intervent ion , was eventually 
to lead to success for the Indonesian claims . In August 
1962 an agreement between the Dutch and Indonesians provided 
for the trans fer of Wes t  Irian to Indonesian administrative 
control by May 1963 after a brief p eriod of United Nations 
interregnum . 67 
Indonesian success and Du tch capitulation in this issue 
produced concern in Australia and in greater measure within 
PNG about fu ture Indones ian military intent ions towards 
Papua New Guinea . Indonesia ' s apparent appetite for 
territorial expansion and a generally bellicose foreign 
policy generated anxiety amongst both Aus tralian residents 
in PNG and tho se Papua New Guineans who took an interes t in 
such matters . There was thus a gathering interest within 
PNG about Aus tralia ' s  future p lans for PNG and especially 
about arrangements for the de fence of PNG against the 
possibility of Indonesian aggression . 
In an attemp t  to dispel the unease about security matters 
in PNG the Minis ter for Territories , Mr P . M. C . Hasluck , in a 
speech delivered in Port Moresby in September 1962 , assured 
PNG residents that PNG would be de fended as if it were part 
of the Australian mainland . Hasluck emphas ised that this 
undertaking had been cleared by Prime Minister Menz ies 
p ersonally . He added that PNG was included within the scope 
of the ANZU S treaty which guaranteed Austral ia powerful 
allies in the event of aggres sion . 68 
67 see Has ting s ,  1969 : 22 1-39.. Indonesian sovereignty over 
West Irian under the terms of the 1962 Agreement was to be 
finally determined by an ' Act of Free Choice ' to .be 
supervised by the United Nat ions before the end of 1969 . 
68Hasluck , 1962 . The ANZUS trea ty , con cluded in Sep tember 
1951 , spec ifically included Papua and New Guinea and unlike 
SEATO , was not limited to ' Communist Aggression ' in it s 
coverage . In 1963 the US Under-Secretary of S tate for 
Political Affairs , Mr Averell Harriman was to publicly 
affirm that PNG was included under the terms of ANZUS 
(Watt , 1967 : 134) . 
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The Minister ' s  speech had, been des igned t o  allay fears within 
PNG and demonstrate Australian preparednes s  to meet with 
force any Indones ian military activit ies directed against 
PNG. The military preparations by which Australia . might 
actually fulfil such a commitment were rather slower in 
eventuating.  The decision to increase the size o f  military 
forces deployed within PNG was no t announced until mid-1963 . 
The expansion of indigenous mil itary forces in PNG 
In May 1963 the Aus tralian Prime Minister , Sir Robert 
Menzies , announced that the size of the P IR would be doubled 
from its strength of about seven hundred , consistent with 
adequate training and equipment . He added that when this 
had been implemented , further developments would be 
considered . Menzies no ted earlier in his speech : 
It certainly cannot be stated that we have entered a 
period of stability in the area of immediate 
strategic concern to Aus tralia • • •  We have made this 
recent review in the light o f  our treaty arrangement s ,  
but particularly in reference to the security o f  our 
own country and of the territories of Papua and New 
Guinea . We will defend these territories as if they 
were part of our mainland ; there must be no mistaken 
ideas about that . 69  
In an election-eve speech in the House of Representatives 
in October of the same year , the Leader of the Oppos it ion , 
Mr A. A. Calwell , announced Labor ' s  de fence policy for Papua 
New Guinea if it were to win the election . Labor ' s  policy 
indicated a willingnes s  to more than match the government ' s  
defence expansion plans for PNG : 
We will raise the strength o f  the Pacific Islands 
Reg iment in New Guinea , which the government 
estimates to be only seven hundred strong.  I have 
b een asking the Minister for the Army for the last 
ten years to raise the st rength of this Regiment 
to at least two battalions . We will raise it to 
brigade strength and later to a battle group of six 
thousand men . We will guarantee the territorial 
integrity of Papua and New Guinea with something 
69 sir Robert Menzies , CPD, H o f  R, Vol . 38 ,  22  May 1963 , pp . 
1669-71 ,  Ministerial Statement : Defence Review. The 
Prime Mini ster also announced plans to develop Boram air­
field , Wewak , for defence purposes . 
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more than words . 7 0  
By November 1964 , the Menzies government had virtually 
accepted Labor ' s  plans for a brigade-size force in PNG. In 
a minis terial statement the Prime Minis ter argued that there 
had been a deterioration in Australia ' s  strategic posit ion -
partly as a consequence of recent Indonesian policies . The 
government believed that , in regard to Indonesia , Australia 
must prepare for all eventualities includ ing the control an� 
if necessary , defence of the front ier b etween West New 
Guinea and PNG . Menz ies stated that in the existing 
strateg ic s ituation the government attached a high priority 
to the strengthening of PIR. Accordingly , the government 
would proceed with a plan to increase the strength of the 
PIR to three battalions and supporting units - a total 
approaching 3500 men - by June 1968 . At the same time a 
£1 2 mill ion building program was announced for the con­
struction of barracks , workshop s ,  engineering services and 
married quarters . 71  Apart from the Army build-up , the 
formation o f  a PNG coastal security force was announced . 
The force was to consist o f  five p atrol boats and its role 
would be the surveillance of PNG ' s  shores and rivers . In 
addit ion there would be an airfield building and up grading 
program designed to improve PIR mobility in the border area 
and p ermit the use of Mirage type aircraft in PNG . 7 2  
The implementation of this ambitious program of defence 
expansion , which was explained largely in terms of Australian 
security interes ts , proceeded gradually over the next 
several years . Practical limits to manpower expans ion 
within the Army were experienced . There were limitations on 
training resources , a lack of barracks and a shortage of 
Papua New Guinean leadership as a result of the expans ion of 
what had been a small force . This problem was compounded by 
the lo s s ,  at about this t ime , o f  many of the older 
experienced war time PNG NCOs and this may have contributed 
to several further incidents of group disobedience by PNG 
servicemen during the period b etween 19 66 and 1969 . These 
inc idents were principally concerned with pay and were non-
7 0  A. A. Calwell , CPD., H of R,  Vol. 40 , 22 Oct . 1963 , p . 2071 .  
7 1sir Robert Menzies , CPD., H o f  R ,  Vol. 44 , 10  Nov.  1964 , 
pp . 27 15-24 , Minis terial Statement : De fence Review . 
Nadzab was to be extended for Mirage use ,  Daru was to be 
extended and ' smaller airstrip s  between Boram and Daru 
brought to a higher standard ' .  
7 2rbid . 
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violent , having more the character of ' industrial action ' . 
Nonetheless they provided further grounds for the criticism 
o f  the force by its opponents in PNG. There were sit-down 
s trikes over pay in Decemb er 1966 at Murray Barracks and in 
April 1966 at lPIR. In 1967  a company of 2P IR ' sat down ' 
over a dispute with their o fficer s .  In Septemb er 1969 2 7 0  
soldiers failed to parade for work at Murray Barracks , Port 
Moresby, because of long-standing complaints over pay .  In 
this inc ident there were some attemp ts by the strike ring 
leaders to co-ordinate their activities with soldiers in 
other locations but they were unsucces sful . Sixty-two 
sold iers were dismissed from the Army as a result o f  the 
incident . In the aftermath it was evident that many of 
those involved had no t b een aware of the seriousness and 
inappropriatenes s of a military s trike compared to an 
indus trial s trike . 
There was also the problem o f  generating a more complex 
infrastruc ture of technical and support units for the force . 
This required new skills and higher levels of educat ion 
amongst the PNG soldiers . Previou sly the technical and 
support needs of the one battalion of PIR had been relatively 
simple and they had generally b een met either from within 
the unit ' s  resources or from Au stralia . 
By 1968 the s trength of the Army in PNG had risen from a 
strength of 695  in 1963 when the original decis ion had b een 
made to double the Force to a total of 2406 officers and 
men (Defence Report , 1973 ) . Some $40 million dollars had 
been spent on the cons truction of five self-contained modern 
barrack areas : Taurama , Murray and Gold ie River Barracks 
in the Port Moresby area , Igam Barracks in Lae and Moem 
Barracks in Wewak. $3 mill ion had also been spent on the 
upgrading of refuelling and support facilit ies at the RAN 
base at Manus Island which had b een developed as the PNG 
patrol boat base ( see Lynch , 1969 : 22 ,  and Mediansky , 
1970 : 3 8) . 
The Army in PNG in 1969 was organised as follows . The 
force was controlled by Headquarters PNG Command lo cated at 
Murray Barracks , Port Moresby . The connnander of the force 
was a brigadier , responsible directly to the Military Board 
in Canberra . 7 3  The maj or units were : lPIR lo cated at 
73PNG Command was formed in 1965 . Up until 1963 , PNG was 
known as 8 Military District and connnanded by a 
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Taurama Barracks ; 2PIR at Moem Barracks Wewak , with one 
company outstation at Vanimo ; a training depot at Goldie 
River Barracks , near Port Mo resby ; the PNGVR battalion 
(open to PNG volunteers as well as Europeans since 1964 , it 
was about five hundred strong and had six maj or training 
centres ) ;  a b attalion o f  school cadet s ;  an engineer con­
s truct ion squadron ; a signals squadron ; and various adminis­
trative , supply , ordnance and repair unit s necessary to 
support the force . 
In regard to naval development , the PNG Division o f  the 
RAN by June 1969 consisted of 7 Papua New Guinean o f ficers 
and 1 30 sailors at the Manus I sland base and under training 
in Australia . There were in addition 48  PNG sailors who had 
been enlisted in an earlier period with lower educat ional 
standards .  There was a total o f  33 PNG sailors serving at 
sea with the patrol boat squadron . The se boat s  were all 
commanded by Australian officers and they also had 
Australian sailors filling specialist and senior billet s . 74 
The exp ansion of the force in PNG sharply increased the 
requirement for Papua New Guinean of ficers and this subj ect 
received considerable attention . 7 5 By October 1968 , 
although defence p lanning had shown a requirement for over 
300 PNG officers by 1984 , there were still only six PNG 
o f ficers serving with the PIR and a fur ther s ix cadets 
undergo ing training in Australia . The principal reason for 
7 3  (continued) 
lieutenant-co lonel .  In that year the connnand was upgraded 
to a Military Area Headquarters . Both the Military 
District and Military Area commanders were responsible to 
the General Officer Commanding , Northern Command , lo cated 
in Brisbane . The new command arrangement from 19 65 , 
giving the PNG Commander d irect access to the Military 
Board , indicated the increased importance o f  the PNG 
force s .  
74Defence Report 1968 , p . 24 .  The first PNG Division patrol 
boat , HMAS Aitape , was commissioned in November 19 6 7 ; the 
fifth boat arrived in March 1969 to comp lete the Squadron . 
(Aus tra lia in Facts and Figures , No . 9 6 ,  Dec . 19 6 7  and 
No . 101 , Mar . 1969 . )  
7 5PNG Nat ional Archives , A82 , File 8-1-8 , Letter from 
Dep artment of the Army to Secretary , Department o f  
Territories , 1 5  May 196 7 .  
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this lack of progress was the shortage of educationally 
qualified volunteers able successfully to complete the 
Portsea training.  In an attempt to solve this problem the 
Army established a Military Cadet School (MCS)  in mid-1968 
to prepare candidates educat ionally for officer training
.
in 
Australia. 76 It  was no t until the p eriod 19 70-72 ,  however , 
that the numbers of PNG officers began to increase 
sign ificantly . 
The Army ' s  efforts during the later hal f of the 1960s to 
recruit a larger number of PNG o fficer cadets led to 
conflict between the Army and the Civil Administration over 
manpower priorit ies . The Army believed that it was 
necessary to produce high quality officers , both well 
educated and well trained .  In so far as this was possible 
it was thought that entry and training standards should , 
therefore , correspond to Australian levels . Whilst this 
general approach was accepted by the Civil Administrat ion 
there was also a strong competit ive demand by them for the 
still small educated PNG elite : 
Senior Army officers here have maintained that the 
Army should no t only have the best available young 
men but also the numbers required as a priority . 
The Adminis tration needs are such that this 
priority is not accep table • • • 77 
Because of the shortage of suitable recruit s the Adminis­
trat ion suggested that the Army should up grade the 
educational s tandards of its officer cadets in PNG be fore 
s ending them to Australia and thereby help to remove some o f  
the shortfall in educated PNG manpower . 78 This proposal 
7 6 P . R. Lynch , CPD , H o f R, Vol . 61 ,  23 Oct . 1968 , p . 2224 , 
Statement by the Minister for the Army . MCS was estab­
l ished at Igam Barracks , Lae .  The course was eighteen 
months long and was designed to prepare PNG students 
academically and militarily for the OCS Portsea course . 
7 7PNG National Archives , A82 , File 8/1/8 , Administrator to 
the Department o f  Territories , Aug . 1967 . The Adminis­
trator was also invited to comment on the des irab ility of 
establishing an Officer Cadet School in PNG to replace the 
Portsea course.  The Administrator replied that there was 
merit in PNG of ficers being clo sely associated with 
Australian o fficers and this was b est achieved by the 
training of PNG officers in Australia . 
78Ib id .  
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encouraged the Army to  establish the Military Cadet School . 
By the end of 1969 the plans for the expans ion of the 
Army to a three-battalion force , as announced , remained 
unfulfilled . Although the barracks for the p roj ected 3PIR 
had b een built at Lae , the third battalion had not been 
raised . 7 9  The Mini ster for the Army , Lynch , in answer to a 
quest ion from Labor ' s  shadow Defence Minister , Barnard , 
in October 1968 , had referred to reports o f  the raising o f  
3PIR a s  merely ' speculat ive and uninformed ' ,  although the 
previous Defence Review placed before the Parliament had 
retained the original propos al for a three-battalion force . 
The Min ist er then hedged in his reply as follows : 
the government has not de cided no t to raise a 
third battalion • • •  The forward role and compos it ion 
o f  the P IR, as with all aspects of the government ' s  
defence program will of course be included in the 
formulation of the new three-year defence p rogram • • •  8 0  
There was however a new and s ignif icant emphas is in what 
followed : 
In the meant ime ,  the Army in the Territory is 
cont inuing to service a dual purpo se . I refer in 
the first ins tance to the development of a nat ional 
army c·onst ituted of indigenes and capable of playing 
a vital part in the defence of the Territory , and 
secondly to the provis ion in the future of a well­
trained , well discip lined loyal and effective force 
which will be completely subservient to the legally 
constituted authority . 81 
There were indications of a develop ing awarenes s at the 
polit ical level in Canberra that the Aus tralian forces in 
PNG would comprise the future armed forces of an independent 
nat ion . The emphas is placed on the future loyalty and 
sub servien ce of this force t o  the civil government also 
ind icated an awarenes s that the relationship between the 
civil and military leadership was likely to be of cruc ial 
importance in a new s tate . As to the hes itancy in the 
further expansion of the PNG Force to the previously planned 
7 9  
80 
P . R. Lynch , CPD_, H of R,  Vol . 61 , 28  Nov . 1968 , pp . 3496-7 . 
The b arracks were completed in Augus t  1968 at a cos t  o f  
some $8 . 5  million . 
CPD , H of R,  Vol . 61 , 23 Oct . 1968 , p . 222 7 .  
81Ibid . 
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level of three battal ions , it may be attributed , firstly , to 
a greatly diminished military threat from Indones ia and 
secondly and more important ly , to the need to proceed with 
defence planning in PNG on the basis of the country ' s  future 
as an indep endent nat ion and not principally as an adjunct 
to Austral ian defence needs . There was by 1969 on the one 
hand less strategic urgency for further development and on 
the other a lack of policy direction . The development o f  
this pol icy , involving consultat ion with Papua New Guineans 
in the evolution o f  a defence force for an independent Papua 
New Guinea , was to come later . Once again , however ,  
Aus tralian military planning seems to have t o  some extent 
anticipated this process o f  change . 
The Army had apparently already developed ano ther blue­
print for a PNG Nat ional Army based on a three-battalion 
force with supporting naval and air elements and this plan , 
produced during 1969 by a spec ial proj ect t eam, was to 
contribute to subsequent planning in PNG in much the s ame 
way as the earlier 1962 proposals had influenced the po st-
1963 expansion . 
The Papua New Guinean response to defence expansion 
At this s tage of development some contemporary att itudes 
of Papua New Guineans towards questions of nat ional defence 
and indigenous military units may be ident ified , although 
there is a difficulty in regard to the scarcity of articulated 
Papua New Guinean opinion on defence during the period.  A 
review of the debates of the Legislative Council and o f  the 
House of Ass embly after 1964 indicates that , with one 
important excep t ion , the Au stralian policy of developing 
PNG defence capac ity in response to an ' Indones ian threat '  
was enthusias tically supported by expatriates and indigenous 
members alike - at least in their public utterances .  With 
the except ion of the crit icism o f  Aus tralian defence policy 
in PNG delivered by Gaudi Mirau in June 1966 ( see below) , 
indigenous political opinion supported Aus tral ian policy . 
Papua New Guinean att itudes in s ecur ity matters appear to 
have b een cond itioned by two factors .  Firstly , Papua New 
Guineans had in recent living memory experienced invas ion 
and modern warfare within their own country . The need for 
defence forces and military preparednes s ,  for many Papua New 
Guineans , espec ially those who had fought or otherwise been 
caught up in military operat ion s , was no t a philosophical 
ab s traction but what s eemed to be a fact of life . Bes ides ,  
the need for self-defence again st the ' foreigner ' was a 
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basic reality of their tradit ional society . Secondly , there 
appears to have been a quite general and pervasive suspicion, 
perhap s , even fear , of Indones ia and it s intent ions in regard 
to  PNG . .  This dislike of Indones ians may have been reinforced 
by a vague concep t of bro therhood felt by some Papua New 
Guineans towards the Wes t Irianese ,  perhaps der ived from the 
manner in which Wes t  Irian had been acquired by the 
Indones ians . It may also have been fuelled by the generally 
anti-Indones ian attitudes of many Aust ral ians and of the 
media within PNG at the t ime. 82 
Although Australia throughout this period retained 
control over PNG ' s  defence and foreign affairs , speakers 
both in the Legislat ive Council and later the Hous e  of 
Assembly d id discus s these topics , albeit infrequently .  
During the period from 1960 to 1969  there was in fact only 
one debate involving several speakers on defence matters .  
Nonetheless there was a significant number o f  ind ividual 
speeches and questions in relat ion to Indones ia and PNG 
security which provided keys to ind igenous and expatriate 
op inion on these subj ects . 
Following Hasluck ' s  declaration on defence in September 
1962 several members in the Legislat ive Council spoke , 
warmly accept ing the position taken by the Aus tralian 
government .  One nominated memb er in touch with indigenous 
views , the Anglican Bishop of New Guinea , obs erved in 
rela t ion to Indones ian ac tions in Dutch West New Guinea : 
All this I think naturally perturbed the peoples 
of the Territo ry , no t only the expatriate people , 
but also the ind igenous people . The Minister ' s  
clear , s trong and firm s ta tement that Aus tralia 
will defend this Territory as it would the 
Aus tralian mainland • • •  has now removed all 
doub ts • • •  and given a s tronger sense of security 
to the peoples of this Territory , whether 
expatr iate or ind igenous , than they have had for 
many years past . 83 
82 see Hast ings , 1969 : 244-6 . Hastings cons idered the pan­
Papuan sentiment should not be underestimated in relat ion 
to PNG att itudes towards Indonesia .  
83Anglican Bishop o f  New Gu inea , Legis lative Counci l Debates 
(LCD ) , 6-10 , 7 Sep t .  1962 , pp . 606-7 . 
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The following year , in June 1963 , an elected European 
member of the Counc il again called attention to the 
Indones ian military threat to PNG , claiming that PNG was 
inadequately defended and faced a nation which posses sed 
formidable armed forces and had territorial ambit ions . 84 _ In 
Sep tember 1963 a Papuan member ro se to support several o ther 
Papua New Guinean speakers who were calling for the inclusion 
of indigenous recruits in the then all-white PNGVR. He 
argued that it was important that Papuans and New Guineans 
be trained in military techniques - he was sure there would 
be no shortage o f  volunteers . 85 
With the election o f  the first House of Assembly in 1964 , 
ind igenous memb ers , on the infrequent occasions on which 
defence was discus sed , continued to support Australia ' s  
policy of developing forces within PNG. There were also 
calls for an increased de fence effort.  In the June 1964 
sittings of the House , Zure Zurecnuoc ,  Memb er for 
Finschhafen , recalled the tradit ion which Papua New 
Guineans had established during World War II , fight ing 
alongs ide Aus tral ian troops in defeat ing the Japanese 
invaders . He observed that the country ' s  de fences were 
p resently inadequate : 
There are no t enough Army p ersonnel , the Naval Base 
at Manus has become j us t  a small depot and we do not 
have an Air Force at all . I think that much work 
should be done to build up the defences of Papua and 
New Guinea • • •  It also concerns Australia becaus e i f  
this Territory i s  safe then Austral ia will be safe 
also  • • •  We canno t escape war if it starts . Our 
name is known throughout the world . Rememb er what 
the Papuans and New Guineans did during the war • • •  8 6  
Zurecnuoc was supported in the same debate b y  a Papuan 
member , Dirona Abe , who agreed that it was a good thing for 
the people of PNG to know that Australia was willing to 
assist in PNG ' s defence . 87 
84R. Slaughter , LCD , 6-10 , 3 June 1963 , pp . 7 34-5 . 
85 R. Taureka , LCD , 6-10 , 19  Sep t .  1963 , pp . 925-6 . Taureka 
later became a medical practitioner and Minister for 
Health in the Somare Government .  (This change to the 
PNGVR was made in 1964 . ) 
86House of Assemb ly Debates . (HAD ) ,  Vol . l ,  No . l ,  16 June 1964, 
p . 118 . 
87HAD_, Vol . l ,  No . l , 16  June 1964 , p . 119 . 
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In February 1965 , a prominent Highlands member , Tei Ahal , 
reported the fear of Indones ian invasion felt by the people 
in his elec torate in the Wabag area o f  the Western Highlands .  
Ahal called for the PIR to be prepared for action and t old 
the House that thirty-four counc illors and seven thousand 
village people gathered at Wabag had called for an army 
training school to be es tablished in the area so that the 
people could be trained to f ight . ' The people asked me to 
bring this matter up in the House and said that this school 
should be set up in Wabag because Wabag is close to the 
Indones ian border . • 8 8  
Papua New Gu inean political op inion oppo sed t o  Australia ' s  
defence policies in relation to PNG was heard for the f irst 
time in June 196 6 .  In a speech which generated the first 
full-s cale defence debate within the House of Assembly , 
Gaudi Mirau ,  a Papuan member and supporter of the Pangu 
party , claimed that Australian defence development in PNG 
was involving the country in issues which could make it 
difficult in the future for PNG to live with her Asian 
neighbours . Mirau pro tested that the House of Assembly had 
no t b een consulted on defence issues - includ ing the 
construct ion of bases in PNG which could be used to at tack 
' our next-door neighbours ' .  
We are the ones who should decide whether to be 
friends or enemies of Indonesia.  We should be able 
to think and decide for ourselves . This House 
should dec ide whether we are Indonesia ' s  allies or 
enemies . Bu t it is Australia that is deciding this 
for us today . 89 
Mirau argued that the development o f  expensive bases in PNG 
by Australia indicated that she intended to retain the bases 
for her own use after independence .  Australia was thus 
s eeking to provide for her own long-term strategic interest s . 
These interest s ,  Mirau pointed out , might no t necessarily 
accord with those of PNG which would have to live in the 
Asian region . 
Mirau ' s  views drew heated and unanimous oppos ition in the 
debate that ensued . Oppo s it ion by indigenous memb ers 
ind icated the extent to which the need for defence prepared­
nes s  and fear of Indones ia were entrenched att itudes , 
although this oppo sition may well have been intens ified by 
88HAD , Vol . l ,  No . 4 ,  2 6  Feb . 1965 , p . 594 . 
89HAD , Vol . l ,  No . 9 ,  7 June 1966 , p . 13 93 . 
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European members mobilis ing support agains t  Mirau ' s case .  
Mirau was accused of having been duped by  academics and 
present ing the views of others - and by one European member , 
of having acted as the mouthpiece o f  a comnrunist or draft­
dodger seeking to embarrass Australia at the United 
Nations. 90 Several Papua New Guinean members averred that 
Mirau ' s speech could not possibly represent the views of his 
electorate and his attempt to quest ion the benefit o f  
Australia ' s  defence shield in PNG and her motives was 
' spoiling ' the work of the House of Assembly .  P ita Simogun , 
a PNG war hero representing the border elec torate o f  the 
Sep ik , told the House that he was concerned about border 
matters b ecause of the location of his electorate and it 
was as neces sary for PNG to prepare to defend itself as it 
was for other nations . 9 1  Another member recalled that in 
1942 Australia had not adequately provided for PNG ' s  
security . He was now happy ' b ecause Australia is es tab­
lishing defence bases and I want this work to continue ' . 92 
Mirau ' s critic ism of Australian policy evoked no manifest 
support  from his fellow members in the House o f  Assembly . 
It did , however ,  result in a resolution moved by a 
Bougainvillean member , Mr (now S ir )  Paul Lapun , and passed 
by the House of Assembly on 10 June 1966 , reco rding 
apprec iation of Aust ralia ' s  defence effort in PNG and 
satisfac t ion with the Australian defence policy in PNG . 93 
This manoeuvre was clearly designed to des troy the 
credib ility of Mirau ' s  argumen ts . While Mirau ' s  attack on 
Australian policies may have b een ill-conceived and ill­
timed as a polit ical tactic and suscep tible to charges of 
out s ide influence , it  d id nonetheles s raise several 
impo rtant defence and foreign relations issues which would 
need to be faced by a Papua New Guinean government at some 
future t ime . If there was almost unanimity amongst Papua 
New Guineans up until 1966 on the defence policies which the 
Aus tralian government was pursuing in PNG , from 1967  onwards 
a measure of disquiet was occurring in the minds of both 
Papua New Guineans and Australians in PNG , about the 
consequence of these policies for the future of PNG . 
9 00. I .  Ashton , HAD� Vol . l ,  No . 9 , 8 June 1966 , p . 142 3 .  
91 HAD , Vol . l ,  No . 9 ,  8 June 1966 , p . 142 1 .  
92 Ehava Karava , HAD , Vol . l ,  No . 9 ,  8 June 1966 , p . 142 1 .  
93 HAD , Vol . l ,  No . 9 ,  10 June 1966 , p . 1468  and Sir John 
McLeay , CPD , H of R, Vol . 5 2 , 17 Aug . 1966 , p . 105 . 
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In May 1967 an Aus tralian Army maj or serving with the 
Pacific Islands Regiment argued , in a paper delivered at the 
University of Papua New Guinea , that in his view , the P IR 
was not only heading in the d irection o f  what he termed 
rapid detribalisation but , in des troying the links with the 
soldiers ' cultural heritage , the Army might be in danger of 
creating a new and elite tribe - the PIR. This new trib e ,  
he considered , might constitute a greater social gulf 
between the soldier and his village relat ives than that 
which had ex is ted in pre-contact days between tribes (Bell , 
1967a) . The officer did no t explain what the polit ical and 
soc ial consequences of this gulf might be .  
This concern about the elitis t nature of the Army in PNG 
was taken up from another aspect by two European members in 
the House of Assembly later the same year . One member (Mr 
John Pasquarell i ,  representing the Sep ik District ) argued 
that the lavish scale on which PIR barracks had b een 
cons truc ted by the Commonweal th government in PNG would 
create a rift b etween the people s of PNG . The bases , in his 
view , were ' [ a]  huge complex of modern buildings of 
aluminium ,  concrete and s tainless steel , with amenit ies 
which village people in the Sepik District will never be 
able to enj oy • . 9 4  
Pasquarelli went on t o  argue that in his experience 
sold iers within the PIR tended to forget about their village 
life and become a separate part of the community. What 
should be done , he felt , was divert some of the funds and 
manpower into a form of civil construct ion corp s  so that the 
village community could benef it d irectly from the training 
which Army men had received . Pasquarell i also called 
attent ion to the problem which an independent PNG government 
would , in due course , face in maintaining the PIR and its 
ins tallat ions from within its own internal revenue resources . 
Whils t  Pasquarell i did no t deny that PNG should have an 
Army , he did doub t the wisdom of establishing it on what he 
called ' such a magnificent scale ' . 
Pasquarelli was supported by another European member , 
Mr J .  S tunt z .  Stuntz , an experienced former distr ict 
administration officer , saw the problem of the Army as part 
of a growing d isparity between the ' haves ' and ' have-no ts ' 
within Papua New Guinean soc iety . Stuntz ar gued that there 
were , however , graver problems associated with the develop­
ment of a PNG Army : 
94HAD ,  Vo l. l ,  No . 15 ,  1 7  Nov. 1967 , p . 2968 . 
I realise the need for an e fficient Army , but I 
think we must  also b ear in mind that we should 
endeavour to keep standards of that Army , somehow 
or other , relative to the standards that could be 
sustained and maintained by a future government 
of this Territory . Otherwise , we could be 
creat ing a considerable problem for that future 
government when it takes over , as has been seen 
in other parts of the world . It is quite possible 
that here , should there be an occasion in the 
future when funds were no t available to maintain 
the standards that we are setting in our fight ing 
services , then these very f ight ing services may 
also be quite unwilling to surrender what they 
cons ider to be their right , and that is when one 
creates the conditions that lead to the troubles 
that we read about in parts of Africa and other 
countries . 95 
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In September 1967  there was further public quest ioning by 
a Papua New Guinean o f  the relevance o f  an Army to  a 
developing nation such as PNG. Writ ing under the p seudonym 
of Basita Heatu in the j .ournal New Guinea, a PNG school 
teacher saw a PNG Army as merely ' one of the many expens ive 
activit ies that s eem to be regarded as necessary to prove 
one ' s  independence - such as a national airline • • •  ' 
(Basita Heatu , 1967 : 3 2-3 ) . Basita Heatu was unimpressed 
with the convent ional arguments j ust ifying an army , arguing 
that internal s ecurity was the j ob of the police and if the 
army was to fight enemies , where were the enemies ? In his 
view PNG was too small to de fend itself effectively . He 
concluded that the army was ' probably the b iggest s ingle 
threat to the peace , s ecur ity and development of our 
count ry ' ( ib id . ) .  
These doubts about the future were reinforced by another 
Papua New Guinean contr ibutor to New Guinea in June 1968 . 
In Kokou Warubu ' s  view (1968 : 8-10) , the cost o f  such an 
expensive organisation as the army should be j ustif ied in 
terms of PNG ' s  needs - and PNG ' s problem was one o f  under­
development rather than defence . Warubu argued that the 
P IR, which was based on elitist lines , would be likely to be 
more a d ivisive force in PNG society than a unifying one and 
it was l ikely to place itself above the law in its attempts 
to create esprit de oorps within the ranks . Warubu ' s  
solution was for a PNG army like the armies found elsewhere 
95HAD ,  Vol . l ,  No . 15 ,  17 Nov. 1967 , p . 29 7 1 .  
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in develop ing countries rather than an army based o n  an 
Australian model - ' armies of youth or [ thos e ]  aimed at 
real istic nat ional development ' .  Such an army , he believed , 
would serve the interests of PNG rather than Australia . He 
was not opt imis tic about the prospect o f  such changes being 
implemented : 
Whichever way you look at it it seems that self­
government , independence , call it what you will 
is neces sary before we gain an opportunity to use 
the imaginat ion , skill and experience o f  other s 
elsewhere in the development o f  our country 
(Warubu , 1968 : 10) . 
� 
Conclusion 
By 1969 the era of defence force policy in PNG extending 
from World War II that had placed b roader Australian 
strategic interests f irst was rapidly drawing to a clo se.  
It was b ecoming evident that the military forces in PNG 
would form the basis of a defence force of a na tion which 
Australia had by now irrevocably accepted was bound for 
self-government and independence ( see Hast ings , 1969 : 267 ) . 
The military forces in PNG would therefore not only be 
required to provide for PNG ' s  territorial security as in the 
past but would also need to b ecome fully integrated within 
the Papua New Guinean political system and society . 
This fundamental change in the perspective from which 
military forces in PNG were to be seen raised new sets of 
political as well as military issue s for both Papua New 
Guineans and Australians - both for politicians and defence 
planners . It was now necessary to take account of the 
impact and wider soc ial and polit ical role of an el ite 
mil itary organisat ion on the politics of an independent PNG . 
Until then , c ivil-mil itary relations had exist ed in a 
virtual pol it ical vacuum in PNG. The indigenous military 
units in PNG were raised as units of the Australian armed 
forces , financed , administered and connnanded d irectly from 
Australia . The c ivil administration - the c ivil power in 
PNG - exercised no power s of control or f inancial management 
over these forces . The transit ion from colony to independent 
nat ion in the matter of defence would , therefore , involve 
the transfer of the complete range o f  c ivilian powers over 
the mil itary establishment from Australia to PNG. This 
transfer could not build on any existing tradit ion of 
domest ic defence responsib ilities in PNG , as had b een the 
case in former Brit ish colonies in Afr ica . 
Chapter 2 
The trans fer of mil itary power : 
from 1969 to the eve· · o f · independence 
Defence development after 1969 has to be placed in the 
wider context of political change in PNG . Before 1969 
polit ical change in PNG was characterised by policies of 
' gradualism' , emphasis on economic rather than polit ical 
development and , at the same time , the grant ing of increased 
legislat ive and executive powers . After 1969 , however , 
Australian policies were those of quite rapid decolonisation 
and dis engagement from PNG ( see also Parker , 1974 , and 
Hegarty , 1972 : 5-8) . 
In the p re-1969 era o f  gradual development , the House of 
Assembly had evolved as a ' national ' parliament with an 
embryo ministerial system in which pro to-ministers exercised 
power j ointly with officials over a limited range o f  
subj ects . A t  the same t ime the Administrator ' s  Execut ive 
Council was developing as a ' cabinet ' for the exercise o f  
executive ministerial function s .  
The accelerated tempo o f  polit ical change after 1969 may 
be attr�buted to factors at work both in PNG and Australia. 
In January 197 0  Australia ' s  then Leader of the Opposit ion , 
Mr E . G .  Whitlam, vis ited PNG and , breaking with the 
previously b ipartisan approach in Aus tralian polit ics to 
PNG matters , called for ' home rule ' as soon as possible 
after the 197 2 House of Assembly elections . Whitlam argued 
that the fact of independence was not nego tiable ; the 
decis ion for independence was no t one for the people of PNG 
alone but involved the responsib ilities of the Australian 
Parliament and people as well (Whitlam ,  1970) . By the t ime 
o f  Prime Mini ster J . G .  Gorton ' s  vis it to PNG in mid-19 7 0  
and the fur ther devolut ion o f  power that h e  announced it 
was clear that both maj or polit ical group ings in Australia 
were intent on rap idly disengaging from PNG . In PNG there 
was also increasing evidence of pressure for polit ical 
change marked by the turbulence and political activism on 
the Gazelle Peninsula generated by the Mataungan As sociation 
and conflict on Bougainville b etween Bougainvilleans and the 
PNG Admin i stration (Parker , 197 4) . 
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By 19 7 1  the Australian Liberal -Country Party Government 
had accep ted the recommendation of the PNG Select Committee 
on Const itutional Development that full internal self­
government should be sought during the life of the Third 
House of Assembly (1972-7 6 ) . The Australian government 
announced its willingnes s  to nego tiate on the t iming of this 
change with the leader of any cohesive group that might 
emerge from the 197 2  election (Hegarty , 1972 : 5 ) . Sub sequently 
these House of Assembly elections resulted in the country ' s  
first independently-formed government in April 1 9 72 - a 
national coalit ion of members from several parties and 
independent s  led by the Pangu Party leader , Mr Michael 
Somare ( ib id . ) .  
Soon af ter being elected to office , Somare announced that 
he would seek self-government within nine to e ighteen months 
and , following nego tiat ions in May 19 73 between PNG and the 
newly el ected Australian Labor administration , PNG was 
granted self-government on 1 December 1973 . 1 After the 
trouble-free introduct ion of s elf-government , which had 
confounded many expatriate ' prophets of doom' , Mr Somare 
announced to the House of As sembly in March 19 74  that his 
government would seek full independence by Decemb er 197 4 . 
During this period the Australian g overnment remained 
committed to a policy of early independence for PNG on the 
basis that the difference between independence and self­
government was of little pract ical significance to PNG and 
independence flowed readily from self-government . Australia 
was also concerned to speed the trans it ion to independence 
because of what the Aust ral ian Minister responsible for PNG 
affairs t ermed the ' anomalous posit ion which can only be 
resolved at indep endence ' of  Australia being formally 
respons ible for PNG ' s law ,  order and good government whilst 
these respons ib ilities had b een , in part , con ferred on the 
PNG government by the ac t of self-government (Morrison , 
1973 ) . Notwithstand ing the declaration o f  the PNG Chief 
Mini ster on the timing of independence , doub t  as to the 
prospective independence date persisted in mid-1974 . There 
was opposit ion from PNG group s to ind ependence during 19 74 
and the program for the introduc tion of a ' homegrown ' 
const itut ion for PNG lagged behind the schedule agreed to by 
the PNG and Aust ralian governments in May 1973 and behind 
1r>os t-Courier, 9 May 1972  and Aus tra lian Foreign Affairs 
Record , May 1973 , text o f  a communique released on 22 May 
1972 . 
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subsequently amended schedules . 2 By 1974 , however ,  it was 
recognised that early independence was inevitable .  (PNG 
became independent on 16 Sep tember 197 5 . )  
In the defence sphere the f irs t transfer of limited 
function s to local political authority took place in August 
197 2  with the appointment of a Ministerial Spokesman for 
Defence . Mr Somare assumed this func tion in addit ion to 
his o ther duties as Chief Minister , announcing that the 
in troduction of the o ffice would p ermit effective defence 
consultat ion between PNG and Au stralia in the development 
of PNG forces . 3 In August 1973 these limited defence 
respon sibilit ies were assumed by Mr A.M.  (now S ir Maori) 
Kiki in a combined portfolio of Defence , Foreign Relat ions 
and Trade . The introducti on of a measure of local polit ical 
respon sib ility for defence mat ters from August 19 72 onwards 
thus marked the first stage in the transfer o f  political 
control over the defence power . With these changes defence 
was now to be seen . as an important facet o f  the decolon­
isation process .  
The t rans fer o f  defence and foreign affairs powers is 
almost always the hallmark of independence for former 
colonies and this was particularly true in the case of PNG 
whose colonial relationship to Australia had largely grown 
out o f  defence considerat ions . Because st rateg ic matters 
were an important underlying basis of the relat ionship 
between PNG and Australia , defence disengagement was also 
likely to  reflect the complexities of post-independence 
relations b etween the two countries . 4 The transfer o f  
military power in PNG may be viewed in terms of three 
distinct processes : firs t , strategic reappraisal o f  PNG ' s  
defence s ignificance to Australia ; second , the development 
o f  an indigenous milit ary organisat ion adap ted to the defence 
needs and budgetary resources o f  PNG ; and third , the process 
by which the colonial military heritage is adapted to the 
2communique of 22 May 1973 , and Canberra Times ,, 24 June 
1974 . 
3 s tatement in the House o f  Ass embly by the Chief Minister , 
Mr M. Somare , on the constitutional talks of July-Augus t  
197 2 , 3 1  Aug .  1972 , pp . 163-5 . 
4see Crocker , 1969 . He makes a s imilar point in relation to 
the African s tates : ' The Military transfer reflects the 
weight of colonial his tory more clearly and for a longer 
period of time than do most o ther aspects of the trans fer 
of power ' (p . 2 ) .  
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PNG polit ical system. 5 These three processes may be seen in 
relat ion to two identifiable p eriods after 1969 . The first 
period extends from 1969 unt il the as sump tion of off ice by 
Mr Somare ' s  government in April 1972 . Until then PNG 
defence planning and development had b een conducted by 
Australia on a proxy basis without consultat ion with PNG ' s  
political leaders . The second period ext ending from April 
1972  up to and beyond independence is charac terised by 
increasing consultation between Australia and PNG and the 
actual t ransfer of defence responsib il it ies and init iat ive 
from the metropole to the colony . 6 
A number of general is sues emerge from a discus sion o f  
the trans fer of defence power in PNG between 19 69 an d  197 4 . 
These is sues concern the changing strategic relat ionship 
between Aust ralia and PNG , the ef fect of the Australian style 
of colonial rule on defence administrat ion and the relation­
ship between Australian and P apua New Guinean approaches to 
defence force development in PNG . 
The close strategic link between PNG and Australia 
described in Chapter 1 has been an important determinant in 
the transfer of military power in PNG. Post-World War I I  
defence arrangements in PNG (to  descrihe them in terms of a 
policy would imply a status they probably never had ) bore 
evidence of this defence nexus . The defence unit s in PNG , 
principally the PIR, were integral unit s  o f  the Aus tralian 
Services , under direct ma inland comrnarid and p aid for , totally , 
from the Australian defence budget . There was , therefore , 
no trad it ion in PNG s imilar to that in Brit ish co lonies where 
indigenous military units were under some measure o f  local 
polit ical control and in which mil itary development was 
5'I;hese three aspects of the transfer of military power have 
b een adapted from the three stages suggested by Crocker 
(19 69 ) in the trans fer of military power to black African 
states . 
6Because the PNG defence planning proces s has b een shrouded 
in s ecrecy and only occas ionally illuminated by brief 
offic ial statements and terse press releases , it is 
difficult to dis cus s the p rocess c r it ically or in de tail . 
Even in a supposed era of ' open government ' after December 
1972 there was no observable increase in Aus tralian 
Government candour in relat ion to PNG defence , al though PNG 
offic ials and politicians were of ten prepared to discus s 
these matters in university s eminars and in interviews . 
connected with the notion o f  colonial self-defence as a 
necessary pre-condition for sel f-government . 
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Although the clo se strategic link between Australia and 
her colony was prolonged into the 1 960s by Indonesian 
confrontat ion , by 1969 changes in Indonesia as well as 
fundamental global trends had weakened this linkage ;  by 1974 
thes e trends were even more clearly eviden t .  There was a 
realisat ion that technological changes in a nuclear age , as 
well as changes in the character of internat ional relat ions , 
had reduced the likelihood o f  conventional mil itary invasion 
via PNG. Furthermore , the era o f  decolonisat ion and later 
the Vietnam war , which demonstrated the polit ical costs of 
strategies of ' Forward Defence ' ,  forced change on Australian 
governments in their attitude towards PNG. Political and 
strategic d is engagement from PNG had been largely accepted 
by the end o f  the Liberal-Country Party tenure in o ffice 
but these changes were represented in a far more dramatic 
way by the coming to office of the Whitlam government in 
December 1972 and it s disavowal o f  many of the old foreign 
and defence policy stances . The fundamental change in 
Australia ' s  strategic perspective , from that which saw PNG 
as a vital forward bastion to one which , perhaps out o f  
neces sity , saw PNG a s  n o  more than of ' ab iding importance ' ,  
allowed defence devolution to take place in PNG. 
A second important i ssue in the PNG-Aust ralian defence 
relat ionship has been the pattern of post-World War II 
colonial rule in PNG which was marked by strong polit ical 
control from Canberra and ,  for a colonial s ituation , 
remarkably little local political and administrat ive 
autonomy in PNG.  The centralised system of Australian 
government control in PNG naturally extended to the realm 
of defence admini stration also , thereby imped ing the growth 
of local polit ical and administrative control over defence 
in PNG. In consequence of the colonial tradit ion of control 
from Canberra , when the time came from 1972  onwards to 
transfer defence responsib ilities to PNG there was no local 
expertise in de fence admin istration , policy making or 
financial control . This no t only compounded the problems of 
the trans fer process  but also reduced the ability of PNG 
leaders to influence the pattern of defence force development. 
The third issue that surrounds the transfer of defence 
power in PNG is the relat ionship b etween Australian and 
Papua New Guinean defence orientations . Although this issue 
is clouded by a lack o f  public connnent the trend is 
reasonably clear . From the outset of the defence planning 
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exercise in the early 19 60s Papua New Guineans , with few 
excep tions as shown in Chapter 1 ,  accepted Austral ian 
defence assumptions which were based on PNG defending it self 
in a convent ional manner against an Indones ian border 
incurs ion contingency . These assumptions led to force level 
prescript ions that were logically based on a mil it ary 
appreciat ion of the de fence forces required to de fend the 
PNG border .  Australian government statemen ts up to 1969  
show that this force was thought to be of brigade strength 
with naval and air forces amounting to a to tal of about 
five thousand men . Australian planning for PNG defence 
forces up to 1972  appears deficient in two respec ts . It 
suffered from the absence of any consul tation with PNG 
polit ic ians and , as a result o f  it s Australian military 
b ias , it placed inadequate emphas is on the likely polit ical , 
economic and social consequences of  a defence force o f  this 
size on PNG . 
After 1972  the ' Australian-centrednes s '  of  defence 
planning was challenged and , under the Somare government 
and as a result of the de fence consultat ions process in PNG , 
the Aus tralian defence assumptions regard ing role and s ize 
were re-examined and crit icised . Nonetheless and in spite 
of this Papua New Guinean reas sessment , by April 1974 it 
was evident that PNG defence solut ions differed remarkably 
little from what Australia had planned and in some cases 
already developed and Australian defence planning had 
therefore , in great measure , b een accepted by Papua New 
Guinean leaders . This cycle of acceptance , quest ioning and 
then ult imate acceptance of Australian planning may be seen 
as a result of  the rap id on se t of indep endence which reduced 
the scope for radical defence changes , the constraints posed 
by the virtual Australian monopoly on specialist defence 
advice , the polit ical decis ion-making process in PNG which 
tended to result in minimum change and , f inally , the cold 
reality that PNG ' s  defence forces would depend init ially on 
what Aust ralia was prepared to support with manpower and 
f inance . 
The conclusion that is reached is that PNG ' s  defence 
forces at independence end up pretty much as if they had 
been des igned completely by Australia and , therefore , the 
elaborate proces ses of planning and consultation in PNG may 
be seen essent ially as a legit imat ion o f  the Aust ralian­
developed defence forces . 
5 7  
Defence devolution in PNG 
Australian initiatives 
In the per iod b etween the ending of the Indones ian 
Confrontat ion threat with the slowdown in PNG defence 
development and the election of the Somare government in 
197 2 , little is known publicly o f  Australian defence planning 
in relat ion to PNG . Although the Vietnam war almost 
certainly dominated the attention of the Au stralian defence 
community throughout the period from 1969 to 1972 , it may 
be assumed that the development of PNG forces received 
considerable attent ion within the defence group of depart­
ments . Probably connected with this activity was the visit 
to PNG of the Secretary o f  the Department o f  Defence , Sir 
Henry Bland, from 16 to 2 2  March 1969 . His visit was 
followed by the establishment , in August 1969 , of an Army 
planning cell in PNG Command which had the task of s tudying 
the future requirement s of the Army in PNG . 
Although it was reco gnised that fundamental issues about 
defence force size and roles could not be determined in the 
absence of consultation with PNG leaders ,  there was scope 
before 197 2  for further administrative development in 
preparation for the ultimate es tablishment of separate PNG 
forces at independence. To this end the command arrange­
ments in PNG were evidently reviewed towards the end of 
197 1 .  As soon as Army planning f o r  a future force f o r  an 
independent PNG commenced in earnest it would have b een 
evident that the future o f  naval and air elements would 
need to be considered concurrently .  Although Australian 
military trad it ion and practice had b een one of separate 
service organisations , it would be unlikely that a country 
such as PNG with only very small forces could afford the 
organisat ional luxury of separate defence services and 
command structures . Nonetheless there may have be·en doub ts 
about the wisdom of a s ingle unified defence force . Dangers 
of a coup d 'etat might have b een seen in a monolithic 
defence organisation and , in terms of compat ib ility with 
Aus tralian single service procedures and systems , it might 
have been thought preferable for Aus tralia to train and 
support forces in PNG which organisat ionally and procedurally 
resembled her own services . 
In the probable absence o f  service consensus on inte­
gration and as a conservative preparatory step it was 
decided , in 19 72 , to establish a Joint Force Headquarters 
lo cated at Port Moresby and bas ed on the Army Command 
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Headquarters . 7 Under the j o in t  force concep t the connnander -
an Army brigadier - would , with several minor excep tions , 
command the Army , Navy and Air Force unit s lo cated in PNG . 
Connnand o f  the individual service elements was to be exer­
c ised through Service Component Commanders . It was expec ted 
that the new command arrangements would lead to the better 
co-ordinat ion of the activit ies and the future development 
o f  the three services in PNG.  The Commander would report 
directly to the Chairman of  the Joint Chief s  of  Staff 
Commit tee ,_ and this relat ionship would fac il itate more 
effect ive communicat ion b etween the Connnander of the Joint 
Force in PNG and the Department of Defence in Canb erra which 
would , henceforth, exercise a principal and controlling 
interest in the development o f  PNG forces . Previous ly 
effective control had ,  in the first instance , resided with 
ind ividual services . By this change it was , however , s t ill 
no t evident whether there would ultimately be an integrated 
defence force in PNG , or three forces operating under j oint 
command arrangements .  Nor did the new arrangement apparently 
place the Commander under any form of local c ivilian control 
in PNG although there may have been some strengthening of 
the consultative and liaison relat ionship b etween the 
Military Commander and the Administrator . 
Event s during 197 0  had certainly called for closer 
co-operat ion b etween the civil and military authorit ies in 
PNG . Confrontation between the Mataungan Assoc iat ion and 
the PNG Administration and Police on the Gaz elle Peninsula 
of New Britain had involved p reparations for the use of PNG 
forces , espec ially the PIR, to as sist the Police in the 
maintenance of  order .  A call out order had b een issued by 
the Governor-General (on the recommendation of the Adminis­
trator and advice of the Au stralian government) and PNG 
troops were for a t ime held at a high degree of readines s .  
In the event they were not employed and the call out order 
was sub sequently revoked . 8 This cr is is may also have led to 
the reasses sment of the future relat ionship of the indigenous 
milit ary unit s in PNG to the civil administrat ion .  The Army 
in PNG had embarked on a crash program of ' aid to the civil 
power ' training in riot  control techniques and the possibil­
it ies o f  Army involvement in aid to the civil p ower in s ome 
7Department of De fence Press Release 493 / 7 2  of 1 Feb . 197 2 , 
Format ion o f  Joint Forces Headquarters , Papua New Guinea 
( S tatement by the Minister for Defence , the Hon . David 
Fairbairn , D . F . C . , M. P . ) .  
8For a fuller account o f  these events , see O ' Neill , 197 1 .  
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future s ituation , which might prove beyond the capabil it ies 
o f  the Police to control , no doub t led to a fuller realis­
ation that the PNG Army would henceforth need to be seen as 
an integral part of the security resources available to the 
PNG Administration . The need for a closer working relation­
ship in PNG between the Administrat ion and the military 
force was apparent and the likelihood of further incidents 
requiring military assistance to the civil administration 
would have made it advisable to specify the internal security 
role of the force in greater detail . 
Nevertheless there appears to have been no attempt , even 
at this comparatively lat e  stage to place the Joint Force 
and the Connnander in any way under the command of , or in 
some other form o f  subordinat ion to , the head of the civil 
administrat ion . There was , therefore , a continuation o f  the 
direct control of the military forces in PNG through 
exclus ively mil itary channels of authority to Canberra . 
Bett er liaison b etween the mil itary and civil administration 
would have done nothing , either , to change the vis ible system 
of command , or to establish a tradit ion of working civil­
mil itary relat ionship s within PNG involving precepts of 
local civil control over the military .  The introduction of 
a routine proces s of interaction b etween the mil itary and 
local civil authorit ies in PNG which might have promoted a 
const itut ional trad ition of civil supremacy over the military 
was ,  therefore , further delayed . 
Changes under a PNG government 
To some extent the post-1969 pause in the development of 
polic ies for the structure and role o f  forces for an 
independent PNG ended with the format ion of the Somare 
National Coalit ion government in April 197 2 . Before April 
1972  attempts to involve Papua New Guineans in defence 
planning and to devolve defence responsibilities had almost 
certainly been impeded by the absence of a truly responsible 
form of minis terial national government from which authori­
tat ive views on. PNG ' s future de fence o rientat ion and policies 
could be derived . There may also have been an Australian 
government inhib it ion , possibly involving security cons ider­
ations , about di scussing defence development propo sals with 
PNG polit ic ians when it was doub tful whether they would have 
nat ional leadership responsibility in the future . After the 
formation o f  the Somare government , however ,  the way was 
cleared for a process of government-to-government defence 
consultat ion and planning to be init iated . In August 1972 , 
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some four months after the formation of the Somare govern­
ment , a significant s tep in the transfer of military power 
was taken with the appointment of a Minis terial Spokesman 
for Defence . At the same time it was announced that a 
Defence Section would be established to support the Spokesman 
for Defence . 
Although several commentato rs before 1 9 72 had called on 
the Aust ralian government to devise the means whereby PNG 
leaders could become more actively associated with defence 
matters , this demand was no t s trongly taken up in PNG by 
the princ ipal polit ical parties until the 1972  election s .  
Though none of the maj or polit ical parties - the United , 
Pangu , and Peoples ' Progress Parties - init ially called for 
the appointment of a defence spokesman in their party 
policy statements published before the election , Pangu did ,  
during the course o f  the campaign , sub sequently call for 
the appointment of a Defence Spokesman . 9 
The appointment of a Spokesman was formally proposed to 
the PNG government by the Australian Defence Minister , Mr 
D. E .  Fairbairn , during a visit to PNG in June 19 7 2 .  
Fairbairn proposed that a Defence Spokesman b e  appointed to 
represent the PNG defence forces in the House of Assembly , 
where he would answer quest ions and deliver statements on 
behalf of the Australian government to the House . He would 
be consulted by the Aust ralian government on all matters 
affecting the development of PNG ' s  defence forces . 
Fairbairn proposed that the Defence Spokesman would be 
serviced by a small sect ion within the Department of the 
Administ rator , to be known as the Advisory Defence Sect ion 
and headed by a seconded senior officer of the Australian 
Defence Department (see SMH , 16 June 197 2 ) . 
Whilst the Spokesman ' s  role was seen by the Australian 
government to be initially educative and consultative , it 
was envisaged that , pro gressively , the defence views of the 
PNG leaders would be incorporated in further development o f  
the forces . The Spokesman ' s role would there fore develop 
into that of de facto defence minis ter prior to independence 
even though the formal exercise of defence powers (together 
with foreign affairs)  would remain with the Australian 
government unt il the moment o f  independence .  TQe Somare 
government agreed in outline to the Fairbairn proposals 
and Mr Somare became the Defence Spokesman in 
9 see House of Assemb ly Elections 1 9 ? 2 .  What Do Po litica l  
Parties Want for Papua New Guinea? , Department of Inform­
at ion and Extension Services , Port Moresby , January 197 2 . 
August 197 2 . In September 1972 · ,  Mr N . L.  Webb was seconded 
as the head of the ' Defence Branch ' .  
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The appointment of the Chief Minister himself as Defence 
Spokesman may be interpreted as an ind icat ion of Somare ' s  
view of the importance of the PNG Defence Force as posing 
either a potential s ource of power to a future independent 
government , or , if mishandled , a threat to democracy . It 
may also have indic ated the Aus tralian government ' s  keenness 
to have Somare as the Defence Spokesman and negot iator 
because of his authoritative position within the government 
as Chief Minister and party leader and hence his powerful 
decis ion-making role in government .  The appointment of the 
Chief Mini ster himself to the o ffice of Defence Spokesman 
no doubt also served to accelerate the process by which the 
office of Defence Spokesman grew in authority and prestige , 
perhaps more rapidly than the Australian Liberal-Country 
Party government may have anticipat ed . lo By the end o f  
197 2  i t  had become evident that Somare ' s  defence power 
extended beyond the right to be consulted to one of veto 
over new proposals for the development of the PNG defence 
forces and an influential ' watching brief ' over routine 
defence act ivit ies . Nevertheless  PNG government influence 
over defence throughout 1972 was significantly hampered by a 
compl ete lack o f  thought-out policies . 
It seems that it was init ially envisaged by the Australian 
Defence Department that Webb , as civilian defence adviser , 
would operate within the Administrato r ' s  Department , 
providing policy advice through the Administrator , to the 
Chief Minister . 11 Webb ' s  appointment within the 
Administrator ' s  Department was , however,  overtaken by the 
lOit was init ially announced that the Defence Spokesman 
would be limited to the following funct ions (Bayne and 
Colebatch , 1973 : 163 ) : 
(a)  answer parliamentary quest ions and make 
statements on defence matters ; 
· 
(b)  consult the Administrator , present submissions 
to the Administrator ' s  Execut ive Council (AEC) , 
in regard to the development o f  the PNG forces 
and defence policies , and 
(c)  undertake ceremonial dut ies . 
11 p · . .., R . See �nanc�a v ev�ew , 2 7  April 1973 : 
' PNG ' s Armed Dilemma ' and Department 
Release 581/72  o f  4 Oct .  1972 . 
Christopher Ashton , 
of Defence Press 
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tempo of developments in PNG , especially by the format ion of 
the Chief Minister ' s  Office which was seen as a PNG-oriented 
struc ture to some extent insulated from entrenched Australian 
Public Service influence within other parts of the PNG 
Administration . It was later agreed that Mr Webb and the 
Defence Branch would be located in the Chief Minist er ' s 
Off ice . Cl early this change was required in order to secure 
the confidence of the Chief Minister and the PNG government 
in Webb ' s  task of defence planning for PNG. Any direc t 
responsib ilit ies to the Administrator and the Australian 
Department o f  Defence could easily have confronted Webb 
(whose appointment was des ignated Ass istant Secretary 
Defence )  with irresolvable conflicts of interest , and this 
problem should have been antic ipated by the Australian 
government when his appo intment was f irst suggested . 
Bes ides supporting the Defence Spokesman , the Ass istant 
Secretary Defence was responsible for advice to , and liaison 
with , the Joint Force Connnander and it was apparently 
envisaged that , based on Aust ralian tradit ions of civil­
mil itary relat ions , the Force Connnander would only tender 
professional mil itary advice to the Defence Spokesman whilst 
the civilian adviser would advise in regard to policy . In 
fact the Joint Force (and later Defence Force ) Commander 
continued to have free access to the Defence Spokesman 
across the range of defence policy and administrat ive 
matters , especially in so far as they affected developmental 
issues . This was facilitated by the Force Commander ' s  
excellent social relat ions with the Chief Minister (and 
Defenc e Spokesman) ; whereas the relationship of the civil ian 
defence adviser to the Chief Minister may have been more 
forma1 . 12 
Australian approaches to colonial mil itary policy 
The eventual introduct ion of the "Defence Spokesman ' 
formula raises the quest ion as to why the change was no t 
introduced earlier . Although the demand for some form of 
Defence Force representation within PNG may not have been 
forcefully art iculated , the matter was raised by indigenous 
12 Age� 6 July 1973 and p ersonal communicat ion , May 1 9 73 . 
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members in the House of Assembly as early as 196913 and the 
importance of representat ion as a means of ' indigenising ' 
the loyalties of PNG servicemen had been emphasised by 
several observers o f  PNG affairs . 14 It therefore appears 
that there was a reluc tance based on Aus tralian colonial 
policy to devolve defence responsib ilit ies on PNG authorit ies 
in advance of political development in other sectors of PNG 
government . 
Au stralian approaches to colonial military policy may , 
however , be distinctively contrasted with the practice in 
Brit ish colonies where powers o f  command ,  control and 
13 rn March 196 9 , Mr Traimya Kamb ip i ,  a member o f  the House 
o f  Assembly , asked why it was that the PNG Administration 
had no control over the Army . He was informed that : ' The 
Administration does not control the Army here s imply 
because all Army units in the Territory , including Papua 
and New Guinea Command , are p art of the Australian 
Conmonwealth Military Forces , and their costs are borne 
directly by the Australian Commonwealth Government ' .  The 
member was not satis fied with the reply and on 24 June 
1969 asked if the Army was represented within the House by 
an official memb er , and what were the plans for the Army 
in PNG . He was told that the Army was no t represented and 
the Army ' s  future was a matter for the Australian 
Government .  
On 27 June 1969 Mr Yakob Talis sought the appo intment o f  
an addit ional of ficial member t o  the House t o  represent 
the Army . Talis was informed that : ' The Army in Papua 
and New Guinea is at present part o f  the Australian Army 
and it would no t be appropriate for an of ficer of the 
Australian Army to sit in this House. Questions relating 
to the Army are answered by the Senior Official Member 
after consultat ion with respons ible army officers ' .  
These replies gave little encouragement to indigenous 
pol it ic ians who sought to b ring the Army in PNG under some 
form of local accountab ility . ( See HAD , Vol . 2 ,  No . 4 ,  12 
Mar .  1969 , p . 1020 ;  No . 5 ,  23  June 1969 ,  p . 1248 ; 24 June 
1969 , p . 1287 ; and 27  June 196 9 , p . 1404 . )  
14see Mediansky , 1970 , and Parker , 19 72 .  Before the intro­
duct ion of responsible ministerial government in April 
197 2 ,  it would have been possible only for the Administrator 
or a senior official , rather than an elected politician , 
to have exercised any defence function .  
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recruitment and financial responsib il ities in regard to 
mil itary forces usually res ided with the colonial government . 
This policy was very different to the clo se metropolitan 
control which , as shown in Chapter 1 ,  Australia exercised 
over the ind igenous forces in PNG . Brit ish colonial military 
policy was , moreover , not an acc ident of adminis.trat ion but , 
instead , flowed from the Brit ish pattern o f  colonial rule , 
which was quite different from the Australian pattern in 
PNG . The Brit ish way of do ing things was that ' each 
territory , large or small , should constitute ,  in form,  a 
separate kingdom of the British Crown , with its own laws , 
its own finances and its own public service ' (Jeffries , 
1960 : 4 2 ) . It was therefore normal British colonial practice, 
dating from before World War I ,  that colonial military 
forces were , in peacetime , paid for , either wholly or in 
part , by the colonial authorit ies under whose ordinances 
they were raised and commanded (Crocker , 1969 : 4  and 151-2 ) . 
In contrast to the command s ituation in PNG , the c ivil head 
of government in the former Brit ish colonies usually 
possessed the powers of connnander-in-chief over local 
military forces - this power being exercised primarily for 
internal s ecurity functions ( Crocker , 1969 ; O ' Neill , 19 7 1 ;  
Jeffries , 1969 : 3 4) . 
Crocke r has argued that the British approach to colonial 
military policy was founded on reasons of both exped iency 
and doctrine . Colonial military self-reliance for local 
defence relieved the British treasury of heavy colonial 
defence burdens although in practice , in the post-World War 
II period , Brit ain did contribute to colonial internal 
security costs as well as paying for the defence forces 
mainta ined for s trategic purposes . Colonial self-reliance 
was , however , also connected to Gladstonian colonial doctrine 
that self-government entailed self-reliance and , accordingly, 
pol it ical development required that colonial governments 
also assume respons ib ilit ies for their d�fence forces 
( Crocker , 1969 : 53 , 151 , 191 , 244 ) . Defence devolut ion of this 
kind , however , to a PNG Administrator would always have b een 
difficult in the po st-World War II period and it may be 
doubted whether any scheme of relat ions between the civil 
administration and the military , which amounted to more than 
consultation and liaison , could have been devised which was 
at once pract ical , legal and acceptable to the Australian 
government o f  the day in terms of Australian colonial 
practice in PNG . 
Under the Liberal-Country Party Government ' s  longstanding 
pol icy from 1949 onwards of centralis ing decis ion-making in 
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regard to PNG in the responsible Minist er and his Department, 
the consequent role o f  the Adminis trator was , unlike his 
British colonial counterpart , lit tle more than that o f  
' delegate ' (rather than a more powerful ' representative ' )  of 
the Australian governmen t .  This policy , which was clearly 
enunciated by tne Australian Minister for Territories , Mr 
P . M. C .  Hasluck , in 1951 , remained in force unt il the post-
1969 era of  rapid decolonisation . Hasluck ' s  policy of  
centralisat ion , which also had unmistakeable implications 
for colonial military arrangements , was j ustified as follows: 
For some years to come , it is inevitable that Papua 
and New Guinea will be administered as a territory 
and that the admin istration will become increas ingly 
centralised in Australia. This is due to the fact 
of  the constitutional superiority of  the Commonwealth 
Parliament , to the fact that the expenditure in the 
Territory will be financed by the Commonwealth , to 
the fact that the Connnonwealth g overnment alone holds 
the responsib ility before the world and ( in the case 
of New Guinea) to the United Nations for administering 
the Territory accord ing to certain standards and 
canno t delegate that responsib ility to anyone els e ,  
and to the fact that the Connnonwealth government 
must of  necessity maintain the security of the 
Territory and the observance in the Territory of the 
fundamental principles of national policy . This 
centralisation of  administration will also be promot ed 
and facilitated by the improvement o f  communications • • •  
(Hasluck , 1952 ) . 
In the light o f  this policy regard ing civil government in 
PNG it was unlikely in the extreme that a proposal for the 
Administrator to assume significant defence responsib ilit ies 
would have received Australian polit ical support . There 
were , besides , other reasons why devolution o f  defence powers 
had not taken place on the Brit ish colonial model . 
As previously argued , the defence of PNG had been seen , 
especially since the war with Japan , as integral to the 
defence of Aust ralia . The forces in PNG , expanded in the 
mid-1960s in response to the perceived military threat from 
Indones ia ,  were an integral component of  Australian defence 
forces and it would not have made sound military sense at 
the t ime for civilian layers of control in PNG to be ins erted 
between elements of these forces . Furthermore , it could 
have been argued that , in regard to Papua , it was a 
Territory of Australia and , therefore , a special defence 
6 6  
relat ionship between the civil and the military powers was a 
as inappropriate as such an arrangement would have b een , 
say , in the Northern Territory . Until PNG ' s const itutional 
future , including the po ssibility of some form of statehood , 
had been finally clarif ied in the late 1960s there was 
therefore a weak and rather theoretical argument for 
preserving the same military command relationships in PNG 
as applied elsewhere in Australia . 
Nonetheless , by 1969-7 0 the obstacles to a measure of  
defence devolution would seem to have signif icantly 
diminished . The ' threat ' from Indones ia was no longer 
relevant as a resul t of polit ical change and the PNG forces 
were to be seen increas ingly in an internal security 
cont ext . As for the Australia-PNG strategic nexus , the 
long-established view that the security of PNG was vital to 
Aus tralian security was now considerably weakened , if not 
actually d iscredited . The reasons for this change in the 
Au stralian asses sment of PNG ' s strategic relat ionship to 
Australia ' s  own security were to be found both in revolu­
t ionary advances in military technology , such as the advent 
of land and submarine launched nuclear ball ist ic missiles , 
and changes in world politics , includ ing the protection 
afforded by the ANZUS alliance . The fir st factor appeared 
to reduce the po tential mil it ary importance of ' invasion 
springboard ' bases such as PNG and the second seemed to 
reduce the proba�ility of a conventional military invasion 
of Aus tralia . The gradual process of strategic reappraisal 
which Aus tralia had experienced in relat ion to PNG during 
the fifties and s ixt ies was later to be accelerated and 
confirmed by the course of  mil it ary intervent ion in Vietnam. 
The ' failure ' of  forward defence concep ts in this conflict 
served to further diminish the credib il ity of similar 
notions of ' forward de fence ' or ' defence shield ' arguments 
in respect o f  PNG . 15 This new strategic assessment fund­
amentally differed from the Australian government and 
Oppos ition views in the ilillllediate postwar period when it had 
been argued that PNG was vital , and hence indispensable , to 
Australia ' s  future defence . 16 Strategic reappraisal 
facil itated the process o f  colonial disengagement by greatly 
lSF · . d . i f h . h or an interesting iscuss on o postwar c anges in t e 
Australian percept ion o f  PNG ' s strategic significance , see 
Harries , 19 7 3 : 34-42 . 
16Even in the period associated with Indonesian 
reducing the ' apparent ' costs  to Australian national 
interest s by withdrawal from PNG. Furthermore , by 1970  
PNG' s future as  an independent nat ion had been sealed and 
this fact alone should have accelerated the devolution o f  
defence responsib ilities . 
The failure to devolve at least some defence powers 
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before Ausust 1972  had several potentially far-reaching 
consequences . Firstly , it still further delayed the develop­
ment o f  a tradition o f  civil control over the PNG forces in 
PNG which might have provided a more sound basis on which 
Papua New Guinean political , bureaucratic and military 
leaders would conduct their civil military affairs after 
independence . Secondly , the absence o f  a working interaction 
16 (continued) 
Confrontation the authoritat ive Australian defence analyst ,  
Dr T . B .  Miller , was arguing that in military terminology 
PNG was only essent ial rather than vital to Australian 
security , thus implying a s ignificant downgrading o f  its 
importance (Miller , 1965 ) . By 19 7 0 ,  another writer , Peter 
Hastings , argued that PNG could not be considered as even 
essential to Australia ' s  cont inental security in any o f  the 
principal security contingencies that he could envisage , 
namely , nuclear war , conventional war in South-East Asia , 
subversion , or internal rebellion in PNG (Hastings , 19 70) . 
In o fficial de fence papers the term ab iding now generally 
replaced that o f  vital in relation to PNG' s strategic 
importance to Australia and in the comprehensive 
Australian government ' s  Defence Review o f  1972 the 
importance of PNG was even les s  precisely stated : 
It may be assumed • • •  that , for historical as well 
as strategic reasons , Australia will always be 
closely concerned that its near neighbours in the 
North East are independent and secure from external 
threats • • •  It is to be hoped that it will share 
the interest of Australia and its other neighbours 
in co-operat ing to safeguard mutual interest s (p . 5 ) . 
If  an option o f  strategic importance is not to be 
foreclosed , Australia will also need to sustain the 
ability o f  its forces to ass ist in the external 
defence of Papua New Guinea • • •  (p . 21) . (AustPalian 
Defence Review , Department o f  Defence , March 1972 . ) 
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between the civil and military in PNG resulted in the 
failure of the PNG forces to be effectively identified and 
accepted by the local people as an integral aspect o f  PNG 
government . The force was , instead , widely seen as an 
Australian institution , operat ed ,  paid for , and controlled 
by Australia . 17 Thirdly , because there was no interaction 
between the mil itary and the civil administrat ion there had 
b een no development o f  defence administration and policy 
expertise within the PNG bureaucracy . Consequently , when 
there was eventually the need for it after August 197 2  with 
the appointment of a Defence Spokesman , it had to be hurredly 
exported from within the Australian defence organisation , 
with the result that defence p olicy development was to take 
place at the official level in PNG without the background 
experience derived from working within the PNG Publ ic 
Service and socio-political environment .  
One may speculate that , i f  the prewar proposals in both 
territories to establish de fence forces under local ordin­
ances ( see Chapter 1 )  had b een implemented , a quit e 
dif ferent relat ionship between the indigenous PNG military 
forces and the Australian government might have emerged . A 
postwar force established under it s own ord inance with , say , 
arrangements for the secondment o f  Australian servicemen and 
subj ect to financial management by the PNG Administration 
might have had a relationship closely resembling that of the 
PNG Police and the Civil Administrat ion , rather than that 
which grew up between the Army in PNG , the Australian 
Services and the PNG Administrat ion . The organisat ional 
identificat ion of the indigenous military unit s with the 
Australian Army and connnand struc ture prevented the full 
adaptat ion to PNG cond it ions , whilst providing inadequate 
17All defence co sts incurred in PNG were included in the 
Australian defence bud get and ind ist inguishable from other 
defence costs . Even by 1973  it was st ill not possible for 
officials to determine accurately the cost of  PNG defence 
activit ies , partly b ecause of  invisible costs  such as the 
training of PNG per sonnel in Australia and logist ic 
support for the PNG forces from Australian ordnance 
dep ot s .  During 1973  there was st ill no effe c t ive o f f ic ial 
liaison permitted between the Defence Force Secretary 
(the off icial respons ible for f inancial administrat ion) 
and the PNG Department of  Finance in regard to the 
adopt ion of connnon f inancial procedures . ( See De fence 
Report 1973 , pp . 33-43 , and personal communicat ion , Jan .  
1974 . )  
insulation from Australian procedures and political 
imperatives - especially those associated with the 
employment o f  military units on internal security . 18  
Initial public discussion o f  PNG ' s defence policies 
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Although by the appointment of the Defence Spokesman it 
had now b een accepted that the PNG government would hence­
forth play a maj or role in initiating,  in consultat ion with 
Australia , new emphasis and directions in defence force 
development , PNG was handicapped in two respect s .  Firstly , 
no clear defence policy had been evolved by PNG ' s polit ical 
leaders as a basis for this development and , secondly , the 
Somare government was serviced by a small , newly formed , 
civilian defence staff which had not yet developed policy 
alternat ives on which the PNG political leadership might 
base policy decisions . This lack o f  defence policy is 
reflected in PNG government pronouncements on defence 
matters during the early months of the coalition government . 
Immediately before coming to o f f  ice and assuming his 
Defence Spokesman role , Somare had argued publicly that the 
PNG Army was already sufficiently large (with the 
implication that the establishment o f  a third battalion o f  
the PIR, suggested b y  the departing Army Conunander ,  
Brigadier R. T .  Eldridge , should not go ahead) and that the 
Army was too expensive to maintain . 19 By December o f  1972 , 
however ,  Somare was d iscount ing rumours o f  reducing the 
18Attitudes to the use of military units in PNG to assist 
the civil authorities in the maintenance of security were 
largely determined in accordance with Australian pract ice 
rather than PNG condit ions and bore little relevance to 
PNG' s political future . Had PNG ' s military forces been 
subj ect to a measure o f  domest ic control in PNG , Australia 
might have seen its law and order responsib ilities , as PNG 
approached independence ,  as less polit ically onerous . 
This may have pro duced less pressure for precipitate 
independence by the Whitlam government after December 19 72 
and may have altered the prospects  for post-independence 
political stability . 
19 c . d Post- ou:r>�er , 20 April 19 72 . Mr Somare ma e these 
connnent s  on 17 April 1972 , the same day that he announced 
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Army ' s size although there was still no  policy on the role , 
s ize and shape o f  the PNG Defence Force ( see Sundhaussen , 
1 9 7 3b ,  and updated version , 19 73c) . The staff studies within 
the PNG government ' s  defence section had only j ust got under 
way , the views of  his Cab inet had not been canvassed and 
because o f  Australia ' s  crucial supporting role , PNG ' s future 
de fence policy could only really be determined after 
extensive j oint defence con sultat ions which had yet to take 
place . A new factor was int roduced with the election o f  an 
Australian Labor government in December 19 72 . 
The Somare government ' s  new defence influence was , at 
best , largely exerc ised in terms o f  init iat ing public debate 
in PNG about de fence , questioning existing policies and 
l ines o f  development and exploring what might be the nature 
of the role of the Army in PNG after independence . These 
issues were discussed in a two-part program ent itled ' The 
Sword and the State ' broadcast on ABC Radio in PNG during 
November 19 72 . The Chief Min ister , the PNG Jo int Force 
Connnander (Brigadier J . W. Norrie) and other politicians and 
servicemen part icipated in these programs . In them Somare 
argued that the PNG Army should not change in s ize , 
admitting that he had previously argued whilst in oppo sition 
during 1971 that the Army should be much smaller . Somare 
also discussed the likely role o f  the Army in internal 
security and the relat ionship of the Army to polit ics . He 
conceded that in a ' real national emergency ' the government 
would have to consider calling in the Army if the Police 
could not maintain law and order . In relat ion to civil­
military affairs , whilst he agreed that the Police and Army 
would b e  kept out o f  polit ics , he said it would not be good 
to isolate the Army from the rest of the community . 2 0  
19 (continued) 
that Pangu would be able to form a coalition government .  
His comments were based on a b elief that the Army in PNG 
was 5 000 men-s trong and that the Army budget was $ 30 
million per annum, whereas in fact there were only 3200 
men in the Army and the $30 million figure was likely to 
have been a considerable over-estimate . 
2 0Post-Courier , 10 Nov.  19 7 2 .  As_ reported by Sundhaussen , 
1973b and c ,  Mr Somare had presumably sensed some 
' simmering disenchantment ' among local o fficers as a 
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In an address t o  PNG o fficer cadet s a t  the Military 
Cadet S chool , Lae , in December 1972 , Mr Somare argued that 
PNG would require a defence force able to defend itself  
against aggression until help arrived . 2 1  In the ABC 
program in November he had already suggested that this help 
would come from Australia if required , thus introducing the 
issue of pos t-independence treaty arrangements between the 
two countries . At the addres s  to the o fficer cadets and 
again on 15 December 1972  Somare saw the Army making a maj o r  
impact on development and nation building through rural 
development proj ects .  In the same month Mr Somare rej ected 
a proposal for the PNG Army to become part of a United 
Nat ions force within the South Pacific and placed under UN 
control . Mr Somare argued that i f  PNG was to be an 
independent nation it would need its own defence force in 
order to protect its national int erest s . 2 2  
B y  the end o f  1972 , therefore ,  Somare had presented 
views , if not policy , on the size , role , and civil-military 
relat ions of PNG' s forces - views which were in varying 
degree& demonstrably Papua New Guinean in o r.igin . These 
first months of the Somare government which had witnessed 
the appointment of the Defence Spokesman and increasing 
public discussion of PNG de fence issues represented an 
20 ( continued) 
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result o f  his early defence s tatements and , consequently , 
during the later half  o f  1972 , placed emphasis on 
improving relations between the government and the 
military . He did this most effectively in his role as 
Defence Spokesman by meeting with senior local o fficers 
both o fficially and socially . Somare ' s  s tatements ort 
defence in early 1972  and the imputed defence views of 
the Pangu-led government had created considerable unease 
and mistrust amongst PNG officers and men in early 1 9 7 2 ; 
this had dissipated by the end o f  the year (personal 
communicat ion , May 1973) . 
PNG Government Press Release , No . 3438 , 4 Dec . 197.2 . At 
this address Somare again dis counted rumours that his 
government intended to reduce the size of PNG ' s forces . 
22Post-Courier , 1 3  Dec . 1972 . The proposal had b een put 
forward by ALP Federal Parliamentarian Dr D . N . Everingham. 
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init ial polit ic isat ion of  defence as a PNG matter rather 
than an administrative function of the metropolitan power 
as it had b een seen in the past . Although defence had b een 
discussed by PNG politic ians and others in a crit ical manner, 
there was as yet no actual policy development . 
The formation of the PNG defence force 
and the emergence of a PNG defence policy , 
197 3-7 4 
Whilst the f irst months of the Somare government saw 
public discuss ions of PNG defence is sues but lit tle evidence 
of  government policy , two events in early 1973 clarif ied 
PNG ' s  future defence arrangement s  and c leared the way for 
further decis ion-making . These were the format ion of  a 
single Defence Force and the visit o f  the Aus tralian Minister 
for Defence to PNG during which Labor government policy in 
relat ion to PNG ' s  Defence Force was discussed . 
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) came into 
being on 26 January 1973 by the act of redesignating its 
forerunner ,  the PNG Joint Force . 23 The format ion of the 
PNGDF , which was lat er described as ' a  logical step in the 
development of a local force and the closer identif icat ion 
o f  the force with PNG ' , finally resolved the issue of 
defence integration . 24 The decis ion to form an integrated 
s ingle Defence Force , rather than persevere with three 
separate s ervice compenents under some form of unified 
command , recognised the benefits of  rationali sat ion and 
economy which might be obtained in a country with meagre 
economic resources .  'Ihis decision was in a way a bold one 
in reco gnising PNG ' s own par ticular defence needs and in 
moving away from Australian defence practice . 
The formation o f  the PNGDF was init ially , however ,  an act 
of redesignat ion , no t far-reaching change . The subsequent 
implementat ion o f  change occurred progres sively and gradually 
23Notified in the Corrononwealth Gaze tte ., 22 Feb . 1973 . 
Brigadier J . W. Norrie , OBE , the Joint Force Commander , was 
appointed to command the newly des ignated force . As under 
the former Joint Force Command arrangement , Brigadier 
Norr ie , the Commander of the PNGDF , was responsible 
directly to the Australian Chief s  of Staff Conunit tee .  
24  Defence Report 1 9 73, pp . 8  and 9 .  
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through 197 3 and 197 4 .  Development o f  the new force was 
supervised by a s ignificantly enlarged headquarters organ­
isation . Paradoxically , the establishment o f  the PNGDF , 
although des igned as a step forward in the development o f  a 
self-reliant local defence force , resulted in a very 
signif icant increase in senior and middle level Australian 
officers serving on the headquarters of the PNGDF . The new 
expanded headquarters organisat ion had b een des igned during 
197 2 by the PNG Joint Force Connnander and his staff and 
sub sequently approved by the Australian Department of  
Defence .  The responsibility for the development o f  the new 
organisation was primarily l eft in the hand s o f  the ' men­
on-tb e-spot ' so that it would be in harmony with local 
developmEnts .  Based on the pre-existing headquarters 
organisat ion , the new HQ PNGDF appeared to be a dramatic 
expansion in both the number of  officers on the establ ish­
ment and the es calation o f  rank levels . The development o f  
what might have b een seen a s  a top-heavy st ructure was 
j ustified on the grounds that the new rank levels bore 
comparison with other PNG government departments and , 
secondly , expansion was warranted in order to develop new 
spheres of administ rat ive and planning capab ility now 
required because of  the PNGDF ' s  innninent status independent 
from the Australian defence organi sat ion . 
Dur ing the January 197 3 vis it of  the Australian Defence 
Minister , Mr L . H. Barnard , to inaugurate the PNGDF , the 
Minis ter served not ice of  the newly elected Labor governmenr s 
policy in relat ion to PNG ' s Defence Force. He announced 
that henceforth PNG would be expected to make the decisions 
on the role and future of her own Defence Force - PNG ' s own 
view of  the rol es and func tions o f  this force would be 
paramount .  PNG would be expected to exercise foresight to 
develop a defence force properly at tuned to PNG ' s needs as 
an independent nation . The Australian De fence Minister also 
ind icated the general course of future Australian-PNG 
defence relat ions . Australia would be prepared , after PNG ' s 
indep endence , to contribute to the maintenance of  the PNGDF 
in such f ield s as ' staff , facilit ies , and courses for 
training ; op erat ional and technical assistance ; supply of 
equipment ' .  This assistance would not be completely open­
ended . Barnard explained that he expected that PNG would 
wish to take on a gradually increasing share of her own 
defence burden . The Australian Minister suggested that a 
start could be made by PNG paying the day-to-day defence 
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co sts such as the pay and allowances of  her own personnel. 25 
Mr Barnard sugges ted the maximum financial contribution that 
PNG could afford would be $A4 million - the current 
es timate of the indigenous personnel wages and allowances 
bill . It was apparently not spelt out in negot iat ions 
whether the $4 million figure was a target to be reached at 
once or over a number of  years . Not long after the Barnard 
vis it the indigenous wages and allowances b ill was assessed 
to have risen to $A6 million - a more difficult figure to 
reach . 
In regard to ALP policy on PNG defence , by which the 
Minis ter was bound , the December 1972 election won by Labor 
had been contes ted on the bas is of the plat form approved by 
the 1971 Federal Conference . In this document , Labor 
undertook to second and support skilled personnel as 
requested by PNG for her defence force . In addition the 
Party undertook to seek a defenc e treaty with PNG . This 
commitment was , however ,  later revoked at the 1973 Federal 
Conference after Labor came into office . The clause 
relating to a defence treaty was removed following the 
reconnnendat ions of the ALP Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Policy Committee . The Committee Report did ,  however ,  restate 
the Party ' s  commitment to financ ial and p ersonnel support 
for PNG ' s Defence Force . It s eems that the treaty provision 
was removed because of fears that a rigid treaty arrangement 
might pos s ibly lead to Aus tralian military intervent ion in 
PNG ' s  internal affairs . A looser more informal type of  
defence arrangement was now preferred . This preference may 
have b een shared by the Department of  Defence . In more 
general terms , the Australian Prime Minister , Mr Whitlam,  in 
his po licy speech opening the 1972  election campaign had 
listed the achievement of ' a  secure , united and friendly 
Papua New Guinea ' as the second of four principal foreign 
policy connnitments (Clark , 19 73 : 2 04 , 2 11-12) . 
The Aust ralian Defence Minister ' s  public connnitment in 
January 1973 to provide support for the PNGDF was , therefore, 
consonant with ALP policy . In reco gnising the cont inued 
necess ity of  reliance by the PNGDF on Aus tralian resources , 
the Barnard policy was , furthermore , largely a cont inuation 
of pol ic ies enunc iated by the previous Liberal- Count ry Party 
government .  The March 1 9 7 2  Defence Review prepared under 
that government , in foreshadowing the formation of the PNGDF, 
25For Barnard ' s  PNG defence st.atements see Pos t · ·· )ourier , 2 6 , 
2 7 , 29  Jan . 1973 . 
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had observed that unt il independence ' emphasis will need to 
be placed on the training and equipment o f  local forces , and 
arrangements for their administrative support in PNG , in 
order to provide a basic national force for de fence and 
internal s ecurity ' (p . 21) . And in the period after inde­
pendence , defence assistance to PNG might be required to 
cont inue at s ignif icant levels in the areas of  ' training , 
organisation and support of  local forces , secondment of 
personnel to staff and technical appo intments , and the 
supply of equipment and the development of technical 
infrastructure ' ( p . 29) . 
Despite the change o f  name , the introduction o f  the Bird 
of Paradise national emblem as the dress ins ignia o f  the 
PNGDF and the indications of Aus tralian policy in relation 
to PNG defence , many questions about the PNGDF had yet to 
be decided ;  important among them were tho se of the size and 
shape , role , and function o f  the PNGDF within the PNG polity . 
As planning got under way during 1973 it became apparent 
that there was les s scope for innovation than had been 
realised at the outset . Although Barnard had sought to 
encourage PNG to attune her defence forces to her own needs , 
defence was not a tabuia rasa. 
There were already forces and systems in exist ence in 
PNG and a small indigenous of ficer corps with entrenched 
professional attitudes . There was the matter o f  what 
changes Aus tralia would be prepared to underwrit e in 
financ ial and manpower terms in the future . There was also 
the constraint on change posed by the rap id onset o f  
independence. Besides the practical limitations of  what 
could be achieved in the t ime remaining under Australian 
rule , there were indigenous polit ical constraints to change . 
The PNG decis ion-making process at both the bureaucratic 
and polit ical levels , based on a concept o f  Melanesian 
Consensus , in relation to defence matters frequently meant 
the polit ics of ' minimum change ' .  Wider defence options 
were probably already foreclo sed and radical defence 
rest ructuring had b een pre-empted by the forces in 
existence . In that sense ,  therefore , many of the options 
which may have b een thought to be available to PNG 
politicians and defence planners ,  including some form of 
' Peoples Army ' model , drast ically reducing the s ize of the 
defence force , or forming a single security force - with 
integrated police and defence components - were largely 
illusory . For instance in early 1973 the Speaker of the 
House of Assembly , Mr B . B . Holloway , proposed that the 
PNGDF should be disbanded and replaced by a 250-man Sp ecial 
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Services unit . This suggest ion seems t o  have b een effect­
ively countered in discus sions with indigenous leaders 
principally on the grounds that such radical changes clo se 
to independence might have d isastrous destabilis ing effects .  
Mr Holloway later dropped the proposal. Similarly the 
reported suggestion by the Minister for External Territories 
(Mr W. L .  Morrison )  of  converting one of the PIR battalions 
into a Police Field Force unit was no t pursued , partly for 
the same reason . The con cep t of a single security force may 
have been con sidered by the Department of Defence during 
1972 and appears to have had considerable civilian suppor t ,  
espec ially within the Department of  External Territories . 
The concept was strongly opposed by the military in PNG 
which emphasis ed the discrete external defence func tion of a 
milit ary force compared to that o f  the police . The propo sal 
was finally scotched in May 1973  when the PNG cabinet agreed 
that a separate defence force would be needed in PNG .  
Radical reorganisat ion proposals f o r  the PNG Public Service 
were also  dropped . The prospects of early independence had 
tended to focus planning and p roblem solving on the practical 
issues of  administrative development , lo calisation and the 
transfer of formal responsib ilit ies . 2 6  Much o f  the consul t­
at ion and planning which sub sequently took place was , in a 
way , an exercise in politically legit imating the force which 
Aus tralia had es tablished . 
The defence planning and policy development process in 
both PNG and Australia intensified from late· 1972 onwards 
with the commencement of  defence consultat ions between PNG 
and Australia at the official and ministerial leve1 . 27  These 
in it ial d iscus sions seem to have been primarily exploratory 
in character and allowed for the exchange of  planning inform­
at ion . The planning process as it developed appears to have 
b een conducted on the bas is of  co-ord inated and parallel 
stud ies in Canberra and Port Moresby and marked by a 
continual exchange of conferences , visits and exchange o f  
documents . To support these consultations and t o  develop 
policy op tions on both s ides , a quite elaborate commit tee 
struc ture evolved .  Routine co-ordinat ion o f  PNG defence 
mat ters within the Australian Defence Department was the 
responsib ility of  a small secre tariat of civilian and 
milit ary officers . Matters were referred by this s taff , as 
26 See SMH , 12 , 19 Mar . , 2 7 ,  30 April 1973 ; Canberra Times 
3 1 Mar . · 197 3 ; Age , 6 July 1973 . 
27 Department of Defence Pres s Release , 85 / 7 3  of  17 May 1973 
and 248 / 7 4  of  5 April 197 4 .  
7 7  
necessary , t o  the Chiefs o f  Staff Commit tee , the Defence 
Committee and the Minister for cons ideration . Because o f  
the increasing tempo o f  events in PNG i t  was evidently 
necessary late in 1972  to es tablish an inter-departmental 
committee on PNG defence matters so as to ensure proper 
co-ordination between the Service Departments on PNG defence 
planning and allow for consultation with the Departments of 
Foreign Affairs and External Territories which also had an 
interest in PNG defence arrangements . 28 
Whils t  the Australian defence group involved with PNG 
matters consisted o f  a relatively homogeneous team 
(essent ially the Service Departments with a Foreign Affairs 
input)  the PNG s ide cons isted of two semi-autonomous groups ­
the PNGDF {primarily a military group ) and the Department 
o f  the Chief Minister , which included the Ass istant Secretary 
Defence and his Defence Branch s taff (a civilian group ) . 
Because of  this and the need to take account o f  an increasing 
Papua New Guinean contribution to the policy-making process , 
the PNG defence planning environment was probably more 
complex than Aus tralia ' s . 
Within the Defence Force and the Joint Force b efore 
January 1 973 , development planning appears to have b een the 
respons ibility of a Director o f  Plans (colonel)  and a small 
mil itary planning s taff . 2 9  Headquarters officers and unit 
commanders were also routinely consulted and involved in 
planning proj ect teams ; planning was not conducted in 
isolat ion by the planning group alone . In add it ion , the 
PNGDF Commander (Brigadier Norrie) and his predecessor 
(Brigadier Eldridge)  devoted a cons iderable proport ion of 
their t ime to development issue s .  The manner in which 
planning was conducted within the PNGDF , by the thorough 
28A further organisat ional change was the appo intment in 
January 1974  of a senior civilian defence o fficial , Mr 
J .  Bennetts , as Australian Defence Representative in 
Port Moresby . This official was responsible for 
representing Australian defence policy to the PNG govern­
ment as well as tendering Australian defence advice to the 
PNG High Commissioner ( formerly Administrator) , relieving 
the PNGDF Commander of this funct ion which was no longer 
appropriate to his role as Commander of a PNG-oriented 
organisation . 
2 9Th · · · h . h f h Arm Pl . is organisat ion , w ic grew out o t e y anning 
Cell established in 1969 contained land , air and marit ime 
planning officers of  the rank o f  maj or or equivalent . 
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' staffing ' o f  papers an d  frequent p lanning con ferences ,  
meant that it was usual for a Defence Force ' party line ' to 
emerge on each issue , before discussions with PNG government 
o ff icials . 
On the s ide of the PNG government , defence planning was 
primarily the responsib ility o f  the small Defence Branch 
which operated through 1973 with b etween two and four 
civilian officers )O The planning resources of this group 
were clearly limited · in compar ison to the large Defence 
Force headquarters s taff . To augment this pol icy group and 
provide a forum for the discussions of issues , an int er­
departmental committee , the PNG Defence Policy Working Group 
(DPWG) , was established in December 1972 in preparat ion for 
the f irst o ff icial defence talks b etween PNG and Australia . 
This commit tee appears to have b een an important body 
throughout 197 3-74 for the dis cussions o f  policy and for the 
establ ishment of the official PNG dtfence view , integrat ing 
civil ian and Defence Force contribut ions . 
In a similar way to that in which the Defence Force 
established its policy posit ion , the Defence Branch produced 
its own working papers for DPWG sess ions . The Defence 
Branch pos it ion seems , usually , to have b een established 
after consultat ion , much o f  it o f  an informal kind , with the 
Chief Minister ' s  advisers . In spite of this pattern o f  
consultation some tension was evident b etween expatriate and 
Papua New Guinean offic ials , as yet in the minority,  who 
were keen to approach defence issues with a more scep tical , 
if not antagonistic , frame of mind . There were also ind i­
cat ions that senior lo cal o ff icers of the PNGDF , when they 
became more actively engaged in planning di scussions , were 
somet imes willing to depart f rom the PNGDF posit ions and 
express views clo ser to those of local PNG public s ervants -
perhaps in a spirit of  Melanes ian Consensus . Selected Papua 
New Guinean officers had , by direction o f  the Force Commander, 
been ac tively con sulted on defence planning matters from 
197 2 onwards and in 1973 there was a PNG officer posted to 
the planning staff . 
In April 1973 a Lo cal Officers Group (civilian and 
3 0Thes e were : the Ass istant Secretary , another Australian 
memb er of  the PNG Public Service ( formerly an Australian 
Intelligence Corps colonel)  and two ind igenous public 
servant s .  In early 197 4 ,  Mr Webb was replaced a s  Ass istant 
Secretary by Mr Noel Levi , the senior of the PNG public 
servants , but Webb remained as his adviser . 
7 9  
military officers) o f  the DPWG was formed t o  reconsider the 
draft Cabinet submis sion on the proposed guidel ines for the 
PNGDF because o f  inadequate ind igenous part icipat ion in the 
fornrulation of the documen t �  Af ter several meetings it was 
no t necessary for it to be reconvened because o f  increased 
indigenous representation on the DPWG it self . At these 
early meet ings , however , couunon military and civilian Papua 
New Guinean views emerged in relat ion to support for the 
concept o f  a separate PNG Defence Force with the primary 
function o f  external defence , increased emphas is being 
placed on the nation-build ing potential o f  the Defence Force 
and the view that the Defence Force should not be isolated 
from the rest of PNG society merely in pursuit of a partic­
ular Aus tralian formula of c ivil-military relations . A 
local military officer is said to have complained at a 
meeting in April 1973 that ' Aust ralians working on Defence 
Policy are trying to dump an Australian model on PNG ' 
(personal couununicat ion , Port Moresby , Jan . 1974 ) . 
Both the military and civilian defence planning group s in 
PNG appear to have b een willing to apply techniques of  
informal advocacy in order to  advance their interests with 
the PNG political leadership and Cab inet . On the military 
side it was evident that Australian officers claimed to 
represent the views o f  the indigenous officer corps  and in 
so doing were , by implicat ion , suggesting that the PNG 
government would not want lightly to override these views . 
Social contacts were also explo ited as much as possible in a 
society which , af ter 197 2 , had b ecome intensely polit ical 
even in official circles . In this context also , two semi­
private defence ' round table ' s eminars may be mentioned . 
These s eminars were conducted at the Univers ity of  PNG , 
Port Moresby, in May and August 1973 and they were attended 
by PNG polit ic ians , public service advisers ,  military 
off icers and academics .  The s eminars ostensibly provided a 
forum for the exchange o f  views and information on PNG 
defence matters but they were also excellent plat forms for 
the Defence Force to express and attempt to gain support for 
its own special interest s ;  namely , a wider public and 
official acceptance of  its role in the PNG socio-polit ical 
system. The seminars , in par t icular , provided a plat form 
for advocat ing the integrat ion of the military into the PNG 
pol it ical system,  a policy favoured by the j oint convenor of  
the seminars , Dr  Ulf Sundhaussen ,  who had also publicly 
advocated this policy in order to avoid the excesses of 
military intervent ion in polit ics , as experienced elsewhere 
in the Third World ( Sundhaussen , 1973a, b , c) . 
80 
The emergence of a PNG defence policy 
The f irst official defence consultations between Australia 
and PNG took place in December 197 2  and following them it 
was decided to seek the polit ical guidance of the PNG C abinet 
on such fundamental questions as whether PNG was to have a 
separate defence force , what were to be it s roles and how 
much could be spent on it . It was envisaged that after this 
init ial direct ion from the Cab inet ,  detailed proposals would 
then be submitted to Cab inet and they would form the bas is 
for later de fence negot iat ions with Australia . Following 
cons iderat ion by the PNG inter-departmental committee on 
defence this initial ' De fence Submission ' went before the 
PNG cabinet in May 197 3 . 3 1  
Af ter this preliminary C ab inet submission further defence 
dec is ions appear to have been made by the PNG cab inet in 
August 1973 when the bas ic struc ture of  the De fence Force 
based on a 3500-man force was resolved and it was determined 
that PNG civil-mil itary relations would be based on a formula 
o f  co-equal status between the Defence Force Commander and 
the senior public servant in the Defence Department , who 
would both work to a De fence Minister . 3 2  
The results of the extens ive period of  planning , policy 
making and consultations since late 197 2 f inally b ecame 
public on 25  April 1974  when the PNG Minister for Defence , 
Mr Kiki , made the PNG government ' s  f irst comprehensive 
de fence statement. 33 Kiki informed the House of Assembly of  
the government ' s  policy decisions and preparat ions for  PNG 
to take over the defence func tion at independence and , at 
the time of  writ in g ,  this statement provided the best public 
evidence o f  PNG government defence policy . It therefore 
merits being quoted at length.  
The Minister ' s  statement commenced by j ust ifying the need 
to maintain separate defence and police forces in PNG , 
31Personal connnunicat ion , Dr Ul f Sundhaussen and Mr N . L .  
Webb , Dec . 1972  and Aug . 197 3 . 
32These planning decis ions were evidently leaked to the pres s 
in PNG. See Age , 6 July 1 9 73 , ' Mosqu ito Force Planned fo r 
PNG ' . 
33 Mr A. M. Kiki , HAD_, 25  April 197 4 ,  Ministerial Statement on 
Defence . See also the corresponding statement by the 
Australian Minister for Defence , Mr L . H . Barbard , Defence 
Press Release , 258/74  of 26 April 197 4 .  
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thereby rej ect ing the view that had b een put from t ime to 
time that PNG required only one security force . Kiki argued 
as follows : 
The coun try ' s  security is at present guarded by two 
separate security forces with very distinctive and 
different roles - the Police Force and the Defence 
Force . One of the first questions the government 
asked its elf  was whether Papua New Guinea should 
continue to maintain two separate forces or whether 
they should b e  combined into a s ingle security force . 
The Government decided that the roles of  the two 
forces , their organisat ion , equipment and training 
and outlook were so different that the nation would 
be b est s erved by keep ing the two forces separate .  
We did not want policemen acting like sold iers o r  
sailors ,  or vice versa. 
The police operate for the most part as ind ividuals 
dealing with ind ividuals ,  whereas a defence force 
operates in groups and against group s of people 
Both are trained to use controlled force and are 
responsible individually and collec t ively for their 
act ions , but Defence Force training gives greater 
emphas is to the more s erious s ituations in which 
there is a greater likelihood o f  having to use lethal . 
force . And whereas it must be the government ' s  
con stant endeavour to avoid these very serious 
situations for which the Defence Force is required 
to train , the Police Force is constantly engaged in 
the role o f  community law preservat ion and 
enforcement , for which it is trained . 
Another d istinctive characteristic of  a defence 
force is it s relat ive self-su fficiency in supporting 
services such as t ransport , communications , repair 
workshops , medical assistance and the feeding and 
quartering of its members .  These services are 
expens ive , but ind ispensable if the Force is to be 
able to deal with situations in which normal 
community services may be disrup ted , or in areas 
remote from conununity facilities . Nevertheless 
the government has had to look very crit ically at 
what this country can afford in this regard • • •  
Many of  the arrangements and systems which were 
appropriate while the PNG Defence Force was an 
Australian Force are qui te inappropriate for Papua 
New Guinea and are being changed (}JAD , 25 April 1974) . 
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The PNG Defence Minister went on to specify the roles of  
the Defence Force : 
In tradit ional terms , the Defence Force has three b road 
responsib ilit ies : 
1 .  To be able to defend the nat ion against external 
at tack. 
2 .  To be able to ass ist the police in the maintenance 
of public order and secur ity as a last resort if 
the police cannot reasonably be expected to cope . 
3 .  To contribute as required to economic development 
and the promotion of nat ional administration and 
unity . 
In the f irst two , it is always the hope that the 
presence of defence forces , and the ab ility to expand 
them if neces sary , will be sufficient to  deter , or 
frighten away , any threat to the nat ion . The third 
funct ion can be p erformed as a normal activity when the 
force is not ac tive in its first two functions , as 
addit ional permanent responsib ilit ies us ing skills and 
facilit ies s imilar to those needed for the f ir st two 
functions , or as inc idental by-products of  fulf illing 
the f irst two funct ions . 
As to the s iz e  and composition of the Defence Force Mr 
Kiki told the House of  Assembly that : 
The government considered a variety of possible ways 
o f  structuring the future Defence Force . It decided 
that it should have a ceil ing strength of 3500 
uniformed men with two battalion s ,  an engineer 
company , the patrol boat squadron and a landing craft 
squadron together with appropriate support . 35  
34HAD, 25 April 197 4 ;  see also Chapter 3 .  Although PNG 
formally emphasised external defence rather than internal 
security , largely for domestic polit ical reasons , the 
potential internal s ecurity applicat ion of the PNGDF was 
freely acknowledged by PNG officials in discussions . 
35Mr Kiki also informed the House that the PNG government 
was consider ing the Aust ralian o f  fer o f  f our Dako ta air� 
craf t ,  instead of the Caribou in service with the RAAF in 
PNG, as the basis o f  a PNGDF Air Element . ( See also Depart­
ment of  Defence Press Release , 258/ 7 4  o f  2 6  April 197 4 . )  
The Minis ter implied a preference for the more versatile 
Caribou but appeared to accept the Dakota of fer subj ect to 
C ab inet approval . In fact PNG could do nothing else if it 
In this way the Minister settled the issue of  the various 
Defence Force structural options that had occup ied the 
attent ion of civilian and military planners s ince early 
197 3 . It was apparent that the Defence Force ' s  public 
advocacy of a somewhat larger force of  four thousand men 
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had been unsuccessful , although the Cabinet had s elected a 
middle range option between the PNGDF solution and other 
smaller options . 3 6  It was likely that the Cabinet had b een 
influenced in this decis ion by a concern to hold down PNG 
defence co sts as well as a gene ral unease about the polit ical 
consequences of a larger defence force . The 3500-man force 
approved by the Cabinet nonetheless did not differ markedly , 
in terms of  capab ility , from the larger opt ions considered 
and , only in the absence of  a third battalion , d id it 
s ignificantly differ from earlier Australian blueprints . 
Although not announced by Mr Kiki in April 1974 two 
quite important decisions on the future struc ture of  the 
PNG Defence Force had already b een taken in September 1973 
after consultat ion b etween the PNG and Australian 
governments .  It had then been decided to disband the part­
time , volunteer PNGVR battalion and the high school military 
cadet system . 37  In spite of the strenuous lobbying of 
senior Australian CMF o ff icers attempting to save the PNGVR, 
the PNG government evidently believed that this type o f  
unit was not suited to the defence needs of  an independent 
PNG . 
Besides the off icially stat ed reasons for the disbandment 
o f  the PNGVR on the grounds of economy and effectiveness , 
there were also problems of  security and a shortage of  
suitable personnel . There were fears that the CMF 
battalion ' s  widely d ispersed sub-units (ten training depots 
in seven centres) , weapons , ammunition and equipment might 
provide a security hazard in the future - by f all�ng into 
the wrong hands . Secondly , the exodus of expatriate 
res idents from PNG had led to a shortage of trained and 
experienced officers and NCOs in the unit and there were 
insuffic ient numbers of suitably educated Papua New Guinean 
35 ( cont inued) 
wanted an air element at independence . 
36A 4000-man force was advocated by Defence Force sp okesmen 
at the Univers ity ' round table ' seminar in August 197 3 .  
37 see Department o f  Defence Press Release ,  141/1973 o f  10 
Sep t .  197 3 . 
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volunteers available to replace them. 38  
The disbandment o f  the PNGVR appears to have foreclosed , 
at least temporarily , the option of  a milit ia component in 
the PNG Defence Force which might have been seen in terms 
of  a countervailing force to the PIR battalions or even the 
Police , or as a means of more direc tly as sociating the 
Defence Force with the civilian populat ion by providing an 
avenue of  civilian service.  Both these points had been 
argued in support of  the former PNGVR' s role . More realist­
ically , however , it was extremely unlikely that a highly 
dispersed unit of fewer than four hundred men would 
ef fect ively resist any acts of sudden polit ical violence by 
the regular Defence Force or the Police . It was also 
doub t ful whether the part-t ime memb ers of the former CMF 
battalion , who were largely recruited from an educated , 
urban b ase and who were thus unrepresentative of  the PNG 
populat ion at large , draw the Defence Force any clo ser to 
the PNG nation . Finally there was the danger that political 
leaders might have at tempted to ' play off ' one security 
force against another by various forms of preferment in 
order to neutralise them. Where this has been attempted , as 
for example in Ghana under Nkrumah , the results have usually 
been counter-productive , leading to violence and polit ical 
conflict ( see First , 1972 : 197-200) . For these reasons the 
decis ion to disband the PNGVR was sound . 
The disbandment of  the school cadet system in PNG (which 
had b een modelled on that operating in Australia) may also 
have b een j ustified in terms of the considerable costs 
involved in maintaining and supervis ing widely scattered 
and small school cadet unit s .  Such units were first 
established in PNG in 1959 . By 1973 there were about 1000 
cadets in 15 schools (interview Off icer Connnanding 35 Cade t 
Battalion , Lae , May 1973 ) . Although they may have 
performed valuable integrative social func tions within the 
limited number of high schools  in which they operated , they 
did nothing for the maj ority of  PNG youth outs ide the high 
school system who were no t exposed to cit izenship-building 
influences and it would seem preferable to direct mil itary 
training benefit s  to this group (of non-high school 
at t enders and high s chool drop-out s )  in the future ( see 
Chapter 3 ) . 
38 rn May 1973 there was still only one indigenous officer in 
the PNGVR out of  a unit total of  thirty-two . Nearly all 
expat riates serving in the battalion were officers or NCOs 
and they accounted for 2 5  per cent o f  the to tal strength 
of about 350 . 
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The higher defence organisation 
In the Apr il 1974 statement the PNG Defence Minister also 
publicly outlined the structure of  civil-military relat ions 
that the cabinet had agreed to in August 197 3 .  In a j usti­
f icat ion o f  the co-equal status o f  civil ian and mil itary 
heads within the defence organi sat ion , he argued that 
b ecause military action was related to other spheres of 
government activity the government must have acces s  to both 
civil ian and military defence advice : 
Expenditure on defence has t o  be related to other 
financial priorit ies . Account must be taken of the 
whole range of cons iderat ions bearing on the 
national interest - such mat ters as intelligence ,  
internat ional and domestic p olit ical interest s , 
military aspects such as the capab ilities of the 
forces , technical , economic and financial cons ider­
at ion . Bo th civilian and military ab ilities , 
t raining and backgrounds are essential for the 
proper moulding of such elements into coherent and 
consistent policies . Military officers are trained 
primarily for a military role . Formulation o f  
defence policy demands a deep examination of  the 
possible alternatives and their wider implicat ions 
for the nat ional good . Only if the Minister can 
tap directly both civil and military advice can he 
be properly equipped to control the nation ' s 
defence effort . 
Accordingly the government has decided that the 
Minister responsible for defence , that is I ,  should 
be advised direc tly by both the force commander and 
the senior civilian defence admin istrator , who 
should be o f  equal status , each having defined 
functions , and being required to work in a manner 
which brings together both the civilian and the 
military contributions to the development o f  
defence policy (HAD , 25 Apr il 197 4 ) . 
Mr Kiki explained that it was intended to combine the PNG 
Defence Branch and the PNGDF Headquarters in order to form 
the future PNG Defence Department .  It was clear at this 
point that PNG defence planners had placed cons iderable 
emphasis on the formal relat ionship b etween Minister , 
Secretary and military head , presumably because it was 
believed that the relat ionship at this level would set the 
general pat tern o f  PNG civil-military relat ions . This 
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dec is ion indicated , further , that whilst it was the policy 
of  the Somare government no t to isolate indigenous officers 
from the national leadership group , it did not intend to 
give the military the degree o f  corporate independence that 
they may have sought by means of military dominance o f  the 
defence organi sat ion . On this issue polit icians were 
encouraged by Australian officials who could be expected to 
advance arguments for strong civilian control in defence 
administ ration , based on the Australian pract ice . 
It  is o f  course arguable whether decis ions settling the 
formal structure would necessarily have much bearing on the 
way the PNG higher defence organisation might actually 
operate and the manner in which power would be distributed . 
The PNG Cab inet may see dangers in the future in alienating 
the PNG Defence Force and its officer corps from the 
government leadership , even though retaining the allegiance 
o f  civilians within the Force.  It will be the o fficer 
corps and it s senior officers which command the Defence 
Force and its loyalties , not the civilian secretary, and the 
government might ultimately s ee it as more important to 
retain the political support of officers , rather than that 
of civilians working within the Defence Force . 
There is a further reason why the de fence public servant 
in future may no t funct ion as a countervailing influence to 
the military . In the same way that ministers are sometimes 
' captured ' by their public service advis ers , neutralising 
their independence and critical approach to policy matters , 
it is po ssible that the military in PNG may be able to 
' capture ' the loyalties of civil ians operating within the 
defence organisation - and perhaps the minis ter as well . 
Further , it is no t unlikely that public servants will 
perceive their own career interests in regard to prestige 
and affluence as complementary to those of  the officer 
corps - both group s forming part of  an urban elite.  The 
prospect of  defence civil servants being either ' captured ' 
or impotent may be enhanced b ecause o f  the lack o f  a 
tradit ion of  s trong civilian influence in PNG defence 
matters and b ecause of a dearth of experienced public 
servants who might be effective in limit ing military 
influence in quasi-civilian areas of de fence policy and 
administration . 
Although the integration o f  the Defence Branch and 
Defence Force Headquarters had b een announced there was , as 
yet , no decision in regard to the establishment o f  a formal 
body for the coll ect ive management of defence , such as by a 
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board or council . It is likely , nonetheless ,  that a 
collegiate defence body , involving at least the Minister , 
Defence Force Commander and civilian head , will become the 
future bas is for executive decision-making , whether arising 
out of convention or formal statute .  
Unresolved defence issues 
In April 197 4 there were several important defence issues 
which had yet to be finalised ; these included PNG ' s post­
independence defence relationship with Australia , the 
transfer of f inancial responsib ility to PNG and defence aid 
arrangements . 
It has long b een evident that there would be the need for 
pos t-independence defence arrangements between PNG and 
Australia , either embodied in a treaty or within a les s 
formal framework , to  cover a range o f  operational , training , 
personnel ,  logist ic and financial matters (see O ' Neill , 1972 : 
193-203 , and Sundhaussen ,  1973a) . But by April 197 4 consul­
tat ions were still only at a preliminary and exploratory 
s tage . This lack of  progress relative to developments in 
o ther areas was understandable .  Post-indep endence defence 
relations involved complex and sensit ive issues of internal 
as well as foreign polit ics in both PNG and Aus tralia and 
settled PNG defence policy in other areas was a prerequisite 
for determining post-indep endence relations between PNG and 
Australia .  Post-independence relations were to be seen 
therefore as the keystone o f  the PNG defence policy-making 
process .  
Although a formal defence t reaty between PNG and Australia, 
once in some favour , was apparently no longer a public policy 
obj ect ive of either the Australian or PNG governments , the 
likely extent of Australian personnel , logistic , and 
financial assis tance to  the PNGDF at independence pointed to 
cons iderable Australian defence involvement regardles s  o f  
the formal basis under which i t  was t o  b e  sanct ioned . Here , 
Aus tralian defence planners have had to chart a difficult 
course b etween the bas ic policy and ideological posit ion of 
the Australian Labor government that Australia should not 
become militarily involved in an independent PNG , and the 
ensurance o f  the cont inued viability of the PNGDF . It was 
apparent that the mos t  sensit ive issue of future PNG­
Australian defence relat ions would be the c ircumstances and 
conditions under which Australian s ervice personnel might 
take part in PNGDF operation s .  Broadly speaking , two types 
of operat ions and three sorts of Australian roles might be 
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envisaged . Aust ralians might conceivably be involved , in 
operational units in command roles (say ,  as infantry sub­
unit commanders ) ,  in an operat ional support role (say ,  as 
helicopter p ilo ts or engineers) , or in staf f  and training 
roles . Operations might be either against an external 
enemy or of an internal security nature - the second 
possib ility perhaps being the more likely one in the short­
term future . 
Whilst it might be possible to remove the probab ility of  
Australian involvement in an operational command role at , 
or soon after , independence by rapid lo calisation o f  
command appointments , the support roles are likely to 
continue for a number of years . Australian planners have 
had to accept the fact that precip itate withdrawal or  non­
participat ion o f  Aus tralian personnel might j eopardise the 
success of PNG milit ary operat ion s .  In this s ituation a 
wide-ranging prohib it ion by Australia on the employment o f  
Australian troops within the PNGDF might force PNG to turn 
to mercenaries or other countries for defence personnel , or 
attempt to lo calise its forces at a pace which would lead 
to a serious reduc tion in e ffectivenes s and reliab ility. 
Because of  this crucial relat ionship between the role o f  
Australians and the effectiveness o f  the PNG Defence Force 
it is understandable that the PNG government might want to 
know the conditions under which Australians are to be 
permitted to operate in the PNGDF after independence . In 
this regard Australia appears to face several alternatives . 
It might elect to set out formal and predetermined restric­
t ions on employment ,  such as no involvement by Australians 
in operat ions against certain seces sionist groups ;  or , 
alternatively, Aus tralia might rely on a set of  mutually 
agreed safeguards , such as insistence on the institution of  
proper legal procedures before Defence Force units could b e  
employed on internal security operat ion s .  Australia might 
also want to insist on consultation and consent b efore 
certain types of  operat ion s o f  a particularly sensit ive 
nature , such as internal s ecurity operat ion s involving other 
foreign nationals . It would be very difficult  for Australia 
to remain formally neutral in any conflict which involved 
the PNGDF (supported by Aust ralian s ervicemen ) and another 
s tate .  Australia would be s een , int ernat ionally , to bear 
respons ibility for the official acts of its own servants , 
that is , Australian servicemen in PNG. 
In relation to post-independence defence relations at a 
more general level it seems that  whils t  PNG will principally 
rely on Australia , PNG has already indicated that she will 
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attempt to diversify her defence contacts as well as 
es tablishing close relations with Indonesia. PNG is already 
receiving small-scale p ersonnel and t raining assistance from 
the New Zealand defence forces and it s eems likely that 
contact b etween Indones ia and PNG will soon lead to defence 
links and exchanges . 
The trans fer of  financial responsib ility for the PNGDF 
from the Australian to the PNG government and the details of  
po st-independence defence aid arrangements have also yet  to  
be finalised . A smooth transit ion in f inancial responsib­
ilities for defence has b een hampered by almost complete 
metropolitan control over defence expenditure and by 
cons iderable difficulty in actually determining the level of 
defence expenditure in PNG, aris ing out of the integration 
o f  Aus tralian and PNG defence . In April 1974 Mr Kiki did , 
however , announce that a general formula of defence aid to 
PNG had been agreed upon in de fence consultat ions between 
the two countries . This formula provided that 
for the f inancial year in which independence occurs 
the following arrangement s would apply . 
Under a program met directly from the Australian 
Budget and agreed between the Papua New Guinea and 
Aus tralian governments provision will be made to 
cover the personnel costs  of Australian s ervicemen 
attached to the Defence Force , the cost of  training 
Papua New Guinean servicemen in Australia and the 
cost of s elected capital proj ects . 
The remaining costs of  the Defence Force which I 
might broadly describe as normal running costs will 
comprise the Papua New Guinea Budget defence vote .  
Half of  this amount will be met from Papua New 
Guinea ' s  budget resources and the Aust ralian 
government has promised to provide financial 
assistance in respect of the o ther half . 39 
It was stated that this formula would be reviewed during the 
year of independence f or application in following years . 
The general problem which PNG leaders have faced in 
relat ion to the subj ect o f  post-independence defence aid has 
b een that of how to secure the maximum Australian budgetary 
ass istanc e  from Australia without the PNG Defence Force 
appearing , in effect , as an Aust ralian mercenary force . 
Papua New Guinea may have b een attracted to the idea of a 
39HAD, 25 April 197 4 .  Ministerial S tatement on Defence . 
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substantial proportion of her future defence budget being 
funded from aid grants not explicitly t ied to defence so 
that PNG its elf  would then be able to allocate its resources 
as b etween defence , law and o rder and developmental 
priorities . In this way Papua New Guinea leaders might 
believe they would be seen to be exercis ing greater 
sovereignty over their own defence forces . This approach to 
PNG defence aid would involve Australia in taking into 
account PNG ' s  defence burden in determining levels  o f  
Australian aid .  I t  would als o  b e  implicit in such an 
arrangement that Australia would have no control over 
defence expenditure . (PNG might , for example , decide that 
its security priorities lay in expanding the Police and 
down-grading it s external defence capacity . )  If  Australian 
priorities were disregarded , Aus tralia might be reluctant to 
continue to provide sub stan t ial levels of aid b ased on 
Australian perceptions of PNG security need s . Australian 
foreign defence �olicy could depend , for instance , on a PNG 
capacity to deal with low-level military threats on it s 
borders and the lack of this capab ility might thereby be 
seen as increasing the likelihood of requests for Aus tralian 
support in s ituat ions in which it d id no t want to become 
embroiled . Because of these implicat ions it is likely that 
Australia may want to retain a cons iderable degree o f  
influence over the manner in which aid is supplied t o  PNG ' s  
defence forces . 
The is sue o f  defence aid to PNG involves the wider 
quest ion of all cagegories of aid to PNG , and Australian and 
Papua New Guinean views on this subj ect reflect important 
differences .  In April 1974 the Australian Minister for 
External Territories , in explaining Australia ' s  future aid 
policy to PNG , argued that Australia would want to know 
precisely how the money was to be spent ( in PNG) before 
grants were made and , therefore , proj ect-oriented aid would 
be favoured to a budget-support approach . 40  In con trast to 
this approach , the PNG Chief Minister during a visit to 
Australia in June 197 4  called for Australian ' aid without 
strings ' .  Mr Somare said his government would resist any 
Australian action to use aid as a lever to guide PNG 
development plans . 41 It has b een argued that Aust ralian 
ins istence on proj ect forms o f  aid management would distort 
PNG ' s  developmental priorit ies and , similarly , proj ect-
40Pos t-Courier , 3 0  April 19 7 4  
41 Age , 15 June 197 4 .  
oriented Australian defence aid might inhibit the develop­
ment of a defence force b est suited to PNG conditions and 
priorit ie s  (Ballard , 1 97 3 ) . 
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A solution to the defence aid problem may lie in a pro­
portion of PNG ' s defence budget being provided from ear­
marked Australian defence aid (perhaps for a specif ic 
proj ect , for example , the development o f  an air element)  and 
a larger proportion being received in the form o f  general 
aid which PNG might wish to apply to defence expenditure . 
Under such an arrangement there would be room for tacit 
understanding b etween governments that a certain proportion 
o f  Aust ralian aid could be applied to defence . Apart from 
reassurance over minimum levels of  defence expenditure , 
Aust ralia might , at some t ime in the future , be concerned 
that unduly large proport ions o f  Australian aid were not 
misapplied to PNG ' s  security forces . This problem might 
occur if there was a change to authoritarian or military 
forms o f  government in PNG .  I n  any event , Australia will 
need to be careful not to apply her own polit ical and social 
values rigidly to the governmental problems of an independent 
PNG. There would seem to be ' neo-colonialist ' as well as 
' idealist ' traps here . 
There is also the i ssue o f  PNG ' s  contribution to her 
defence budget from internally raised revenue . In January 
1973 the Australian Defence Minister suggested an init ial 
PNG contribution of about $4 million per annum - an amount 
then j udged to cover PNGDF indigenous wages , although these 
costs have sub sequently risen above $6 million . If PNG ' s  
defence bud get , exclus ive o f  costs  attributable to 
Australian personnel and activit ies is placed in the year o f  
independence at about $ 1 5  million , a contribut ion of  $ 6  
million would represent about 40  per cent o f  the total . 
This level o f  Papua New Guinean contribution might increase 
to a not ionally important 1 51 per cent controlling interest '  
in a matter of  a few years without undue dislocation to 
PNG ' s budget , provided that , as promised , the level of 
Aus tralian aid to PNG remains at about its present high 
level . 42 In 1973-74 Australia provided a total of $Al78 . S  
million in aid to PNG compared to $A143 million in 1972-7 3  
(Post-Courier , 2 2  Aug .  197 3 )  and a total o f  $A500 million 
was promised over the following three y ears . Assuming a PNG 
contribution of $A6 million per annum to a total PNG defence 
42 See , for example , Address by Hon. W. L .  Morrison , Minister 
for External Territories , opening the 197 3 Waigani Seminar, 
April 197 3 , Post-Courier , 30 Apr il 1973 . 
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budget of ab out $Al5 mill ion per annum , total annual 
Australian costs might range between say $Al5 million and 
$A2 0  mill ion , taking into account the wages and salaries o f  
Australian s ervicemen serving with the PNGDF , the training 
of  PNGDF personnel in Australia and other administrative 
�o sts . Whilst Australian defence aid to PNG after independ­
ence will probably amount only to between 10 and 15 per cen t  
of  the total Australian aid - a percentage which would not 
appear to be exces sive - PNG ' s to tal defence burden is , by 
comparison with a number of smaller states , somewhat above 
average . The reasons for the relative ' expensiveness ' of the 
PNGDF are probably to be found in the Force ' s  close inte­
gration with the Au st ralian services as well as the 
generally high PNG cost structure , although it is possible 
that the post-independence period will lead to some defence 
savings . 
There are also procedural and administrative problems to 
be overcome in transferring defence f inancial responsib ility 
from Canberra to Port Moresby . Even by early 1974 the 
process of ' unscrambling ' PNG defence costs  from those o f  
Australia had not b een completed . Costs remained d isguised , 
for ins tance , in the system by which PNGDF logistic units 
were supplied by Aust ralian ordnance sources with stores , 
weapons and equipmen t .  PNG offic ials have , for some time , 
sought increased financial independence and respons ib ilit ies 
in PNG for defence matters so as to provide a period of 
financial tutelage . Although financial devolut ion should 
have commenced earlier , the trans it ional arrangements for 
the management of  the PNG defence budget for the 1974-7 5 
financial year should improve the prospec ts of a smooth 
transit ion at independence . 
Though PNG has been encouraged to develop defence forces 
and policies appropriate to its needs , there has b een little 
fundc:t.mental change , so far , to the s ize , role and organis­
at ion of PNG ' s Defence Force . To a remarkable extent , 
PNG ' s own assessment o f  its defence needs have accorded wit h  
Australian percept ions o f  them. I t  i s  true that the more 
amb itious Aust ralian military plans for PNG ' s defence forces 
produced before 1972  have not been adopted , but neither have 
PNG leaders sought radical defence alternatives to the 
solutions presented by Australia . This outcome is perhaps 
no t unexpected s ince Papua New Guinean leaders have been so  
reliant on Australians , whether employed in Australia or PNG, 
for almost all of  their special ist defence advice and , 
secondly , the rapid onset o f  independence and the reality of  
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an effic ient force-in-being have comb ined to limit both the 
scope for , and willingness to institute , radical defence 
change . PNG has neither greatly expanded nor reduced the 
s ize of the Defence Force . It has accepted the need for a 
volunteer standing force and rej ected , without ever seriously 
considering it , the option o f  some form of  ' People ' s  Army ' 
b ased either on conscrip tion or part-time service . It has 
adopted a formula of c ivil-military relations which resembled 
in formal terms those of Aust ralia . These tendencies serve 
to emphasise the importance o f  the Australian milit ary 
tradition in PNG and the fact that in the early years of 
independence , defence , like so many other aspects of  the 
PNG poli ty , will be a syncret ic Australian-PNG construc t .  
In reviewing the three stages in the trans fer process ,  it 
is apparent that , whilst a substantial Australian strategic 
reappraisal o f  PNG ' s  importance to Australia has taken place 
and the localisat ion of the Defence Force is at a relat ively 
advanced s tage , the third stage o f  military development is 
as yet in its infancy . The change in Australian strategic 
att itudes to PNG ,  from that at the conclusion o f  World War 
II when both maj or political p arties in Australia saw Papua 
New Guinea ' s  security as vital , to that o f  regarding PNG of 
strategic importance but not vital has greatly facil itated 
the military decolonisat ion proces s .  Indeed it is difficul t 
to imagine Aust ralia being prepared to relinquish her 
military influence in PNG so absolutely if PNG was , today , 
st ill held to be as vital as it was once cons idered to be.  
The second s tage of  the transfer process has marched in 
step with successive advance s  in polit ical development and 
as PNG ' s polit ical future became clearer the tempo of  
localisation increased . In this way defence lo calisation 
was seen as one aspect of  ensuring the ultimate preparednes s  
of PNG t o  assume the responsib ilit ies of independence which 
included sovereignty over PNG ' s own armed force s .  This 
involved the growth of a military structure which Papua New 
Guineans could manage and which was j udged to be within it s 
bud getary resources . 
Military development - the proces s  by which the Australian 
mil itary heritage in PNG is eventually adapted to meet the 
needs of  PNG - could not be completed in the artif icial 
pd it ical environment of the decolonisat ion period in which 
indigenous political forces in PNG were d istorted by 
Aus tralia ' s  interest s and policies in PNG .  This point may 
be exemplified in relation to future levels  of  PNG defence 
spending.  Because the PNG government has so far not actually 
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controlled defence spending , it has not yet seen money spent 
on defence as an opportunity-co s t  in relation to other areas 
of public expenditure , and in this sense , at leas t , it has 
no t had to locate defence within the national priorities . 
This problem is further complicated because , in the post­
independence period , PNG ' s level of  defence spending may 
s t ill be determined more by what Australia is prepared to 
give than by what PNG is prepared to spend and it may no t b e  
clear whether there is a synnnetric opportunity-cos t  relation­
ship with Australian d� fence aid .  That is , if PNG were to 
cut back . on defence spend ing could she be sure of recoup ing 
these ' savings ' in the form of increased Australian economic 
aid , or would it merely be a case of defence benef it s  
foregone i f  no t sought ? This problem may impede the proces s 
by which PNG ' s  defence forces are developed to conform to 
PNG ' s  actual defence needs in terms of size , role and even 
conditions o f  service . 
Because the third phase in the trans fer o f  military power 
of  PNG military development will occur within an independent 
polity , the course of this development should b e  less subj ect 
to  Aus tralian political and military patterns . On the other 
hand , these changes will s t ill b e  subj ect to strong 
Au stralian influences in the form of de fence personnel and 
aid . Rap id removal o f  this inf luence ,  by replacing 
Australians with other foreigner s ,  or by becoming self­
rel iant in defence , is likely to be unattractive to mos t  
Papua New Guineans in the foreseeable future . A strategy of  
national self-reliance would , in the short term ,  be likely 
to lead to considerable hardship and social unrest . And the 
problem of over-dependence (on Australia) is unlikely to be 
solved by moving to a situation of over-dependence on , say ,  
Indones ia .  I t  may b e  concluded , therefore , that further 
military development in PNG in the early years of independ­
ence is more likely to be influenced by tradit ion than by 
pressure for radical change and , for this reason , a study of 
the PNGDF on the eve of  independence will be a useful guide 
to the post- independence performance of the organisation . 
Chapter 3 
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force : 
an organisational analysis 
The Defence Force organisation 
Previous chapters have traced the development of PNG 
military forcey · This chapter examines the Papua New Guinea 
Defence Force . It is written in three parts : the first 
part describes the organisat ion and deployment of the PNGDF , 
the second examines the ability o f  the Defence Force to meet 
the roles which have b een laid down by the PNG government 
and the third analyses the PNGDF ' s  composition and social 
functioning . 
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force is a unified , single 
defence force which has maritime , air and land elements 
within its s tructure . The Force had a total authorised 
establishment strength in January 1974  o f  3681 o fficers and 
men . There were also 7 7 5  civil ian employees authorised , 
making a grand total o f  4456 military and civilian employees. 
The uniformed s trength of the PNGDF in early 1974  was , 
therefore , only slight ly less than that of  the PNG Police . 
The Defence Force consisted o f  the following components : 
A Defence Force headquarters and departmental s tructure . 
The role o f  this component might be described as the 
administration and command of the force , policy 
development and polit ical liaison .  
An operational component . This consisted of a maritime 
element containing a patrol boat s quadron and a support 
squadron , an air element of one medium transport flight 
and a land element of two infantry bat tal ions , one 
engineer company and a s ignals squadron . 
A lo gistic system . This consis ted of  a number of  special 
1The s tudy is bas ed on information current in 1974 . In 
April 1976  the organisation o f  the Defence Force had not 
altered sub stantially from that described here . 
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purpose units designed to  support the Force . 
A training system .  The maj or training unit s included a 
training depot , apprentice and officer training unit s .  
The detailed organisation o f  each of  these components of 
the Defence Force is discus sed later , but it will f irst be 
u seful to remark briefly on the Force as a whole and on the 
Australian contribution to it . Like the PNG Public Service 
the Defence Force in 1974 remained heavily dependent on 
Australians . Of the total of  3780 officers and men actually 
serving with the PNGDF in January 197 4 ,  6 63 or about 17 per 
cent of the to tal were Australians . The dependence on 
Australian leadership and expertise was more sharply drawn 
in regard to officers and senior non-commissioned officers 
(NCOs) . In January 197 4 75 per cent of  the officers serving 
with the PNGDF were Aus tralians as were slightly over 5 0  
per cent of the senior NCOs . The Australians serving with 
units of the PNGDF were , in December 1973 , separately 
identified as members of an Australian Defence Ass istance 
Group (ADAG) . 2 The role of this organisation was to provide 
the neces sary personnel ass istance to the PNGDF in order to 
allow it to operate and develop to the point when Aus tralians 
were no longer required . In January 1974  there were also 
226 Australian servicemen serving in unit s outside the 
PNGDF . There were several Australian support unit s involved 
in providing special type s of support to the PNGDF , 
principally air support , and there were two Australian 
defence units with particular tasks : a survey squadron 
engaged on mapping tasks for the PNG government , and a small 
engineer unit which operated as a Public Works Off ice at 
Mendi in the Southern Highlands District . 
The marit ime element 
The marit ime element o f  the Defence Force consisted of  
two maj or unit s , a Fast Patrol Boat Squadron o f  f ive boats 
based at Lombrum Island in the Manus Island District and a 
Support Squadron equip�ed with a number of  landing craft 
based at Port Moresby . Although the se two units accounted 
2 In 1976  ADAG was redesignated as the Australian Defence 
Co-operat ion Group (ADCG) . 
3Lombrum Island is adj acent to Manus Island and forms part 
for only some 10 per cent o f  the to tal manpower in the 
operat ional unit s o f  the Defence Force they performed the 
important funct ions of patro lling PNG ' s territorial waters 
and providing logist ic support . 
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The Patrol Boat Squadron a t  Lombrum consisted o f  fifteen 
o fficers , ten senior NCOs and s ixty-five other rank. (The 
comp lement o f  each boat is three officers and fifteen men . ) 
In January 19 7 4  all the captains o f  the patrol boats were 
RAN officers and a number of key enlisted men b illets on 
each of the boats were also f illed by Australians . The 
senior PNG o f ficers- were lieutenants ( i . e .  cap tains in army 
rank) and planning them called for complete o fficer local­
isat ion some t ime in 19 78 , with Australian enlisted men 
being required at least un t il 19 75 . The Australian presence 
will therefore continue for some considerable t ime to come , 
unless o fficers o f  other navies or contract o f ficers are 
employed in the task. Good pro gress in localisat ion is also 
dependent on the retention of highly skilled PNG specialis t s  
within the PNGDF . Some o f  these men are reported to be 
tempted by bet ter pay and conditions available to them in 
the merchant navy and their los s  would be a ser ious set-back 
to the development of the marit ime element . 
The role and capabilities o f  the Patrol Boat Squadron are 
affected by technical considerat ions asso ciated with the 
' Attack ' class Patrol Boat . 4 The boats are limited to some 
3 (continued) 
o f  the Manus District o f  PNG. The principal Manus District 
civil airfield and former wart ime and po stwar RAAF airfield 
at Momote is also on Lombrum Island . Both the naval base 
and airfield are j oined with the District Headquarters at 
Lorengau by an all-weather road . I have followed the 
custom, generally , o f  describ ing it as the ' Manus base ' .  
(The term ' maritime ' rather than ' naval ' has been preferred 
by the PNGDF as maritime operat ions in o f ficial usage 
incorporates operations no t only on the sur f  ace o f  the sea 
but also under and over it . )  
4There are 15 'Attack ' class P atrol Boat s in service with 
the RAN as well as the 5 with the PNGDF . The boats in 
service with the PNGDF are : 
PTF 84 Aitape 
PTF 9 4  Madang 
PTF 85 Samarai 
Age in 1974 
5-1 / 2  years 
4-1 / 2  years 
5 years 
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extent in their coas tal surveillance ab ility both by speed 
and endurance . Operating on bo th engines at 14 kno ts , their 
best economical sp eed , they can cover only some 560 nautical 
miles in about forty hours .  Apart from fuel requirements 
they are able to carry enough water and supplies for about a 
sixteen days ' patro l and the boats experience logistic 
problems when operat ing at a d istance from their base or a 
source of  replenishment . Their effectivenes s  in a surveill­
ance role is greatly enhanced if they are able to operate in 
conj unct ion with marit ime reconnais sance aircraft .  
The Patrol Boat Squadron was suppor ted b y  a shore base 
establishment at Manus of  over two hundred officers and men , 
although this number is to be reduced . The short facility 
formed part of the PNGDF logistic system and included a 
patrol boat maintenance section with engineering workshop 
facilit ies , a power house and other base services , including 
a hospital which also provides med ical care for civilians in 
the area. 
The patrol boats are based at what was once a maj or 
Uni ted States wartime bas e which was taken over by the RAN 
at the end o f  the war on a much reduced scale . This base , 
known as HMAS Tarangau , subs equently became the patrol base 
in 1964 when it was decided to form a PNG patrol boat 
squadron . HMAS Tarangau was also developed as an o iling 
station after a decision taken in 1964 and a maj or fuel o il 
installat ion designed for RAN fleet operations was estab­
li shed there . 5 Al though this installat ion underwent maj or 
4 (continued ) 
PTF 93 Lae 
PTF 92 Ladava 
5 years 
4-1 / 2  years 
Each boat displaces 146 tons aild is equipped with one 
40/ 60mm Bofors light automat ic weapon . They have a maximum 
speed of approximately 23 knots and are powered by two 
diesel engines .  ( See O ' Neill and McLean , 1972 : C. 4 . ) 
5 see O ' Neill , 1 9 7 1 : 6 .  The three fuel tanks at Manus have a 
total capacity of  11 , 500 tonnes .  During the period o f  
Aus tralian military involvement in Vietnam, the Manus base 
was quite frequently used by RAN ship s , but in February 
1974  it had no t b een used by RAN ships for more than 18  
months (and only once every 2 or  3 months by RN or USN 
ships ) . The current very low usage o f  Manus may be attrib­
uted , in part , to greater use of the western route to the 
Far East via Fremantle , rather than via the east co ast . 
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refurbishment in 197 2 ,  the Australian government decided 
that it no longer has a strategic requirement for Tarangau . 
( It was decommissioned as an RAN base and handed over to the 
PNGDF before independence . ) 
The Manus patrol boat base , whilst p rovid ing most o f  the 
neces sary shore maintenance facilit ies ( it lacks a slipway) , 
is def ic ient for operat ional purposes . Because of  its 
lo cat ion it is not well suited as a base for ' PNG marit ime 
operat ion s in view of the long trans it voyages that are 
required to reach patrol stations and this entails unecon­
omical use o f  the boats . The isolation o f  Manus from Port 
Moresby has also led to logistic and administrat ive problems 
so that the co sts of  maintaining a marit ime base on Manus 
are probably considerably greater than they would be in a 
more central locat ion .  Measured against this , however ,  is 
the expenditure that would be required to reproduce the 
accommodat ion and maintenance fac il it ies already in existence 
at Manus . Studies conducted in order to determine the best 
s ite for a PNG naval base have pointed to Madang , which has 
an exist ing technical support base,  and this would permit 
the centralised development of  the country ' s  nautical main­
tenance resources . Madang ' s  harbour , although less 
suitable than Manus for very large ves sels , is adequate for 
smaller craft . 
Whilst the prospects of a naval base being developed at 
Madang at one stage seemed bright it is now unlikely . 
Est imates o f  the cost o f  a new b ase may have ranged up to 
$ 8  mill ion and it is unlikely that this amount of money would 
be forthcoming from Australian governments seeking to hold 
down defence spending . The option of concentrat ing both 
marit ime units at Port Moresby has also b een cons idered and 
discarded . Apart from the problems o f  congestion at the 
small ships facility in Port Moresby harbour and what was 
seen as the undesirab il ity o f  placing too much of the 
Defence Force in the cap ital city , there was also an oper­
at ional obj ection . For part of each year during the south­
east t rade wind season the pas sage o f  pat rol boats around 
the southeast t ip of Papua to the north coast is diff icult 
due to sea condit ions . 
Aside from these f inancial and technical cons iderat ions 
it is l ikely that Manus will remain the PNGDF ' s  principal 
marit ime base for largely polit ical reasons . The Manus 
base plays a s ignificant part in the life o f  the Distric t , 
supporting a community of about three thousand people . As 
Manus Island is one o f  the less developed Districts in 
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economic terms (although educat ion facilities are widespread 
and Manus Islanders are prominent in PNG nat ional life) , 
local and nat ional politicians would no t wish to see the 
base removed if it could no t b e  replaced by some other 
economic act ivity. Indeed , Manus leaders might wish to see 
the naval base developed to provide a maintenance facility 
for other marine act ivity such as fishing.  
It could also be argued that  Australia ' s  interests might 
be best served by the PNGDF ' s  retention o f  the Manus base.  
As Australia does not wish to retain the fuel oil install­
at ion as a foreign base after independence ,  on the bas is 
that the strategic benefits and possible polit ical costs  do 
no t warrant it , it might , nonetheless , still be able to use 
the oil fuel facility on Manus if it should become neces sary . 
Although it will no longer be an RAN base , Australian 
personnel will still be required on Manus for a considerable 
number of years to assist in the operation and maintenance 
of the patrol boats and Australia may , therefore , obtain 
the best of  both worlds - access to Manus without the odium 
attached to a foreign base . 
The Support Squadron had an es tablishment strength o f  
four o fficers , s ixteen senior NCOs and fifty-eight other 
rank . This unit , previously a water transportat ion squadron 
o f  the Australian Army , is currently equipped with three 
LCM-8 shallow draft landing craft and several small work 
boat s . 6 Though the LCM-8 craft provide a valuable logist ic 
capability , they lack crew facilit ies for long voyages and 
due to a lack of  navigat ional equipment they have to be 
escorted on longer voyages .  Because o f  these shortcomings 
and the view that more o f  the lo gis tic burden might be borne 
by sea rather than by means of expensive air transport , the 
PNGDF sought to have the marit ime element o f  the Defence 
Force equipped with larger sea-go ing transports of the 
Australian LCH type.  It was announced in November 19 7 3  
that Australia had agreed t o  provide two such landing craft 
to the PNGDF . 7 The craft were delivered in 1975 . 
6The LCM-8 has a range o f  19 0 naut ical miles at 8 kno t s  (in 
a period of  24 hours ) .  I t  can carry 50 tons o f  cargo o r  
about 6 0  troops . Of the present group o f  three craft 
usually one two out of the three are available at any one 
time because o f  maintenance requirement . 
7 See Department o f  Defence Pres s Release No . 1 7 4 / 7 3  of 7 
Nov . 19 7 3 .  The LCH is an Australian designed heavy landing 
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Besides these two maj or operat ional components of the 
maritime element - the patrol boat and support squadrons -
there were a number o f  supporting units which have been 
classified here as p art o f  the Defence Force logist ic 
system. These units were the Patrol Boat Maintenance 
Section and the PNG Dockyard . The Dockyard under present 
plans will not only carry out maintenance on PNGDF craft but 
also utilise any spare capacity in maintaining PNG government 
cra ft and it will probably be located at Port Moresby . 
Another small but important unit was raised in 1 9 7 4  - an 
Explos ive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit . Without this capa­
bility PNG would be reliant on Australia or ano ther nation 
for the disposal o f  unexploded mines and bombs , largely a 
wartime legacy which continues to cause a problem. 
The air element 
Unt il the decision taken by the PNG and Australian 
government s  in 1 9 7 4  to develop a transport flight , the PNGDF 
had no air element . Instead , the air support requirements 
for the Defence Force were met. by two Australian Support 
Units . 8 Under current planning , the RAAF Caribou detachment 
in PNG will form the nucleus o f  the organic PNGDF air 
element , b ecoming progressively localised as PNG servicemen 
are trained . Although the Caribou was pref erred by the 
PNGDF and PNG government because o f  it s superior airfield 
performance and unique ability (amongst the aircraft types 
based in PNG) to carry certain awkward loads , the PNGDF is 
7 (continued) 
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craft with an over-the-beach capab ility . Some 8 craft have 
already been built for the RAN .  I t  has a 1 70-2 00 ton lift 
capacity and displaces ov�r 300 tons . The craft can carry 
an infantry company or more and their equipment and 
vehicles over long sea voyages to all parts o f  PNG ' s coast 
and in the navigable rivers . 
These two unit s were : 38 Squadron , Detachment A,  RAAF (a  
detachment o f  4 Caribou aircraft based at Jackson ' s  Field , 
Port Moresby) and 183 Reconnaissance Flight (Australian 
Army) and it s associated Workshop ( to tal : 80 men) . This 
latter unit was based at Lae and equipped with 3 Pilatus 
Porter turbo-engined fixed wing light transport aircraft 
and about 5 Bell S ioux light . ob servation helicopters . 
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to be equipped with four Dakota aircraft . 9 Dakota was 
offered by Australia because it is less expens ive to operate 
and is a more convenient gif t .  Australia has only limited 
numbers o f  Caribou , several have been lo st during service 
with the RAAF and it would be difficult to purchase replace­
ments as production of the type has ceased . On the o ther 
hand the RAAF has surplus Dako ta aircraft (military variants 
of the civilian DC3 ) . Whilst the Caribou aircraft are 
certainly more expens ive to run , they can land in well over 
one hundred airf ields , including a number of st rategically 
important airfields in the Indonesian border area which are 
at present c lassif ied as unsuitable for Dakota . 
A belated s tart to the training of PNGDF ground and air 
crew was made in 1973 with seven p ilo t trainees and eight 
technic al ground crew trainee s .  This train ing had b een 
delayed until the future composit ion of the PNGDF air 
element was decided , but the trainees eventually commenced 
their courses before a decision was finally taken , thus 
saving a little valuable time . 10 Some of the p ilot t rainees 
should complete their training by early 1975 . 
The Australian Army Aviat ion unit , 183 Reconnais sance 
Flight , based at Lae , was classified as an Australian support 
unit and therefore not part of the PNGDF . There were no 
Papua New Guineans within its ranks and no plans for the 
unit to be localised .  Current intentions are that the 
PNGDF air element will consist of medium transport aircraft 
only and no t include the types flown by 183 Reconnaissance 
Flight . Because of the valuable air support provided by 
183 Reconnaissance Flight in the fields of  reconnaissance 
and liaison , casualty evacuation and resupply of troops in 
the field and , because of the training value to the 
Au st ralian Army of having the unit there , it was dec ided 
that the Flight would remain in PNG after independence . 11 
There have been plans drawn up for a new PNGDF air base 
at Nadzab airfield in the Markham Valley near Lae ; however ,  
the expense involved in this proj ect , together with the 
availab ility of the exist ing facilit ies at Port Moresby and 
Lae , make it s adoption unlikely in the short term. In the 
9 See Mr A. M. Kiki , HAD , Minist erial Statement on Defence , 
25  April 1974 . 
10 See Department of Defence Press Release , No . 58 / 7 3  of  
April 1973 . 
11The flight was withdrawn from PNG early in 197 6 .  
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longer term the development of Nadzab as the principal air 
base appears sens ible . Nadzab is a better nodal po int for 
air operat ions both in regard to the d isposition of other 
PNGDF bases and the geography of the country and a base at 
Nadzab would be more economical and efficient . Such a 
proj ect might , after independence , merit Australian f inancial 
support . 
The land element 
The operat ional units of the land element accounted for a 
high proportion (87 per cent ) of  PNGDF operat ional manpower . 
Here the PNGDF conformed to the. pattern of black African 
armed forces in that the PNGDF was predominantly a land 
force . The principal PNGDF land element units were lPIR, 
2PIR, the PNGDF Eng ineer Company , and a Signals Squadron . 
There was also a small PNGDF Intelligence Section .  
The infantry battalions in January 197 4 were each 
organised on the basis of a ' restric ted ' establishment o f  
2 9  0 ff icers , 42  senior NCOs and 481 o ther rank. Each 
battalion had a headquarters , · a  combined administrative/ 
support c ompany and three (rather than the ' usual ' four) 
rifle companies . The administ rative/ support group included 
a mortar platoon (equipped with 8lnun mortars ) ,  a signals 
platoon , medical assis tants and an administrat ive elemen t .  
The members o f  the battalion P ipes and Drums ( a  nice colonial 
touch) also had an operational role as stretcher bearers .  
The rifle companies , each commanded by a maj or , contained 
three platoons , each with an e f fective day-to-day strength 
o f  about thirty men. The combat strength o f  each battalion 
in terms of ' bayonets ' might , therefore , be reckoned at nine 
platoons , with an addit ion to this total of some or all the 
support company specialist platoons , depending on the type 
of operat ions . The PIR battalions were equipped with the 
current range of infan try weapons and equipment in service 
with the Australian Army . Indeed this range o f  equipment 
was to be found generally throughout the PNGDF . 
The deployment o f  the two b attalions was as follows . 
lPIR was based at Taurama Barracks , Port Moresby , 2PIR at 
Moem Barracks , Wewak , with one of  its companies located � t  
Vanimo ( this out-station company is periodically changed 
over with ano ther Wewak-based company) . Until 1974 lPIR had 
a company at Igam Barracks , Lae , but when the battalions 
were reorganised on a three rifle company bas is to keep the 
PNGDF manpower level as clo se as possible to 3500 men , this 
outstation arrangement ceased . The deploymen t  of the 
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infantry battalions has not led to ' specialisat ion ' by one 
or another of the battalions to certain parts of the country . 
It has b een policy for both battalions to patrol , train and 
carry out civic act ion tasks in all parts o f  PNG , so that 
lPIR has commonly operated in the Sep ik districts adj acent 
to the 2PIR bases and 2PIR has op erated in Papua . This has 
been j ust ified on the bas is o f  the need for both units to be 
familiar with the whole country , no t just part of it . Apart 
from operat ional reasons , famil iarity with the whole country 
has been seen as an aspect of  the soldiers ' civil educat ion , 
promot ing a sense of n ationalism and an awarenes s of  how the 
people live . 
The mobility this policy entails has been possible because 
the battal ions are each located by airfields and ports , RAAF 
transport has b een available on a quite elaborate scale to 
airlift troop s to all parts of  the country and water craft 
have also been used. Whilst the collocat ion of the infantry 
elements with airfields and ports facilitates rapid redep loy­
ment in an emergency , it would seem unlikely that the 
present extensive use of air transport for normal training 
will be sustained after independence when con siderat ions of  
economy become more important . If this is so , the battalions 
will then tend to become more res tricted to their own base 
and contiguous areas and it might become neces sary period­
ically to change over the battalions in order to prevent any 
regionalist tendenc ies . 
As a consequence·  of the concentrat ion of the land element 
in Port Moresby and Wewak two key areas of PNG - the High­
lands and New Guinea Islands - are without Defence Force 
bases . If the Defence Fo rce does become involved in internal 
security operations in either of these areas it may have to 
rely on air transport for its de.ployment . The orig inal 
intention to locate a third infantry battalion at Lae (.for 
which Igam Barracks were constructed )  would have meant chat 
a battalion s ize force could have been rapidly deployed to 
most areas of  the Highlands by road if air transport was no t 
available . With a two battalion force this is not possible . 
In regard to the company base at Vanimo , its strategic 
location clo se to the Indonesian border makes it useful . It 
is a good locat ion from which to mount surve illance patrols 
on the northern border region and if a border control 
p roblem were to arise in the future , the importance of  
Vanino and its port and airfield would increase.  The base 
at Vanimo also reduces the air support needed to deploy 
patrols in the border region . 
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The localisation of the PIR battalions in January 197 4 
was well advanced . In each battalion there were only about 
seventeen Australians (of thes e ,  sixteen were officers and 
one was a warrant o ff icer) . Thus the pro cess of  localisation 
below the offic er level was vir tually complete and about 
half the o fficer appointments had b een localised . Of the 
higher appointments , the Command ing Off icer of lPIR in 
February 197 4 was a Papua New Guinean and about half the 
total number of company commanders of both battalions were 
Papua New Guineans . On the other hand some Australian 
officers may be required in command posit ions in the P IR 
battalions into 1975 and in staff or advisory positions 
beyond then . 
The PNGDF Engineer Company , based at Murray Barracks , 
Port Moresby , had a s trength o f eight officers and 159 men . 
Half of  the officers and senior NCOs were Aus tralian but 
almost all the other rank were PNG servicemen . The Engineer 
Company was o rganised to provide combat engineer support 
(such as the construction of obstacles and the carrying out 
o f  demolitions )  as well as bein g  able to carry out engineer­
ing construction tasks on a 11mited scale ( such as road and 
bridge build ing) .  To carry out con s t ruct ion tasks the 
company was equipped with some engineering plant , including 
bulldozers , graders and dump trucks . This unit provided 
the basis of the Defence Force ' s  civic action engineer 
capab il ity , however ,  its limited number of men and equipment 
const itute real limitations on the proj ec ts which may be 
attempted . 
The Defence Force Signals Squadron is also based at 
Murray Barracks with detachments at Wewak , Manus and Lae . 
It contained eight o fficers and 149 men (of this total 55 
were Australians in January 197 4) . There was , therefore , 
some way to go towards full lo calisation in PNGDF communi­
cat ions . The Squadron links all the PNGDF bases with voice 
and teleprinter communications and provides communicat ions 
with ships and aircraft as well as with land element groups 
operating away from their bases . The Squadron thereby 
provides for the ef fective administrative management and 
command of  the PNGDF from the Port Moresby headquarters . 
Because the PNGDF communications system is independent o f  
the communications provided by the PNG Pos ts and Telegraph 
Department (and o f  the Police which also has a radio 
network) , the Defence Force is able to operate effectively 
12 rn April 197 6  only four Australian officers were still 
serving in the PIR battalions . 
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in the event of the failure of civil communications . 
The logist ic system 
The logist ic component of the PNGDF is both large and 
funct ionally important , accounting for 40 per cent o f  to tal 
Defence Force manpower and some 27 per cent of total officer 
strength in January 1974 . Most of the civilians employed in 
the Defence Force were also to b e  found in supporting roles 
within the logis t ic system .  Lo calisation within the logistic 
system was considerably les s advanced than within the 
op erat ional sect ion of the Force . There were over three 
hundred Australians employed within the logistic system - an 
indicat ion of both the complexity of many of the j obs and 
the late start made in training Papua New Guineans for them. 
Most of the logistic units are based in Port Moresby with 
their sub-unit s located in o ther Defence Force bases in 
order to provid e  support to the units they contained . 
Control o f  logistic unit s is generally exercised through 
s en ior staff officers within the headquarters although 
considerat ion has been given to the formation o f  a lo gist ic 
battalion which would act as an intermed iate lo gist ic head­
quarters .  I t  seems , however ,  that the present arrangements 
will cont inue . The Barracks Headquarters located in each o f  
the Defence Force bases undertook the essential adminis­
trative ' housekeep ing ' func tions , thereby freeing the 
operat ional units from this respon sib ilit y .  
Repair an d  maintenance of Defence Force equ ipment was 
carried out by the three engineering workshops ,  the Patrol 
Boat Maintenance Sec tion and dockyard . The workshop at Port 
Moresby was the primary installation and it handled the bulk 
of the work . In relat ion to maintenance of  aircraft ,  when 
the PNGDF air element is formed most , if not all , maj or 
servic ing will b e  conducted in Air Niugini workshops .  
The Defence Force Supply Agency forms an important part 
o f  the logist ic system. Thi s  organisat ion , of about seventy 
servicemen and civilians , was respons ible for the procure­
ment of equipment and supplies from outs ide the Defence 
Force , working in co-operation with PNG government depart­
ments and with the PNG Sup pl i es and Tenders Board . It will 
also manage the flow from Australian sources of logistic 
ass istance to the PNGDF after independence . 
The Defence Force med ical system has b een designed to 
complement the civil med ical resources available in PNG . It 
is , however ,  quit e elaborate and luxurious by PNG standards 
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with medical centres staffed by doctors in all of the PNGDF 
bases (except Vanimo) and small but well-equipped hospitals 
at Manus and Port Moresby . Defence Force dependants as well 
as servicemen receive free medical attention from these 
facilit ies . There is also a well established dental care 
system .  In January 1974 all the medical and all except one 
of the dental o fficers were Australians , but there were 
Defence Force-sponsored med ical and dental undergraduates in 
training . 
The PNGDF logistic system is the product o f  detailed 
planning and , where possible , procedures have been s implified 
to lighten the burden for the future Papua New Guinean 
operators of the system .  Even so , some Australian officers 
claim that the s to res control and accounting procedures 
remain needlessly complicated and will prove difficult to 
manage. The problem is of course to design systems which 
are both s imple and effective but which also meet the 
criteria of financial accountab il ity and the proper control 
of public funds .  PNG polit icians have already expressed 
concern about corrup tion within the government and corruption 
will , no doubt , also have to be guarded against within the 
Defence Force . 
The training system 
The PNGDF ' s  training system accounted for only 10 per 
cent of total Defence Force manpower , but 20 per cent of the 
PNGDF off icer corps were employed within the system. In any 
Defence Force the training of leaders and skilled men is a 
large task and this is even more the case in the PNGDF which 
has to replace skilled and experienced Australians with PNG 
servicemen . To a significant extent the future efficiency 
of the Defence Force will depend on the effectiveness of the 
training system. Formal military training , in add it ion to 
the normal routine of ind ividual and collective training 
within units , is carried out at four locations as follows : 
PNG Training Depo t ,  Goldie River : recruit t raining , 
training in specialist skills , promot ion courses and 
postgraduate training of officers ; 
PNGDF Apprentice Training Unit , Murray Barracks : 
training of Defence Force trade apprentices ; 
Manus Maritime Base : training of marit ime members 
of the PNGDF after their recruit training ; 
Joint Services College , Lae : training o f  PNGDF officers . 
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The PNG Training Depot at Goldie River near Port Moresby 
has a headquarters and three training wings includ ing a 
Recruit Training Company , an Arms and Services Company and 
an Officer Training Wing . In it ial Defence Force recruit 
training lasts for twenty-four weeks and all recruit s ,  with 
the exception of some officer cadets , undergo it . Marit ime 
recruits complete their training at Manus at the conclus ion 
of the Goldie River training.  The minimum educat ion level 
for General Service entrants to the PNGDF is PNG Form Two 
and during their in it ial training recruits undertake further 
general educat ion . Military instruction is conducted in 
English , supported as neces sary by Pidg in .  The twice yearly 
recruit entries vary in s iz e  b etween 150 and 250 men . 
The Arms and Services Company conducts courses in signals, 
engineering , infantry , clerical , driver training , catering , 
supplies management and mus ic .  A ten-week-long field 
engineering and c ivic act ion course , especially des igned to 
increase the civic act ion capacity of b attalion troops, has 
also b een introduced .  Promotion courses required in order 
to qualify for senior NCO and warrant officer rank are also 
held at Gold ie River , as well· as in-service commissioning 
courses for NCOs who are thought to have officer potential . 
The important role of the Training Depot is emphasised 
by the fact that mo re than eight hundred personnel pass 
through the Depot ' s  training courses annually. The training 
techniques employed are modern ,  emphasising training 
obj ec t ives rather than ritualised instruc t ion , and the 
training facil it ies are excellent , although there are 
problems in raising the standard of Papua New Guinean 
instructors who are hand icapped by a lack o f  formal education 
and poor English language ab ility . 
The Joint Services College (JSC) rep resents a bold and 
innovative approach to off icer training . Unt il 197 4 PNGDF 
officers received their mil itary training at the Officer 
Cadet School (OCS) , Portsea . Before the year-long Australian 
course , officer cadets first underwent an eight een-months­
long preparatory course at the Military Cadet School (MCS ) , 
which sought to bring the s tudents to Form Four level o f  
educat ion , give them a bas ic milit ary ground ing and prepare 
them for Portsea . This mixed PNG/Australian training was 
not very succes sful. Australian training was not fully 
suited to PNG needs , learning was inhibited by p rob'lems of 
adj ustment and collllllunicat ion at Portsea and the to tal co st 
of training was great compared to a PNG-based system. 
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The first init iatives aimed at the formation of a 
military college in PNG were taken in 1970-71 and after some 
res istance by elements of  the Australian defence community , 
which cited the case of  New Zealand as a small country which 
continued to rely successfully on overseas training for its 
o fficers , the proposal was eventually supported . The Joint 
Services College (JSC ) was approved by the PNG and Aust ralian 
governments in mid-1973 . 13 It was agreed that the JSC would 
p rovide one year ' s  common training for officer cadets of the 
PNGDF , Police and Corrective Institut ions Service (CIS) , and 
one year ' s  advanced training for PNGDF entrant s after the 
first year of j o int train ing.  Police and other non-PNGDF 
trainees , at the completion o f  the first year ' s  training , 
proceed to their own spec ial-to-service training at other 
places . The PNGDF cadets graduate at the end of the two­
year course as second lieutenants . 
The benefits of a year of  j oint training with the Police 
were not seen as simply economic.  It was hoped that common 
training would develop understanding between the group s and 
serve the Somare government ' s  obj ective o f  integrating PNG ' s 
elite by providing a common core of  knowledge , understanding 
of government ' s  aims and allegiance to government . The 
staff of  the JSC includes both Defence Force and Police 
officers . The Commandant is a PNGDF officer whilst the 
senior Police offic er on the s taff is the chief instructor 
of  the Joint Training Wing . 
The j oint training o f  Defence Force and Police o fficers 
is an interest ing departure from Aus tralian pract ice but no t 
unique within developing count ries . Whilst there may be 
obvious advantages in the arrangement such as developing a 
sense of nationalism and unity of purpose , there are also 
serious dangers because of the need to preserve a balance 
between traditional police and military approaches . Undue 
military influence in PNG Police training could lead to the 
development of an overly authoritarian , para-military force . 
Some might argue that the PNG Police , which has trad itionally 
been an armed constabulary force , should be developed along 
these lines : however , this has b een strongly resisted by 
Aus tralians in the Police who look to the Australian model 
of kin-police , serving within the community , no t apart from 
it . The success of the JS C may well depend on the manner in 
which Police and Defence Force interests are balanced . At 
present the locat ion of the College on a Defence Force base , 
13A. M. Kiki , HAD, Ministerial Statement on Defence , 25 April 
197 4 .  
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the collocat ion of the Advanced Defence Training Wing o f  
the Co llege and the preponderance of military staff within 
the JSC point to a very strong Defence Force b ias to the 
training which even an impartial College Council may not be 
able to prevent . 
Apart from the PNG-based training resources of  the PNGDF , 
the Force at p resent also has access to training courses 
conducted in Aus tralia and this is likely to continue in 
regard to spec ialist training for which the facilities are 
not available in PNG and for advanced officer training.  
Radiolo gist and flying training courses might be taken as 
an example of the former , j unior officers ' staff courses 
and attendance at the Austral ian Staff College as important 
examples of the latter . 14 
The Defence Force headquarters and departmental organisat ion 
The PNGDF headquarters is located at Murray Barracks , 
Port Moresby , in smart concrete and s teel buildings which 
con trast sharply with the disorderly sprawl of the PNG 
government ' s  office complex at Konedobu . The headquarters 
accounted for about one hundred of the 3 7 7  officers in the 
PNGDF . In January 1973 , the s enior officers in the head­
quarters included a brigadier , five colonels and eight 
lieutenant-colonels . The role of the PNGDF headquarters is 
threefold . As de fence headquarters it is responsible for 
the complete range of policy formulat ion and defence admin­
istrat ion . It commands and controls the PNGDF logistic 
system .  And the headquarters exercises operational command 
over all Defence Force units . This last function is partly 
achieved through the manning of an operations room which is 
in radio con tact with the PNGDF ' s  ships , aircraft and land 
elements . These three functions and the ab sence o f  inter­
mediate logistic or operat ional headquarters account for 
what might be seen as a fairly lavish , over-ranked 
organis ation . 15 
In early 1974  the headquarters was in a process of  trans-
14 See Department of Defence Press Release , No . 12 7 / 7 3 , Aug . 
1973 . 
15The headquarters accounts for 7 5 per cent o f  the 20 
officers of  the rank of lieutenant-colonel and above in 
the PNGDF . This ratio of senior executive to total organ­
isation is , in fact , less lavish than most of the important 
PNG government departments and comparable to the Police . 
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it ion towards . its planned shape based on a five-branch 
organisation with integrated civil and military staffs . 
Operat ion s ,  Logist ics and Personnel branches will be headed 
by colonels , the Finance and Programming and Policy and 
Planning branches are to be headed by publ ic servant s .  The 
Commander o f  the Defence Force and the Secretary will be of 
co-equal status and both will have d irect access to the PNG 
Minis ter for Defence .  The allo cation of respons ibilities 
between the branches of  the headquarters and the respect ive 
roles of  the Secretary and Commander are listed as : 
The Secretary is to have the following dut ies : 
princ ipal civilian adviser to the Minister ; responsible 
for the effic ient administration , control and account ing 
of all expenditure and revenue in the Defence Force ; 
responsible for the d irection and control o f  all civilian 
and military personnel employed in respec t of  his 
functions . 
The Commander ' s  dut ies are : principal military adviser 
to the Minister ; command the Defence Force ; responsible 
for the effic ient administration and control of  the 
Defence Force ; in except ional c ircumstances , to have the 
right of access to the Prime Minister . 
The Branches 
( The branches are co-ordinated in their activities by a 
Chief of  Staff ( Colonel) , who has a small staff . )  
Operations Branch (Military head) : tactical operations 
planning ; d irection of military operations and training ; 
military intelligence ; survey and hydrography ; military 
engineer ing ; civic action ; search and rescue ; direction 
of civil d isaster and emergency act ivit ies ; communications. 
Personnel Branch (Military head) : personnel management ; 
recruiting , enlis tment ; individual and specialist 
training ; officer production ; manpower policy and control ; 
cond it ions of  service ; dress and discipline ; protocol and 
ceremonial ; establishments ; welfare ; health ; legal 
services . 
Logistics Branch (Military head) : transportation , move­
ment s and removals ;  material development and plannin g ;  
supply , policy an d  documentation ; unit stores management ; 
equipment , repair , maintenance and des ign ; facilities , 
planning , supervision o f  des ign , construct ion and 
maintenance . 
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Finance and · Programming Branch ( formerly the Force 
Secretary ' s  Branch unt il 1974)  (Civilian head) : 
programming ,  use of resources ; estimates , budget ing and 
expenditure control ; contracts , policy and control ; 
internal aud it ; office services ; library ; civil personnel , 
es tablishment s  and administration . 
Policy and Planning Branch (Civilian head) : national 
strategic and defence policy ; nat ional military prepared­
nes s policy , force s tructure and development ; policy in 
regard to the role and dep loyment of the force ; external 
defenc e relations ; liaison with nat ional intell igence 
bodies ; government co-ordination ; parliamentary liaison ; 
public relations . 
The Secretary and Commander both have direct access to 
each branch ; however military branch heads are respons ible 
in the first instance to the Commander and civilian 
branch heads to the Secretary . The military deputy of 
the Policy and Plann ing branch has right of access to the 
Commander . 16 
The roles and capab ilities of  the Defence Force 
The PNG government has allocated to the Defence Force the 
three roles of  external defence , internal security and 
nat ion build ing . 17  In regard to external defence it was 
clear that the government sought a force which was capable 
of deterring and if necessary repelling tho se incursions 
into PNG which might be too minor to attract the intervention 
of friendly countries ; it was believed that the o ther 
countries would expect PNG to have this mininrum level o f  
defence capability . There was also the view that the 
Defence Force should be ab le to scout out and ident ify more 
serious incur sions as a basis for seeking the help of allies, 
thus playing the role of a ' trip-wire ' force . Beyond these 
situat ions , the Defence Force should be capable of playing 
an appropriate role in conj unc t ion with allies in the 
defence of PNG against invasion . The approach to external 
defence therefore assumed the existence of clo se defence 
allies . In relation to internal security the PNG Defence 
Minister announced that the Police would retain princ ipal 
16Interviews conducted at HQ PNGDF , Jan . -Feb . 197 4 .  
17  A . M .  Kiki , HAD ,  Ministerial S tatement on Defence ,  2 5 April 
197 4 .  
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responsib ility for the maintenance of internal security , 
whilst the Defence Force role would be of a secondary back­
up nature , invoked only when the Police were no longer able 
to cope with the s ituat ion . In regard to the third role , 
the Min ister stated that the fullest use of Defence Force 
resources was to be made in order to further the government' s 
nation building obj ectives . 18 
External defence 
Aus tralian defence p lanners have usually based appreci­
at ions of the s ize of the PNG Defence Force on the defence 
of the PNG/ Indones ian border in a s ituation of low-level 
military confrontation .  Thus it has been held that the 
PNGDF should be based on a three-battalion force with one 
battalion able to operate north of the central cordillera , 
one sou th and a third required as a reserve , for retraining 
and res t .  At present the Defence Force has only two 
battalions and some violence has ,  therefore , been done to 
this defence concep t .  On the o ther hand it might be argued 
that military confrontation with Indones ia now seems 
improbable and , if a threat were to arise , a third battalion 
might b e  rais ed within a relat ively short t ime . The 
quest ion , however , remains as to what external defence 
capability PNG has with the present two-battalion force of 
s ix rifle companies , compared to that of a full three­
battalion force? In mathematical terms the PNGDF land 
e lement now has only 50 per cent of the capab ility once 
thought necessary by Australian military planners and it 
might be concluded , therefore , that the Force ' s  external 
defence capab ility is indeed realist ically represented as 
only a small ' trip-wire ' force which would soon need the 
ass istance of allies . 
Nonetheless , the present force does seem adequate t o  deal 
with the minor operat ions envisaged . In quantitative terms , 
the PNGDF would be able to dep loy a reinforced battal ion 
group in the border area and maintain it logistically . This 
force might be dep loyed indefinitely , provided that e lements 
of the group could b e  relieved from the battal ion held in 
reserve and by other reserve units . This force , operating 
from company bases and supported by air , could effectively 
deal with small-scale border inf iltration by small enemy 
group s or guerrilla bands . Incurs ions by group s above 
platoon s ize would probably tax its resources , although it 
18Ibid . 
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would be within the capability of a battalion group to 
locate and ident ify larger enemy incursion forces , delay 
them and provide t ime to seek external assistance.  The 
PNGDF therefore does appear to be able to meet its external 
defence respons ibilitie s .  
The Defence Force should also be able t o  act effectively 
as a border surveillance force , dealing , for example , with 
any attempts by dissident Irian Jayanese groups to use PNG 
territory as a sanctuary. Provided that this type of 
situat ion was on a small scale , a one-battalion force 
deployed in the part of the border affected should prove 
adequate . The present force would certainly be able to 
maintain the pattern of border patroll ing conducted by the 
PNGDF over the past years . 19 
There are , however , two important provisos to this 
discussion of the border defence capabilities of the land 
element of the PNGDF . Defence Force op erat ions will be 
greatly affected by the extent to which border incursions 
are localised and by the co-operation of PNG citizens in the 
border region . The PNG/ Indonesian border is 7 25km long , 
it is exceptionally rugged terrain over much o f  this d istance, 
communications are primit ive and populat ion on both sides 
of  the border is sparse.  If border operations were focused 
in only several areas , the Defence Force task would be 
simplified , but if border incursions occur along the length 
of the border the situat ion could quickly escalate beyond 
the resources o f  the PNGDF . On balance ,  it is more likely 
that low-intens ity operat ions would be confined to the more 
populated border areas where there are cross-border track 
systems and traditional border cro ssing areas . There are 
seven maj or ones ; four are north of the central cordillera 
and three south . From north to south they are : Wutung , 
Seko tchiau , Imonda/Waris , Kamerataro (west of  Amenab ) , 
Ningerum , Boset ( south of Fly River bulge) , and Weam/ Sota . 
Border control o f  several o f  these cro ssing areas should be 
within the resources of  the Defence Force whereas s imul­
taneous control o f  all of them would not .  Effective border 
operations would also greatly depend on information and 
assis tance from the local peop le . Poor in tell igence and the 
non-co-operation , or resis tance , of local people might place 
even minor border infiltration beyond the capab ilities of 
19From June 1965 to Ap ril 197 4 there were about 60 military 
patrols in the border area includ ing about 10 patrols 
during 1973 . These patrols covered over 13 , 000km of 
border tracks . 
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the present Defence Force . 
In regard to external defence , generally , in areas other 
than the border region , the Defence Force could probably 
deal with small-scale guerrilla infiltration from the sea or 
air , provided that the lo cal populat ion were help ful and 
operations were conducted on sound intelligence . 
The marit ime and air elements o f  the PNGDF also have 
important surveillance and logistic roles in external defence. 
The transport flight would be committed to the logistic 
support o f  any force engaged in border operat ions where it s 
tasks would include redeployment and resupply o f  sub-unit s 
in the operat ional zone.  Apart from these tasks there would 
be a requirement for the type of support provided by the 
Australian Reconnaissance Flight aircraft . Light aircraft 
and helicopters would be needed for reconnaissance and 
liaison , casualty evacuation and resupply to small groups .  
I f  the Australian unit was no t available the Defence Force 
might have to turn to civilian aircraft which might not be 
an effective expedient . Unt il now the PNGDF' s op erat ional 
doctrine has placed great reliance on the use o f  air support 
as a result of  the rugged nature of PNG terrain , the lack 
of alternative means of transportat ion in many parts of the 
country and the influence o f  Australi an air-minded tactical 
doctrine . Because of  these factors the development of a 
PNGDF helicopter and light aircraft unit seems to be 
warranted. This type of unit might be developed slowly but 
until it is done PNG will remain dependent on Australian 
goodwill for an important aspect of its air support. It is 
relevant that almost all of the smaller defence forces in 
black Africa have helicopters and light aircraft as well as 
transports in their air inventory .  
Coastal surveillance where enemy incurs ion into PNG was 
expected would fall in large measure to the five patrol 
boats . In regard to border problems one boat could probably 
be maintained continuously on a patrol station off the north 
and south coasts ,  allowing for maintenance and rest and 
relief requirements . (This is not to assume that the boats 
would be used singly in this way but to state a capacity . )  
The adequate surveillance o f  the rest of PNG ' s coastline 
could well be beyond the resources of the patrol boat 
squadron . Effect ive coastal surveillance would seem to 
depend on the complementary use of maritime reconnaissance 
aircraft ,  as well as the use of other craft for in-shore 
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patrolling20 and a shore-based reporting system . 21 Modern 
marit ime patrol aircraft are probably beyond PNG ' s f inancial 
resources ; however , PNG might be able to rely on Austnalian 
marit ime aircraft which could operate from distant Australian 
bases in a manner unlikely to be politically sensit ive , so 
long as they did not employ offensive weapons . Alternat ively, 
PNG might dec ide to develop a primitive marit ime patrol 
capability based on transport aircraft equipped with a 
rudimentary radar module ( sugges ted by Bell , 197 1 : 10 ) , or 
special aircraft such as the Australian-built Nomad . 
In conclusion , the capabilities of the Defence Force 
indicate that it is able to meet the very l imited external 
defence role seen for it by the PNG government , but beyond 
this role the PNGDF would require expansion or the assist­
ance of allies . Even in terms of the external defence role 
foreseen , the PNGDF is deficient in two areas . It is 
dep endent on Australian marit ime air reconnaissance and it 
lacks helicopters and light aircraf t .  
Internal secur ity22 
Although the Police have the primary responsib ility for 
ZOPNG coastal surveillance might be supplemented by the 
small craft fleet of  the PNG Department of  Transport which 
includes eleven trawlers and more than s ixty launches and 
work boats . 
21An Australian coas tal information gathering and reporting 
system in the form o f  the Coastwatching Service operated 
unt il recently in PNG. ( See Austra l �a in Facts and 
Figures , No . 40 ,  Dec.  1953 . )  The PNG government may take 
over this service and operate it overtly rather than on a 
clandestine bas is as in the past . Apart from the potent ial 
s ecurity value of such a sys tem ,  it would also be u seful 
for civil defence purposes , reporting inc idents at sea and 
other civil d isasters . A further task could be the 
reporting of the movements of foreign f ishing fleets 
op erating in PNG waters and unauthorised mineral explor­
ation act ivit ies . The service could be based on schools 
and government po sts equipped with two-way rad io .  
2 2 Internal security operations are def ined in the Australian 
Department of  Defence Joint Services Glossary as 
'Military Assistance provided to the Civilian Authorities 
to maintain peace , restore law and order and safeguard 
essential services ' .  
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internal order , PNG leaders have accepted the fact that the 
Defence Force should also be prepared for internal security 
tasks . PNG government polic ies will , it is hoped , avoid 
serious threats to domestic security , but policies need to 
be underpinned by security forces trained and effic ient in 
internal security dut ies . PNG ' s  internal security in the 
future might be affected by a range o f  problems including 
urban violence ,  widespread tribal fighting or armed 
secession and it may be assumed that the government will 
meet violence which threatens public order on a general 
scale with both polit ical and coercive strategies . 
Until independence , the participat ion o f  the PNGDF in 
internal security operations was subj ect to the provis ions 
of Australian law, specifically , under the terms of the 
Defence Act and its Regulations . After indep endence , the 
legal basis for Defence Force participation in internal 
operat ions is subj ect to the PNG Const itution and legis­
lation .  Defence Force internal security training doctrine 
is heavily conditioned by Australian law and prac t ice . 
Since the 197 0  Gazelle Peninsula confrontation with the 
Mataungan Associat ion , however , internal security training 
has b een emphasised by the Defence Force . 23 In the future 
it is probable that the PNGDF will have a wider internal 
security role than now envisaged . PNG law may provide for 
a simplified procedure for the us e of the Defence Force and 
wider powers for the Defence Force when acting in aid to 
the civil power. In sp ite of  intentions to keep the PNGDF 
out of  internal security , military aid to the Police may 
prove less excep tional in PNG than has been the case in 
Australia. The lack of military involvement in peace-keeping 
in Australia is increasingly exceptional in today ' s  world 
and the Australian precept of using military force as a 
measure of last resort carries less weight in other western 
countries such as Canada and Britain than it does in 
Australia . The functional d ivis ion in PNG between Defence 
Force and Police may also be blurred by the para-military 
character of parts of the Police Force , especially the 
mob ile s quads . 
The effectiveness of the Defence Force in internal 
23 see O ' Neill , 197 1 : 14 and 15 . During this cris is over 25 
per cent of the Police were dep loyed on the Gazelle 
Peninsula and the Army was placed on standby , but was not 
sent . In 197 4 ,  the infantry bat talions in the PNGDF were 
devo ting about 25 to 3 0 per cent of their train ing t ime 
to internal security training . 
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security will depend greatly on the s cale of disorder . 
Whilst  the Force could enhance the logistic capacity and 
mob ility of the Police , it s usefulnes s  in civil disturbances 
involving large numbers of people may be limited . It has a 
to tal o f  only eight infantry companies , or eight hundred men, 
readily available for these types of duties , and for this 
reason it might be unwise to commit the Defence Force ' s  man­
power prematurely . To be successfully employed , the Force 
may need to be u sed resolutely with the obj ect of achieving 
a dec is ive effect , o therwise its manpower shortage may 
render it inef fective . 
If the policy of generally keep ing the PNGDF out o f  
internal security duties i s  maintained the Force would only 
be used if the Police were unable to cope . The Police have 
the capab ility to  deal with maj or disturbances ,  on the s cale 
of the Mataungan confrontation , in only part of PNG at once 
and if problems arise which exceed this intensity ,  or o ccur 
in more than one place , the PNGDF would become involved . 
Even if the Defence Force were employed , widespread violence 
over more than about three Distric t s  would be very difficult 
to control and the combined resources of  the Defence Force 
and Police would be unlikely to hold down a PNG subj ect to 
widespread violence . The Defence Force , nevertheles s ,  
provides the government with a valuable reserve o f  force for 
the main tenance of domest ic order.  This reserve of force 
may also be used mo st effectively to back up the Police where 
they are defic ient , that is , in logist ics , communications , 
air and sea transportat ion . The capabilit ies of the PNGDF 
act ing as an in ternal security force in its own right are 
limited by three factors . It has lit tle manpower suitable 
for employment in low-intensity situat ions (e . g . the control 
of unarmed rio ters rather than armed dissident s ) . The 
Defence Force , because it is trained and equipped with lethal 
weapons , may be inf lexible when employed in an internal 
security role . Finally , the employment of the Defence Force 
in s ituations of disorder may lead both to the destruc t ion 
of the PNGDF as a symbol of nat ional unity and to problems 
of disun ity in the Force . 
The ability of the Defence Force to deal with secessionist 
problems merit s specif ic cons iderat ion . It is well known 
that polit ical leaders in PNG have previously advocated 
seces sion ; however , quest ions concerning the actual likeli­
hood of secess ion in PNG and the use of force by secession­
ists or government forces are ignored here (Griffin ,  1973a : 
116 ) .  This d iscussion is only concerned with the capacity 
of the Defence Force to deal with a military problem which 
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might arise out of  armed seces s ion . 
Seces sion might be achieved by peaceful means . It  might 
also be attempted by two violent strategies : either by a 
sudden coup, or by a prot racted campaign of insurgency and 
civil disobedience .  A cohlbination of these strategies might 
also be adop ted . To speculate on the capabil ities o f  the 
PNGDF in the case of a campaign o f  violence is diff icult 
beyond the observation that such a situat ion would be 
unlikely to emerge quickly . Insurgent movement s  require 
time to develop a political base of support and acquire 
arms and leaders .  The Defence Force would then become 
involved in long-term operations to counter the usual 
tactics of insurgency in order to restore a central govern­
ment control .  The his tory of counter-guerrilla warfare 
points to bitter and p rotracted campaigns in which superior 
morale of ten conquers over super ior material . If insurgency 
developed in a place like Bougainville , it might well prove 
beyond the resources o f  bo th the PNG Police and Defence 
Forces ( in terms of their current s ize) to control . The 
PNG security forces should ,  however , be capable of  dealing 
effectively with a range of insurgency s ituat ions where the 
insurgents d id not have wide popular support and logistic 
resources . The evidence of both Indonesia and black 
African states suggests that guerrilla movements are less 
succes sful when they are in revolt against ind igenous 
governments , rather than colonial or white minority regimes . 
Secessionists might seek power by a sudden coup (by , for 
ins tance , seizing government offices , d isarming the Police 
and issuing a proclamation over the local radio station) . 
In this s ituat ion the new regime would tend to gain legit­
imacy the longer it survived and was thus able to mobil ise 
domest ic and internal support and consolidate it s power . 
The effectivenes s o f  the central government ' s  attempts to 
put down the secessionists may well depend on the speed with 
which security forces were deployed to the area. Airfield s  
might easily be obstructed and , in view of the lack o f  
parachutists o r  troop-carrying helicopters , the introduction 
of Defence Force units might take several days as air and 
sea transportat ion was organis ed to deploy the force . In 
mo st cases , the PNGDF would probably be capable of  putting 
down this type of local ris ing by operat ions on the scale 
of a one-battalion force ( if introduced speed ily) , although 
the re-establishment of government control might require 
more troop s .  
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The deterrent value of  the Defence Force in relat ion to 
armed upris ings may also be relevan t .  The value o f  the 
PNGDF lies partly in its existence as a national force with 
a reputat ion for effic iency and loyalty to the government ,  
and a Force o f  almost any size might cause sece s s ionist s to 
pause and reckon the potent ial co sts o f  violence . Deterrence 
might also be achieved by the deployment of troops to 
po tential ' trouble spo ts ' on a permanent or semi-permanent 
basis , bu t as the Defence Force is concent rated in a small 
number of bases this is not pract ical . The concentration 
o f  the PNGDF on the other hand allows better training and 
sup ervision and it may also guard against isolated local 
unit s developing ' regionalist ' at titudes . On balance , the 
present deployment of the PNGDF is unlikely to reduce it s 
capab il ity to deal with seces sion and besides , the permanent 
deployment of Defence Force unit s to parts o f  PNG where 
there are seces sionist causes might now be seen as 
provocat ive . 
Intelligence 
The PNGDF ' s  effectiveness in internal security operations 
is likely to be very greatly affec ted by the quality and 
promptnes s of  int elligence . Intell igence organisat ions are 
frequently seen in a sinis ter light as threats to civil 
lib erties and ins truments of political control as well as 
being unneces sarily shrouded in secrecy . Ef fic ient 
int elligence and internal security organisat ions , however , 
may also perform a positive role in contributing to domestic 
order in developing countr ies - by increasing the effect­
ivenes s  of security measures and perhap s even avo iding 
military operat ions . A government serviced by a poor 
intelligence organisation is more likely to respond too late, 
with force , to situations which might have been avo ided , or 
remed ied by changes of  policy or by negotiat ion . Without 
good intell igence and a proper framework for internal 
security decision-making and supervisQon, a government ' s  
developmental , administrative and security polic ies are 
unl ikely to march together , so lead ing to greater security 
problems . 
In early 1974 PNG ' s  intelligence and internal security 
organisat ional s truc ture was st ill in the process o f  
evolut ion a s  Australia handed over these funct ions and as 
PNG planning was implemented . The formal organisational 
s truc ture is also likely to be mod ified af ter independence 
as the system is adapted to the indigenous polit ical system, 
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local leaders · and PNG ' s particular internal security prob­
lems . The collection , collation , interpretat ion and 
disseminat ion of intelligence in PNG are the responsib ilities 
of the PNG Security and Intelligence Organisation (PNGSI0) . 24 
This organisation carries out the range of functions 
conducted within the Australian context by Police special 
branches , the Australian Security Intelligence Organisat ion 
(AS IO) and the Joint Intelligence Organisat ion (JIO) . Thus 
the PNGSIO has three broad roles . It is concerned with the 
monitoring of internal security . To do this it maintains a 
knowledge of  PNG internal affairs by means of reports from 
its own o fficers and information rece ived from the Police 
and most government departments . Secondly , the PNGSIO is 
concerned with the broader issues o f  nat ional intell igence 
including economic , polit ical and foreign intelligence . 
Thirdly , the PNGSIO is responsible for the prevent ion o f  
subvers ion , espionage and sabotage in PNG and the p rotective 
security of government employees and the class ified inform­
at ion to .which they have acces s .  As the PNGSIO carries out 
the func tions o f  the former PNG Police Special Branch , 
Police operat ions are dependent on the intelligence provided 
by the PNGS IO , although a great deal o f  information received 
by the PNGSIO init ially comes f rom the Police . 2 5  The PNGSIO 
also has responsib ility for servic ing the interlocking 
structure of intell igence and internal security commit tees 
at the national and d istrict l evel which have advisory and 
decision-making functions . 
At the national level the PNG Intelligence Commit tee 
advises the government on all aspects of intelligence . This 
Committee , which meets regularly , makes its own intelligence 
assessments based on material provided by its secretariat . 
Information is received from a diversity of sources including 
the PNGSIO , Police , Defence Force and relevant government 
departments . The Defence Force is represented on this 
Commit tee . There is also an Internal Security Committee of 
senior offic ials who are responsible for advis ing the PNG 
24This sec tion is based on interviews with PNG government 
o f f icials in May 1973 and February 197 4 .  The PNGSIO comes 
under the ministerial responsib ility of the Chief Minister . 
2 5The PNG Police ' special branch ' was formed in 1965 and 
d isbanded in 197 1  largely because the Police Commissioner 
of the day cons idered that special branch funct ions were 
best separated from the normal Police organisation .  
( Interview ,  Deputy Police Commissioner , 1 1  May 1973 . )  
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Cab inet . The · Defence Force Commander is a member o f  this 
Commit tee , as are the Police Commissioner and PNGSIO head . 
At the district  level , intell igence and internal security 
responsibilities are exercised by District  Internal Security 
and Intelligence Commit tees which have both advisory and 
executive funct ions and operate under the chairmanship of 
the Dist rict Commissioner . These committees also inc lude 
Police , Defence Force , PNGSIO and relevant Departmental 
representation . ( The Defence Force is represented under 
no rmal circumstances only in tho se Districts which have a 
Defence Force base. ) 
This intelligence and security organisat ion appears to 
provide an adequate framework for PNG , ind icating that the 
experience of other countries has been well app lied by those 
responsible for the development of the PNG system.  The 
representation and participat ion of the Defence Force in the 
system provides the basis for co-ordinated PNGDF partici­
pat ion in internal security operat ions , if this should 
b ecome necessary , within the compass of civilian con trol . 
The quality of PNGSIO intell igence asses sments is , however ,  
cruc ial to the operat ion o f  the system. The PNGSIO head is 
now a Papua New Guinean but many of the officers are still 
Australians . If localisat ion is rapid in this field there 
is a danger of reduced effectiveness which might be dangerous 
if it co rresponded with problems of internal unrest after 
independence . The contribution of the Defence Force to the 
intelligence gathering task is valuable , supplementing 
PNGSIO asses sments . PNGDF activit ies , such as civic action 
and patroll ing and even the reports of sold iers returning 
from leave , provide useful information from which security 
problems may be identified ( for example , tribal fight ing , or 
cargo cult activit ies ) .  
Nat ion build ing and military civic action 
The PNGDF contr ibution to PNG ' s economic development and 
national unity might b e  described as nation building . This 
role includes the conduct of military civic action bu t goes 
well beyond it . The Defence Force also contributes to 
nation building indirectly . As a national organisation 
recruited from all parts of PNG , it is an example of 
integrat ion to the rest o f  the country and a symbol of 
nat ional unity . The Defence Force also contributes to nation 
building as a result of the skills and attitudes which 
Defence Force men acquire during their service.  About 250 
men leave the Force each year and those that go back to 
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their villages take with them non-trad it ional att itudes 
derived f rom mil itary service about such aspects as hygiene , 
leadership and so on . Other s l eave the Defence Force with 
useful skills which may be util ised within the labour force . 
Training of drivers ,  mechanics , clerks and other tradesmen 
is part o f  this indirect nation-building contribution . The 
Defence Force in PNG may also be seen as a ' crucible of  
citizenship ' - preparing its memb ers for the duties of c ivil 
life as well as giving them useful skills and att itudes . 
The value of these contribut ions to nat ion building is 
somewhat reduced by the regular , volunteer character of  the 
PNG Defence Force . If it were a conscript force , or even a 
volunteer force with short periods of  service , the numbers 
of Papua New Guineans who benef ited from the experience of 
military service would be cons iderably greater . The 
proposals made during 197 3-7 4 to establish a National Youth 
Scheme represent an imaginat ive , but as yet unrealised , 
means of promo ting citizenship training within a corporate 
structure and if the s cheme is eventually adopted the 
Defence Force would be well placed to help run it . Defence 
Force leaders and instructors , barrack facil it ies and s tores 
could be used to support the scheme (accepting that it 
would add to defence costs ) , although it is uncertain 
whether the PNG government will wish to establish a youth 
scheme with a predominant Defence Force influence . It may 
see in such an arrangement dangers in the expans ion o f  
military influence , a s  well as problems o f  reintegration 
when trainees complete their service .  
The PNGDF makes a direct contr ibut ion to the nation­
building obj ectives of the government in two ways . It 
carries out c ivic action proj ects and it operates as an 
agent of national administration . In this latter respect , 
the Defence Force marit ime element conducts f isheries and 
sovereigp ty patrolling as an agent of  the PNG government 
and the land element patrols remote areas of the country , 
representing the government as well as carrying out govern­
ment tasks such as reporting on local medical problems . 
The fisheries and sovereignty patrolling act ivities of 
the maritime element are important functions in nat ional 
terms . As an archipelagic state PNG is dependent on her 
marit ime environment for economic wealth and connnunications . 
The rap id development of  PNG ' s  f ishing is expected , and the 
growth of the industry will increase the requirement for 
f isheries surveillance in order to control f ishing by 
foreign fleets . Secondly , PNG ' s po sit ion astride important 
trade routes will lead to an increasing volume of shipping 
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pass ing through or adj acent to PNG waters and this is likely 
to impose responsib ilities on PNG such as ensuring safe 
navigation , dealing with marine emergencies and controlling 
pollution . Thirdly , trends in internat ional law towards 
extens ion of territorial water s will place increased demand s 
on the maritime capability of  the Defence Force . Some of  
the tasks which fall to the maritime element of  the PNGDF 
have been carried out in o ther countries by coastguard type s 
of  organisations . This approach is unlikely to be adop ted 
in PNG and the marit ime element will probably continue to 
perform the resources protection role , supplemented where 
applicable by o ther government agencies . It  is the opinion 
of PNGDF officers that the Force ' s  fleet o f  five patrol 
boats is at pres ent adequate for the natural resources 
pro tec t ion role , but this may no t be the case if PNG ' s  
territorial waters are extended , or if there is increased 
illegal f ishing activity in PNG waters . Fisheries protection 
is likely to be a subj ect o f  qu ite wide political interest 
in PNG as it touches on problems of  conflict b etween local 
village fishermen and overseas fleets operating in PNG . 
Local politicians are likely to demand act ion where the 
fishing ground s of their const ituents are poached and , in 
part icular , a measure of anti-Japanese sentiment may create 
a demand for tough fisheries policing by the PNG government . 
The patrol boats of  the maritime element have taken part 
in an act ive f isheries protect ion patroll ing program in PNG 
since 1968 , at which time there was an increase in illegal 
fishing act ivit ies in PNG waters , chiefly from Taiwanese and 
Sou th Korean boats . Under present arrangements foreign 
b oats ( excluding Japanese boat s )  are no t p ermitted to fish 
within a declared fishing zone (DFZ) , which extends twelve 
miles from the coas tline , unles s  they have a permit . Under 
the terms of a 1969 Japanese-Australian Agreement , Japanese 
boats are permitted to fish within the DFZ but no t ins ide 
the three-mile limit . Although ' the Defence Force ' s  fisheries 
pro tection role is shared with the Department of Fisheries , 
the PNG fisheries inspectors are limit ed by their craft to 
coastal waters . This leaves the PNGDF with an important 
' open seas ' role which is ind icated by its sign ificant share 
of arrests and ' sight ing s '  o f  trawlers in the DFZ over 
recent years . 
The maritime element is , at present , able adequately to 
carry out its role in co-op erat ion with the marine resources 
of o ther government departments . Thi s  role is one which is 
valued by PNG politicians and constantly before the public 
eye as a Defence Force service . Because it is a service it 
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will be pos s ible to measure its effectiveness , and any 
increase in illegal f ishing in PNG may lead to charges that 
the Defence Force is not doing its j ob .  An increase in 
PNG ' s  territorial waters responsib il it ies may result in a 
need for more p atrol craft (and perhaps a need for larger 
craft to take account of longer d istances) and even maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft .  PNG might , therefore , look to 
Australia for assistance in expanding the marit ime element 
of the PNGDF in the future . 
The civic act ion role of the Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force and the u se of military resources on civil proj ects 
in PNG allows the Defence Force to contribute to the 
government ' s  national developmental obj ectives . The extent 
of the Defence Force ' s  contribu tion is , however , limited by 
it s primary role as external defence force and it may be 
argued that if the nation-build ing role is over-emphasised 
the Defence Force might prove ineffect ive , if needed , in its 
primary task. There is also a strong economic argument for 
limiting the role of the Defence Force in physical nation­
build ing tasks . The nation-building role o f  defence forces 
seems to have been used as a j ustificat ion for increasing 
defence forces in certain developing countries and defence 
budgets , as a consequence ,  have taken up increasing pro­
portions of the national budget . The util ity o f  nation­
build ing by the military is thereby challenged on economic 
co st-benefit criteria .  The problem here is to identify and 
quantify nation-building benef it s  which result from the 
mil itary role , such as social integrat ion which may offset 
economic disadvantages (such as the higher labour co sts and 
lower produc tivity of the military . 2 6  
Apart from the economical contribut ion of civic act ion , 
it is useful for two o ther reasons . Civic action permits 
the members of the Defence Force to make a contribution to 
the social welfare of their country and in this manner the 
civic act ion program is complementary to the PNGDF service­
man ' s  cit izenship training . It reinforces attitudes of 
social respon sib ility and service to the people and ensures 
that the members of the Defence Force , who live in comfort­
able urban conditions , do no t lo se sight of the realit ies 
of PNG village life . Secondly , civic act ion has an 
operational dimens ion .  Succes s in military operations in 
PNG , both in regard to internal security and externally 
directed aggress ion , is likely to depend on the co-operation 
2 6This problem , with special reference to PNG , is interest-
ingly developed in Bateman , 1973 . 
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of the population . If Defence Force memb ers look upon PNG 
villagers as ' kanakas ' rather than fellow citizens they are 
unlikely to gain their as sistance when they need it . 
Civic action commenced in PNG on a limited scale with a 
postwar reactivation o f  the PIR. PIR patrols tradit ionally 
rendered ass is tance to the villages they visited , helping to 
build s chools and local government council houses and tend 
the sick. From 1966 onward , however ,  emphasis on c ivic 
action increased (Hussey , 1968) . Under current civic action 
polic ies , the range of p roj ects undertaken includes the 
construction o f  bridges , fords and small airstrips , minor 
road and track construct ion , the building of school class­
rooms , local government council s tructures and medical aid 
posts and medical aid programs . Apart from engineering and 
health , the Defence Force is able to make a useful lo gistic 
contribution by virtue o f  its marit ime and air transport 
resources . The tally of PNGDF civic action proj ects which 
have been carried out is impressive evidence o f  the scale of  
Defence Force ass istance ,  and whilst there is  a very definite 
symbolic importance attached to civic act ion it is no longer 
true to say that the value of civic action is more symbolic 
than economic . 2 7  
The principles governing civic act ion proj ects and the 
mechanic s of implementation are as follows . Requests for 
ass is tance are received from members of  the House of 
Assembly ,  Local Government Councils , missions and officers 
of the Dis trict Administration . All requests are channelled 
through the government ' s  Central Planning Office where they 
are co-ordinated in consultat ion with the Defence Force , 
although , in practice , many tasks are carried out on an 
informal basis , espec ially where the tasks are of a minor 
nature and there is what appears to be a once-only 
opportunity (such as an unscheduled , unladen military flight, 
which might be able to fly in urgent c ivilian cargo ) . The 
formal system is also short-circuited becaus e of  inefficiency 
in collating civic act ion requests . 
The Defence Force prefers to contribute manpower skills , 
design support , ins truct ion , supervisory and equipment 
2 7This was the view of Mediansky (1970 : 41) . Whilst the 
annual ' labour ' contribution probably amounts to a to tal 
of about a month ' s  effort by the equivalent of a battalion 
force , the e ffort , in terms o f  logist ic as sistance and 
contribution o f  skills , amounts to a more s ignificant 
nation-wide impac t .  
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capab ilities and it expects to see contributions of funds , 
materials , equipment and unskilled labour from the civil 
connnunity - the mix of contributions depending on the nature 
of the proj ect.  So  far , Defence Force policy has favoured 
civic act ion proj ects which are relatively minor in nature , 
which can be completed in a relatively short period of  time 
and which have a high impact on the community which has been 
helped . 28 Whils t there may be sound organisat ional and 
p sychological grounds j ustifying thi s  approach , it limits 
the scope of the PNGDF ' s  nation-building contribut ion and so 
some senio r  PNG officers have argued that the PNGDF should 
also undertake maj or and long-term developmental proj ects . 
It is nonetheless difficult to see how the Defence Force 
could carry out maj or engineering tasks , given its small 
engineering resources , unless it were to rely on civilian 
manual labour . 
Civic act ion effort has been focused on rural areas and 
few proj ects have been carried out in urban areas . This is 
based on the assumption that the Defence Force ,  because of 
its logistic resources and mob ility , is best used in remote 
areas where the government is able to do the least . Whilst 
this may be a logically sound policy , the Defence Force ' s  
inactivity in its home areas does no t help its image , which 
might , unfairly , be based on its comfortable barracks and 
elite status . There are , furthermore , increasing numbers of 
new urban dwellers living in s quatter settlements who might 
profit from PNGDF small-scale civic act ion proj ects . This 
raises the political implications of the Defence Force civic 
act ion role . PNG political leaders in the future may 
become concerned that the popularity which accrues to the 
military and the managerial , economic and even political 
skills , which may be the product of a civic act ion role , 
constitute dangers to the survival o f  civil government . 
These dangers might be heightened if greatly increased 
emphasis were to be p laced on c ivic act ion by the PNG 
government and the PNGDF. Because of the polit ical dangers 
of an expanded c ivic action role , the government may be 
reluctant to see the Defence Force too active in this role 
after independence .  
28For example the PNGDF Engineer Company conduc ted a 10-week 
proj ect in the Wes tern District of Papua in March-May 1974 
involving the const ruct i on o f  7 brid ges and 36 culverts 
and upgrading an airstrip (Pos t-Courier., 28 Feb . 197 4 ) . 
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Civil defence · 
In early 197 4 civil defence formally remained a civil 
responsib ility although there were quite advanced proposals 
for the PNGDF to take over this function . 2 9  The PNGDF has 
a very significant capability in regard to c ivil defence 
and emergency requirements in PNG . In the past its manpower , 
communications and command system, special equipment , 
logist ic and transport resources have enabled it to  make 
timely contr ibutions in cases of emergency . The Defence 
Force has ass is ted in famine , epidemic and cyclone relief 
operat ions , searches for ship s , aircraft and ground parties 
and its communications system has b een useful in the rapid 
reporting and assessment o f  d amage and d isaster after civil 
emergencies . 
Under reorganisat ion proposals a central civil defence 
rad io communications net was to be established at the HQ 
PNGDF and the Defence Force Commander was slated to take on 
the add it ional role of civil defence director , assisted by 
a civil ian . A structure of National and District Civil 
Defence Committees was also proposed . Whilst such a system 
might be more efficient than the present arrangements , 
considerat ions of efficiency alone may not be a suffic ient 
argument for a milit ary takeover of civil defence , especially 
if they upset civil-military and police-military relat ions . 
For this reason it seems that the Defence Force will , 
for the p resent , continue to be employed , as in the pas t , 
within a civilian framework , although the consequence of 
this may be duplication o f  effort and some inefficiency . 
The issue may eventually be resolved when civil-military 
relat ions have been s tabilised some time after independence .  
Defence Force manpower composition 
and social funct ioning 
Ethnic composit ion 
Defence Force recru its are drawn from all parts of the 
country and the policy obj ective is that , as nearly as 
practicable , each Distric t ' s  representation in the Force 
should be in proportion to its share of to tal PNG population. 
2 9civil defence was the responsib ility of the Civil Defence 
and Emergency Services Director . See Papua New Guinea 
Annual Report , 197 1-72 : 17 .  
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This policy has , in recent years , become more nearly 
possible as educationally qualified recruits have been 
available in the less developed areas . Nonetheles s it 
remains true that specialist and more senior pos it ions in 
the Force are over-represented by members from particular 
parts of the country . 
Australian policy in the postwar period d id not favour 
the exclus ive recruitment of special ' martial tribes ' as 
had frequently been colonial p ract ice elsewhere , though 
recruiting did favour the traditional areas of wartime PIB 
and NGIB recruit ing . As a result , in its early years , the 
PIR was dominated by Papuan NCOs (especially from the Gulf 
Distric t )  and Tolais who had been recruited for their 
superior education . 30 This influence has to some extent 
persis ted up to the present time .  Whilst the s ituat ion in 
recent years has been one of  more equitable dist ribut ion 
between Districts , there are , nonetheless , signif icant 
anomalies which challenge the assertion that the Force is 
truly nat ional . The percentages of  PNGDF members from each 
Distric t  compared with the Dis trict as a percentage of to tal 
PNG population , as shown in Tables I and II , illust rate this 
problem .  In general terms there is an over-representation 
of New Guinea islanders and Papuans in the PNGDF and an even 
more pronounced under-rep resentation o f  the New Guinea 
mainland and Highlands .  The Highland s region has only about 
half the representatives to which it is entitled on a 
national population basis . If the Sou thern Highlanders are 
excluded from the Papua to tal , the over-representation of 
the Papuan Distric ts becomes even mo re pronounced . Apart 
from these . examples o f  mal-distribution , a 1969 survey found 
that two backward subdistricts (namely Wonenara and 
Menyamya) had no representation at all within the PNGDF . 
There is also a s ignificant urban b ias to recruitment which 
is likely to increase as urban population expands and as the 
PNGDF tends to recruit from within the families of it s 
members . The danger here is that the Defence Force might 
become too urban and no t suf fic iently representative of a 
mainly rural PNG population . 31 
30 See Bell , 19 6 7a ,  for an explanation o f  the early po stwar 
recruiting pattern . 
31During the year 1969 some 30 per cent were recruited from 
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Table . I* 
The percentage d istribution of the PNGDF 
by d istricts · - May 1973 
Distric t  
PaEua 
Central 
Milne Bay 
Northern 
Western 
Gulf 
Southern Highlands 
New Guinea Mainland 
Eastern Highlands 
Chimbu 
Western Highlands 
Moro be 
East Sep ik 
West Sep ik 
Madang 
New Guinea Islands 
Manus 
East New Britain 
West New Britain 
New Ireland 
Bougainville 
Percentage 
of PNGDF 
6 . 5 
5 . 5  
7 . 5  
4 . 1  
6 . 5  
3 . 6  
5 . 0 
5 . 9  
6 . 2  
7 . 9  
7 . 1  
5 . 3  
6 . 8 
3 . 3  
6 . 8 
4 . 1  
4 . 1  
3 . 8  
District as 
percentage 
of to tal PNG 
population 
6 . 1 
4 . 4  
2 . 5  
2 . 6  
2 . 8 
8 . 1  
10 . 0  
7 . 7  
13 . 6  
9 . 4  
8 . 2  
4 . 2 
7 . 5  
0 . 9 
4 . 0 
2 . 4  
2 . 1  
3 . 0  
Percentage 
under- or 
over­
represented 
in PNGDF 
+0 . 4  
+1 . 1  
+5 . 0  
+1 . 5  
+3 . 7  
-4 . 5  
-5 . 0  
-1 . 8 
-7 . 4  
-1 . 5  
-1 . 1  
+1 . 1  
-0 . 7  
+2 . 4  
+2 . 8  
+l . 7 
+2 . 0  
+0 . 8  
* PNGDF Reco rds Sect ion information correc t as at 4 May 
197 3 . Population percentages are derived from population 
figures shown in the Papua New Guinea Annual Report� 
197 1-7 2 ,  Appendix 1 ,  pp . 2 64-6 . Percentages do not quite 
add to 100 per cent due to rounding . 
Table II  
Summary for the PNG Regions 
Regions 
Papua 
Papua less 
Southern Highlands 
New Guinea Mainland 
New Guinea Islands 
Highlands 
Percentage 
of PNGDF 
33 . 7  
3 0 . 1  
44 . 2  
22 . 1  
20 . 7  
District as 
percentage 
of total PNG 
population 
2 6 . 5  
18 . 4  
60 . 6  
12 . 4  
39 . 4  
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Percentage 
under- or 
over­
represented 
in PNGDF 
+ 7 . 2  
+11 .  7 
-16 . 4  
+ 9 . 7  
-18 . 7  
Whilst the present District imb alance in recruitment is 
partly due to a lack of educat ionally qualified volunteers , 
there may be strong polit ical reasons for rap idly redressing 
the imbalance , especially in regard to the Highlands ,  even 
if it entailed a lowering of entry standard . Highland 
leaders have complained about their under-representation in 
the PNG Public Service and in national leadership posit ions 
and , in spite of the later development of the Highlands in 
comparison with other regions , PNG leaders will probably 
need to accep t these demand s in order to ensure the co­
operat ion of Highlanders . Greater Highland representation 
in the PNGDF may therefore be predicted , even if it is at 
the expense of an overall expansion in the strength of the 
Force . 32 
31 ( continued) 
Port Moresby and Rabaul , and to gether with Lae , Goroka , 
Mount Hagen , Wewak and Madang ac counted for 60 per cent 
of enlis tees . This trend may partly be due to recruitment 
taking place in high schools usually lo cated in town 
centres . 
32The adj ustment o f  ethnic representation seems to have been 
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It  is theoret ically simple to control enlis tment on a 
proport ional basis as between district s ,  but it is less 
easy and , . in terms of efficiency , less des-irable to control 
promo t ion on the same bas is . Promot ion should ideally be 
related to ability and qualificat ions and these factors are 
unlikely to be evenly dis tributed . On the other hand it may 
be necessary to make concessions in the direction o f  a 
fairer regional dis tribut ion o f  rank in order to avo id 
ethnic polit ical problems , as has b een the African 
experience in relat ion to o fficer po sit ions . A 19 70  survey 
of the land element revealed that NCO rank was seriously 
mal-apportioned on a District-by-District basis . It showed 
that , where abouf 2 9  p er cent o f  the total force wore NCO 
rank , members from all the Highland Districts and the 
Western District were under-represented and the Central , 
Milne Bay , Northern , Manus and Bougainville Dist ricts  were 
over-represented . At both extremes , only 8 per cent o f  
Southern Highlanders wore rank whilst about 48  per cent o f  
Milne Bay soldiers did . 33  A further finding was that there 
was a tendency for those Dis tricts under-represented to be 
even more seriously under-represented in the senior NCO 
posit ions which carried more authority and prest ige . 34 
The PNGDF is a youthful force . As most recruit s are 
enli sted directly from high s chool , they are a lot clo ser 
to the minimum enlistment age of s ixteen than the maximum o f  
thirty . 35 The average age o f  the Force , taking into account 
the o fficers and senior NCOs and the other rank element is 
32at least a factor in the considerable expansion of the 
Kenyan , Ugandan , and Tanzanian armies after independence . 
See Lee , 1969 : 5 and 44 . 
33Australian Army PNG Psycholo gy Research Unit , Research 
Report No . 30 ,  July 1 9 7 0 . 
34Regimental o f ficers in the PIR have reported difficulty in 
overcoming this imbalance . It has b een found that High­
landers are frequently unwilling to assume NCO respon s ib­
ilities and some who have done so have proven themselves 
to be unsuitable (personal communicat ion , lPIR, 19 72 ) . 
35Enlistment for other rank members o f  the PNGDF is for an 
init ial term of four years followed by re-engagements of  
two year terms (PNGDF Manual of Personne l Administration) .  
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probably between twenty and twenty-three . This average age 
may well rise in the future as trained personnel recruited 
in p revious years elect to stay on in the Defence Force -
especially if civil employment opportunities decline in the 
future . The maturing of the Force in this way might lead to 
improved stab ility , especially in the PIR. 
Educat ion 
The PNG serviceman belongs to an educated elite in regard 
bo th to the distribution of educat ional opportunit ies in PNG 
and the minimum educational standard of Form Two for entry 
to the Defence Force . Whilst there are many soldiers in the 
Defence Force who j o ined before the imposit ion o f  the Form 
Two standard , about 95 per cent of  the Force have received 
s ix o r  more years of  education . 3 6  This represents a dramatic 
improvement since 1957 when mo st of the soldiers in the PIR 
were classified as illiterate. 3 7  Educational standards 
affect the Defence Force in three ways influencing the 
capacity of  the Defence Force to cope with managerial and 
sp ecialist tasks , the way in which the PNGDF perceives and 
responds to political issues and the contribution that 
Defence Force personnel make to PNG society when they 
ultimately return to civilian life . 
The educational level within specialist units of  the 
PNGDF , such as the eng ineering units , is significantly higher 
than that within the infantry b attalions . Even in the 
infantry and less technical areas , however ,  educational 
attainment levels are carefully considered in selection for 
promotion , and minimum education standards are laid down in 
order to qualify for NCO rank. Within the PIR it is recog­
nised that illiterate , or even non-English speaking , leaders 
are unable to funct ion effectively in administrative and 
training roles , although they might well be excellent 
leaders in o ther respects . 
In order to train profess ionals for the Defence Force in 
the f ields of medic ine , dent istry , law and eng ineering , an 
undergraduate traine e scheme has been instituted . Students 
at the univers ities of  PNG and Technology are sponsored by 
3 6 rn June 19 69 , 84  per cent had s ix or more years of 
educat ion . The 95 per cent f igure is an estimate based on 
the earlier f igures and subsequent trends ( see Research 
Report No . 32 ,  April 197 2 ,  para . 2 4 .  
37 Ibid . 
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the Force during their courses and , at the complet ion of 
them , become officers . This scheme is s imilar to that 
operated in PNG by the Public Service and s chemes which 
operate in the Australian Services . Defence Force teacher 
trainees are also being sponsored at PNG t eacher training 
institutions . These trainees will eventually replace 
Au stralian professionals but it will be several years af ter 
independence before PNG professional officers , in s ignificant 
numb ers , complete their train ing and replace Aust ralians . 3 7  
In-service civil educat ion programs have been emphas ised 
in the Force as a means of improving the capac ity of  the 
individual serviceman to ab sorb ins truc tion and perform 
skilled tasks . Until the terminat ion of the Aus tralian 
Nat ional Service Scheme the civil educat ion program in the 
PNGDF was supported by large numbers of national servicemen 
teachers .  With the ending o f  national service , the 
reduc tion of educat ion resources has led to concentration on 
more specific educational obj ect ive s .  Whereas during most 
of  the nat ional service period all soldiers compulsorily 
underwent s ix weeks civil education each year , emphasis is 
now placed on those who show po tential for further education 
which would benefit them in their Defence Force service , 
either through suitability for promotion or specialist 
employment . In addit ion , all servicemen are encouraged to 
reach at leas t Form One level . 
Whilst there was some opposit ion in earlier years to 
increased emphasis on civil educat ion , especially among st 
some Australian of ficers who believed that a ' cult '  of 
education was developing at the expense of  reg imental 
eff iciency , this view has s ince been discred ited . It has 
b een neces sary to advance educat ional standards in the 
Defence Force merely to keep in step with rapid advances in 
the educational standards of other group s such as the Public 
Service and , second ly , a well-educated force seems to be 
needed if it is to be able to administer itself and maintain 
it s equipment as well as being able to fight . 
37 A total of 27  students were selected for sponsorship under 
the PNGDF Sponsorship Scheme in 197 4 .  Sponsored s t uden t s  
are enlisted as officer cadets , receive an allowance and 
have their university fees paid. They are required to 
serv e as officers for a period of up to f ive vears , 
depending on the length of their courses . ( See PNGDF 
b rochure : ' Papua New Guinea Defence Force Sponsorship 
Scheme ' . )  
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The continuing in-service educat ion of the serviceman is 
also important from a nat ional point of view. Servicemen 
who return to civilian employment are , in many cases , better 
suited to their new j obs as a result o f  the formal education 
they receive in the Defence Force . Although a 1969 survey 
of former PNG soldiers showed that only a comparatively 
small percentage of the 65 per cent in urban emp�oyment 
were able directly to apply their former milit ary employ­
ment , the general bene fits of military service were useful 
to them - that is , increased formal education and standard 
of social discipline and leadership as a result o f  their 
military t raining.  There are now , however ,  increasing 
numbers of Defence Force men who have skills in demand in 
the urban sector as a result o f  the d iversificat ion of 
PNGDF units from the infantry b ase of the early 1960s . 
These include mechanics , plant operators and drivers , clerks 
and storemen . Nevertheless , there are st ill numbers of 
Defence Force men who do return to their villages , the 
maj ority of whom are engaged in sub sistence and cash crop 
agriculture . There would , therefore , be considerable 
national benefit to be had in improving the agricultural 
and business skills of these men before they left the 
Defence Force . The Defence Force has , so far , placed lit tle 
emphasis on vocational training to help servicemen to 
resettle in rural cotmllunities . This is unfortunate and 
more could be done . As he is likely to have favourable 
att itudes to change and some accumulated capital as a result 
of military service , the ex-PNGDF man who returns to his 
village is a potentially powerful agent of  rural developmen� 
especially if equipped with agricultural knowledge and 
skills .  Emphas is on vo cational training in the Defence 
Force would , furthermore , complement the rural improvement 
obj ectives of the Somare government which has acknowledged 
that mo st Papua New Guineans will cont inue to live in the 
subsistence sector of the economy (Papua New· Guinea 's 
Improvement Plan 1 9 7 3/74 : 51-61 ) . A small-scale farming 
proj ect which has been in op eration s ince 1969 at Moem 
Barracks may provide an example for further development .  
This proj ect provides training in animal husbandry and 
agricultural techniques to interested soldiers and the 
expansion of this sort of pro gram on a Defence Force-wide 
basis would seem to be desirable .  I t  might b e  linked t o  a 
government resettlement scheme for Defence Force personnel , 
involving assistance with land and loans . 
Education within the PNGDF also plays a role in the 
training of servicemen as cit izens . As des cribed in 
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Chapter 1 ,  Australians have b elieved that the PNG Defence 
Force might be educated to accep t an apolitical role in the 
PNG political system. The assumpt ion has been that if 
servicemen understood about the processes of  democratic 
government and the relationship of the PNGDF to government ,  
there would b e  little danger o f  a crisis in c ivil-military 
relat ions after independence . Nevertheles s it seems to be 
a matter for speculat ion whether the polit ical educat ion of 
an army is more , rather than less , likely to develop a 
corporate polit ical consc iousnes s .  Political education 
might prove counter-product ive after independence , especially 
if the course of nat ional pol it ics does not correspond with 
soldiers ' theoret ical expectations of democracy , ef fic iency 
and honesty in government . Equally obvious are the dangers 
of no or little polit ical educat ion , as in Afr ica , where 
armies have so frequently seized political power , and there 
seems to �e no ready answer to this problem.  
Under existing policy in 197 4 ,  polit ical educat ion was 
conducted within the framework of civics and ethics training. 
All unit s in the Force were direc ted to conduct p eriodic 
ses sions dealing with subj ects contained in a syllabus and 
most units conduc ted a civics sess ion once each week in 
which chaplains , education and regimental o fficers part ici­
pated . Subj ects ranged from ' How the Government operates ' 
to the ' Need for Law ' and ' Who Cont rols the Army ? ' This 
form of cit izenship training has been intensified in recent 
years to meet the pressures which may be experienced at 
independence . 38  
So far the c it izenship train ing conducted in the PNGDF 
has been a mixture of Christian ethics and high school 
soc ial s tud ies . The content has therefore been non­
ideological in character , other than for the intrusion of  
Christ ian and liberal-democratic values . Plans were afoot 
during 19 74 to introduc e a code of  conduct booklet which 
was more exp licitly ideological in approach, set t ing down 
social and mil itary duties o f  Defenc e Force members .  The 
3 8The func t ion of citizenship train ing in the PNGDF as PNG 
approached independence was explained in the following 
terms by the PNG Commander : 
We must make sure as servants of  the Nat ional 
government that we understand our responsib ilit ies 
to the government and that there is no misunder­
stand ing on our part regarding our responsib ility 
bo th as citizens and as soldiers (HQ PNGDF 
Cit izenship Training Direct ive 1973 ) . 
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danger of  establishing an explicitly ideological code of  
conduct ,  given that it might have benefits in terms of 
build ing morale and esprit de corps, is that it might be 
misemployed in the future to j ustify unlawful political 
action by the Defence Force . These are questions which 
will be more appropriate for Papua New Guinean , rather than 
Aus tralian ,  leaders to resolve after independence . 
Language 
Like o ther national organisations the Defence Force is 
multi-lingual . English is the official language of command 
and of written communication s .  Pidgin i s  an important 
language for social communicat ion and an auxiliary language 
for command and instruction . Apart from these two languages, 
Hiri Motu , the princ ipal Papuan lingua franca , 3 9  and 
dialects (or Ples Tok, of which there are estimated to be 
about seven hundred ) are spoken by members of  the Defence 
Force amongst themselves , with their families and with 
c ivilian kinsmen . 
Language issues are relevant to the func tion ing of the 
PNGDF in several ways . They bear on the pattern of communi­
cat ion in the Force and thus its effectiveness : if 
language is no t comprehended adequately , orders may be 
mis interpreted and instruc tion not understood.  Language 
also affects the soc ial cohesion of the Force . It may be 
pos tulated that a common language unites in the way that a 
diversity of  languages segments .  Language use also affects 
the PNGDF ' s  ab ility to connnunicate and establi sh rapport 
with other groups in PNG society . 
English is PNG ' s  principal language o f  government and it 
is also the off icial PNGDF language for command and all 
written communications , orders and instruc tions . It is the 
language of formal military ins truct ion and command between 
officers and men as well as being the language of social 
intercourse between Australian and PNG officers and NCOs in 
3 9Hiri Motu is now more popular than the former descrip tion 
Police Motu . Hereafter , where I refer to Motu I mean the 
lingua franca ,  no t the d ialect spoken by the Motuans of 
the Port Moresby area from which the lingua f ranca has 
been derived .  (These and the following remarks in this 
section on language are based on discussion with PNGDF 
officers and NCOs , and personal experience whilst serving 
in PNG during 1965-66 and 19 7 1- 7 2 . )  
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the officers ' · and sergeants ' mes ses . It is , however ,  also 
neces sary to reco gnise the important use of  Pidg in in the 
Defence Force . Whilst PNG officers and NCOs usually speak 
to PNG soldiers in the specialist and headquarters units in 
English , in the PIR battalions they are more likely to use 
P idgin . This language , which is PNG ' s  mo st widespread 
lingua franca , has had a strong tradit ion in the PIR as a 
language of command , instruct ion and off-duty communication 
between soldiers .  It was , from the beg inning , an instrument 
o f  integrat ion and a builder of esprit de corps as the PIR 
developed its own brand of Pidgin repleat with slick idioms 
and milit ary vocabulary . The use of Pidgin has continued 
s trongly in the PIR battalions , although of fic ially discour­
aged in recent years in favour of English. On the o ther 
hand , the u se of Pidgin in specialist or headquarters units 
during du ty hours has largely given way to English . This 
has resulted , to some extent , in the d ichotomous situation 
of Murray Barracks being prodominantly English speaking , 
Taurama and Moem ( the PIR bases ) being P idg in speaking and 
Gold ie River and Igam falling somewhere between the two . If 
this is the on-duty situa tion , the s ituat ion off duty in the 
married and s ingle quarters environment is les s s imple . 
Here Pidgin , Mo tu and dialects are used more and English 
les s and it is , therefore , easy to overestimate the extent 
to which the Force is in fact Engl ish-speaking . Few service­
men , other than some well-educated NCOs who also  have 
educated wives and most (but no t all) officers , speak English 
at home , preferring to speak their own dialect when conver s­
ing with their own famil ies and wontoks ( i . e .  tho se of the 
same language group ) . Pidg in or Mo tu are also used , 
espec ially if there are non-wontoks present . 
Although most servicemen may prefer Pidgin , Motu and 
dialec t when off duty , they need English for their work 
s ituat ion . Many Aus tralian NCOs and off icers in the Defence 
Force are effectively non-Pidgin speakers and instructions 
and technical handbooks are written in English . Nonetheless 
P idgin has continued to flourish in the Defence Force for 
several reasons . It is an expres sive language with vocabu­
lary and speech patterns that are easy to pick up , whereas 
many soldiers find English cumbersome and inadequate for 
many topics of social conversation . For the PIR so ldier on 
patrol , Pidgin s eems better suited to communicating with his 
fellow countrymen in the villages ; with English he usually 
cannot .  The use of Pidgin identifies the soldier with PNG 
villagers and es tablishes rapport with them ; English almost 
always sets him apart as a member of an alien elit e .  For 
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these reasons · the PIR soldier in most cases prefers to use 
Pidgin .  
For funct ional reasons i t  seems that the PNGDF will 
remain in impo rtant respects multi-lingual . It will in this 
respect be no d ifferent from the PNG Public Service and 
Police . 
The Defence Force will be able to perform an important 
role in promo ting the u se of Pidgin as the principal 
nat ional l ingua franca and , in so do ing , contribute to the 
process of national integration as more and more Papua New 
Guineans are able to understand and converse in one language . 
One important implication for Australia in these observations 
about the multi-lingual character of  the PNGDF is that 
Australian servicemen attached to the PNGDF in the future 
may need to be trained Pidg in l inguists in order to be fully 
effective in a training and advisory role . 40 
Social cohes ion 
The effec tiveness o f  a military organisat ion ultimately 
depend s on the quality of  cohes ion . That is to say , even 
when under operational stress armies have to function as a 
team with their authority and hierarchy unimpaired if they 
are to be succes sful in combat . The cohes ion and co rpo rate 
character of  modern armies depends no t so much on coercion 
but the indo ctrinat ion and resocialisation processes that 
result in their members accep ting the norms and obj ec tives 
of military organisat ion . Similarly , the cohesion of the 
PNG Defence Force derives not only from the patterns of 
organisation and au thority but is also a product o f  morale­
build ing activit ies (Little , 1 9 7 1 : 2 93 ) . 
The Defence Force and its barracks may be described as a 
to tal inst itu t ion in which almost all aspects o f  the service-
40Bell (197 1 : 35 ) and o ther experienc ed officers believe that 
Pid gin will be likely to be used to the exclusion of 
English amongst troop s in moments of stress , as for example, 
' when the first sho t rings out ' .  It is important that 
Australian servicemen who do need to understand P idgin 
are taught it properly rather than merely p icking up the 
brutalised ' baby talk ' version known by Papua New Guineans 
as tok mas ta. 
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men ' s lives are the concern of the military authorit ies . 41 
The barracks enclaves provide for the phys ical and spiritual 
needs of the sold i ers as well as for those of their families . 
The barracks contain supermarkets and swimming pools , p icture 
theatres and chapels in addition to being the servicemen ' s  
place of work. Married servicemen live within adj acent 
married quarters areas and their famil ies are also part o f  
the military comnrunity . Their houses are periodically 
inspected for cleanl iness , their families receive free 
med ical attention and their children at tend schools within 
the barracks . Although there may b e  opportunit ies for 
outside social contact , such as vis it ing civilian friends ,  
playing sport and shopping at the town markets , servicemen 
in PNG , far more than their Australian counterpart , are 
memb ers of a to tal inst itution (symbolised by the cyclone 
wire fence which surrounds Murray Barracks in the midst of  
Port Moresby) . 
The to tal character of the Defence Force organisat ion 
provides the arena in which the indoctrinat ion and social­
isation of Defence Force recruit s take place . In basic 
train ing recruit s  undergo a process of  disorientation 
followed by indoctrinat ion in to the mores of the PNGDF . 
Their civilian life patterns are disrup ted , individual 
expectat ions are replaced by group obj ect ives and they are 
taught to accep t authority without quest ion (see Yarmolinsky, 
197 1 : 3 97 ) . Eventually , military training in new skills and 
rituals produces in the successful recruits new self-es teem 
and sense of group partic ipat ion - they have j oined the 
team (Little , 197 1 : 2 02 ) . In this process  the recruit s '  
prior social characteristic s  are de-emphasised , their hair 
is cut , they don a strange uniform, are given a regimental 
number and placed in the strange company of fellow recruits .  
From the start o f  this resocialisation recruits are regarded 
impersonally as soldiers and not Chimbus or Tolais . In this 
manner the recruits ' old primord ial loyalties are , to  some 
ext ent , replaced by a new loyalty to the Defenc e Force , 
41Go ffman (1961 : 4 , 5 ) suggest s  that ' to tal ' institutions are 
d ist inguished by the following features : ' all aspec t s  of 
life are conduc ted in the same place and under the same 
authority ' ,  ac tivities are carried out in large homogeneous 
group s ; all act ivit ies are purportedly designed to fulfil 
the offic ial aims of the institution . Examples of  to tal 
inst itutions include prisons , monasteries, board ing schools 
and army barracks . 
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their unit and· leaders . 4 2  
Dur ing the recruits ' sub sequent service new loyalties and 
their acceptance into the organisat ion are reinforced by 
vocat ional , social and even religious act ivities within the 
Defence Force . In the social context , servicemen mix with 
Defence Force groups which cut across primordial groupings . 
They p lay , for examp le ,  in Defence Force football teams not 
Papuan or Highland ones . Their sp iritual needs are met by 
Defence Force chaplains and the composition of their denom­
inational congregations are broadly nat ional . 43 
In regard to the ir military duties , servicemen belong to 
units within which they are members of  smaller primary 
groups - in the case of the PIR, a section o f  about ten men 
commanded by a corporal . These primary groups form part of 
larger groups such as platoons and companie s .  Whilst each 
of these group s commands some of the sold iers ' loyalty,  it 
is probably at the sec t ion and platoon level that the indoc­
trination and soc ialisation pro cesses are the most intensive. 
Although these primary group s exist in all the Defence Force 
42Primordial loyalty is used to refer to the ' givens ' of  
blood , race and language . 
43Religion has been consciously and actively employed within 
the PNGDF as an integrative force and morale builder . 
Religious symbolism , for example , plays an important part 
in the annual rededication ceremonial parades held in the 
PIR and other military ritual involving Regimental Colours 
is enmeshed with religious symbolism ( it is of  cour se true 
that even in countries like Aus tralia which have a 
relatively low proport ion o f  active Christians , religious 
symbolism. is still emphasised in aspects of  mil itary cere­
monial ) . In PNG the evangelis ing character of the 
Christ ian mis sions , their role in education , and poss ibly 
the sp iritual attraction of Christ ianity in replac ing 
tradit ional magico-religious practices , have made religion 
important to the lives of many,  perhaps most , sold ier s .  
Rel igion also provides cont inuity and stability in the 
lives of servicemen between village and Defence Force . 
The denominat ional composition o f  the PNGDF mirrors that 
of  PNG soc iety . The Anglican and Protestant faiths account 
for about half the total ( the princ ipal Protes tant denom­
inat ions are the United Church and the Lutherans ) . Roman 
Catholics account for j us t  under half the overall to tal . 
Very few PNGDF members claim to be non-Christian . 
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unit s they seem to be strongest in the infantry bat tal ions , 
on board ship s and in other unit s where the work s ituat ion 
involves sustained periods of  proximity and co-operative 
effort , as for example in the operat ion of a patrol boat at 
sea or within an infantry platoon on patro1 . 44 For this 
reason it may be argued that these units are likely to be 
more cohesive and less likely than support and headquarters 
unit s to  fragmentation along ethnic or other lines in t imes 
of stres s .  
In add ition t o  the effects o f  indo ctrination and the 
informal bonds of the primary group , the cohes ion of the 
Defence Force organisat ion is reinforced by its formal 
structures .  The demands of military disc ipline , the formal 
authority o f  NCOs and officers and the power which they 
wield through the disciplinary sys tem all contribute to the 
corporate character of the PNGDF . 45 Each member of the 
PNGDF has ' unit identity ' ,  he is part of a unit organisation 
in which he has his own sup erior o fficers and a funct ional 
role . He is , therefore , in bo th a formal and informal sense 
part o f  the Defence Force team. The cohesion o f  the Force 
is enhanced no t only by the to tal nature of  the inst itu tion , 
but al so by the serviceman ' s  awareness that he is part of  a 
privileged group in PNG society which is well paid , well 
housed and which possesses excellent social amenit ie s .  
Discipline within the PNGDF i s  more severe and the scope 
of military regulations more comprehensive than is the case 
in the Australian Services .  This is j ustified on the 
grounds of the allegedly special need of Papua New Guineans 
for strong discipline , a view which is part ially supported 
by the experience in PNG with both the Police and Defence 
Force . Discipline for both operat ional and support units 
in the Fo rce is based on what has el sewhere been described 
as the combat ethic (see Ro ss er ,  1973 ) . Training with 
infantry weapons , drill and ceremonial are part of the 
routine for combat and support unit s alike and are seen as a 
means o f  bu ilding esprit de corps and maintaining discipline. 
44A. L .  George in Little (19 7 1 : 298-306 ) argues that the 
loyalty of member s  to the primary group is intensified 
the more isolated the group is . 
45 see Janowit z ,  1964a : 23 .  Janowitz discussed the po ssibility 
of the primary group conflicting with the formal s tructure . 
This could occur in the PNGDF where there was poor 
communication between of ficers and men . 
The standards · of formal discipline demanded are probably 
highest in the infantry units .  Dis cipline in the PNGDF 
appears to be founded on two as sumptions about Papua New 
Guineans , one paternalistic , the other authoritarian . It  
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is generally believed that the PNG sold ier respects f irmnes s 
and abuses concessions which he mistakes for weakness and 
that once a sold ier ' fouls ' (that is , commits a serious 
disciplinary breach) he is unlikely to reform himself and , 
therefore , he should p robably be discharged. For this reason 
discip line in the Defence Force , by Australian standards , 
is generally s tern and unrelent ing and high standards of  
conduct are maintained . This formal pattern is to some 
extent humanised by a paternal style o f  management o f  troop s 
by their off icers .  Deriving from a P IR tradition , officers 
are required to know and ' understand ' their men and 
Aust ralians in the Force are expected to steep themselves in 
PNG trad itions and lore - in a sense , to love their troop s 
in the way that Brit ish officers loved their Gurkha or 
Sepoy . 4 6  
This pattern of leader ship and disc ipline , which has 
developed in a colonial force , may no t be suitable for a 
force commanded by black officer s .  The relationship between 
whit e officer and PNG sold ier has , in a sense , resembled 
that o f  feudal lord and retainer and this is unlikely to be 
an effective or durable basis for relat ions between Papua 
New Guineans . It is evident that some PNG officers have a 
more informal and clo ser social relationship with soldiers , 
although the PNG officer on duty may be less inclined to 
interest himself in the total welfare of  his troop s .  He is 
l ikely to be less paternalistic and more willing to let his 
fellow countrymen sort out their own problems . This 
att itude has led some PNG soldiers of the old school to feel 
that their own off icers are ' second rate ' , whilst other PNG 
o fficers who have emulated their Australian counterparts are 
regarded by some soldiers as ' too Aus tralian ' . 
In this connection , Luckham ( 197 1)  has described how 
o fficer leadership in the Nigerian Army changed in important 
respects after independence , although many of the outward 
appearances and rituals remained seemingly unaltered . This 
is l ikely to be the case in PNG also . The PNG officer will 
be closer to the social pressures and grievances of the men 
46The close relationship between officer and soldier is more 
pronounced in the P IR than in most o ther PNGDF units where 
there is generally less opportunity for clo se contact 
between officers and men . 
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he leads and he will be subj ect to the influence of his own 
ethnic group within the Defence Force . It is unrealistic to 
see the PNG officer corps isolated from the pressures and 
conflicts of PNG society at large . The closed nature of the 
Defence Force organisat ion may reduce these external 
influences but not remove them.  Familial and ethnic linkages 
are likely to produce clo se bonds between Defence Force and 
Police officer , public servant and politic ian within what 
will cont inue to be a relat ively small and interlo cking 
elite. Evidence of this was indicated by a survey of officer 
cadets at the Jo int Services College . Over half the officer 
cadet s  had members of their close family either employed in 
posit ions within the PNG elite or attending high school and , 
therefore , probabl y des t ined for such employment . 
The extent to  which integration within the PNGDF has 
weakened , or actually destroyed , ethnic or reg ional loyalties 
bears examinat ion . Are there , in fact , any ethnic ' flaws ' 
in an ostensibly well-integrated and cohesive organisation ? 
This issue is especially relevant to the performanc e of the 
PNGDF in the case of involvement in PNG internal security 
problems with ethnic implications . Although armed forces in 
developing countries have been characterised as nat ionalist 
organisat ions which are leas t affected by the tribal 
divis ions present in the res t  of society ( see Lefever , 1970 : 
20-1) , there are dangers in overemphas ising this approach. 
Violent ethnic conflict within soc iety at large , when it 
reaches a certain intensity , may sp ill over into the 
military (Luckham , 1971 : 8) . Ethnic or regional ist tens ions 
in PNG society could also be reflected within the PNGDF and 
these tensions might conceivably result in anything from a 
minor reduct ion in effic iency to the unreliab il ity of units , 
the defection o f  ethnic group s , or , in an extreme case , 
internal revolt . 
In spite of powerful Defence Force indoctrinat ion and 
social isat ion processes it is an over-statement to descr ibe 
the Defence Force , or even the PIR element within it , as a 
new trib e  ( see Bell , 1967b : 49-58 ) . Whilst  personal fr iend­
ship s do form across ethnic and regional l ines and ethnic 
prej ud ices are reduced through barracks life , the importance 
of wontok loyalt ies is , in some respec ts , und iminished . On 
duty the sold ier is part of  a multi-ethnic environment and 
as a result his opportunities for wontok group ings may be 
reduced ; off duty , however ,  wontok group ing s may even 
predominate . Some off icers b elieve that in recent years the 
soldier ' s  preference for social mixing with wontok group s 
may , paradoxically , have increased rather than decreased . 
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This has been · attribu ted to the growth of the towns in which 
the PNGDF bases are located and the tendency for soldier s ,  
like others in the conmrunity , t o  fall back on primordial 
allegiances in a time of rapid soc ial and polit ical change 
(Geertz , 1963 ) . The growth o f  urban population has meant 
that mo st PNG ethnic communities are represented and the 
sold ier now has new opportunit ies for social mixing with his 
own group . 47 
The influence of wontoks· within the military system may 
also be seen in the line-boss system. Tradit ionally , l ine­
bos ses were the experienced , respected leaders of their own 
ethnic group ; however ,  with the influx of large numbers of  
younger , well-educated soldier s , the influence of  these men 
is now confined largely to matters o f  custom and tradit ional 
affairs , rather than military duties .  They do , nonetheles s ,  
provide an in formal connnunications and intelligence network 
which is sometimes useful to regimental o fficers as a means 
of f inding out what is occurring . The line-boss system is 
an obstacle to complete integration in the PNGDF as well as 
being a possible means of group action in times of ethnic 
conflict . The term wontok .  its elf has an imprecise meaning 
within both the PNGDF and PNG society . In the Defence Force 
the term more usually refers to an allegiance beyond one 
language group , such as a Subdistrict o r  even District.  
Members of small ethnic group s are happy at  t imes to become 
identif ied with a larger group of greater prest ige , for 
example ,  Tolais or Chimbus ,  and there is evidence that a 
process o f  regionalism ,  as a building block o f  nationalism , 
is und er way in the Defence For ce . Nevertheles s  general­
isat ions o f  this sort are likely to be misleading b ecause o f  
the situat ional character of  these loyalt ies . As Parker and 
Wolfers have pointed out ( see Epstein ,  Parker and Reay , 
1971 : 16 ) , polit ical loyalt ies are in a process o f  rapid 
change in PNG and ' a  man ' s loyalties st ill tend to vary with 
the social content of a conflict ' and , in the Defence Force 
context , a Kerema soldier may see himself as a member of a 
47
These observations are based on discussions with PNGDF 
officers and personal experience . The town wontok group 
provides ho spitality , opportunit ies to discuss village 
affairs and to converse in the lo cal language . In turn , 
the sold ier is expected to honour his own recipro cal 
obl igations which may include help with money , and some 
sold iers find these reciprocal social obligations onerous . 
They may even try to evade them by applying for a transfer 
to ano ther base . 
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Papuan dr inking group in the canteen but later support his 
Moveave kinsman in a polit ical dispute with other Keremas . 
Evidence of the persistence of e thnic group ings in the 
Defence Force is provided by social distance surveys that 
have been conducted .  Thes e surveys show that there is 
considerable degree o f  ethnic stereotyping , in the minds of 
both PNG and Aus tralian servicemen . In a 197 0 survey , for 
example , Chimbus and Keremas were ranked low and Bukas and 
Tolais were ranked high in terms of social accep tab ility 
<Research Report No . 39 ) . ( Sign ificant divergences were 
revealed in the opinions of PNG and Aus tralian respondents . ) 
An.o ther proj ect in 1972  provided evidence of high regard for 
Bukas and poor regard for Go ilalas (Research Report No . 62 ) .  
This is a complex issue , however , and the research that has 
been conducted so far is an inadequate basis for any broad 
generalisation , other than to say that some Defence Force 
memb ers are l ess acceptable than o thers as colleagues on 
purely ethnic grounds . Ethnic stereo typ ing has certainly 
been an aspect  of the Australian experience in PNG and it 
has led to a belief amongst o ff icers that certain behaviour 
is ' typ ical ' of particular ethnic group s and , therefore , 
that the behaviour of soldiers from ' A' may be intuited . 
Whils t  such bel iefs may be based on experience and reg imental 
lore , it is extremely doub tful if the relat ion ship between 
ethn ic group s has ever been as simple as that postulated by 
Bell (1967b : 4 9 -5 8 ) : 
As a generalisation it could be said that New 
Guineans have gained moral ascendancy over Papuans , 
Highlanders over fellow New Guineans and Bukas 
over all . 
The s ignificance of tribal prej udices within the Defence 
force is that they are ob stacles to comple te integrat ion and 
po ss ib le chinks in the cohes ion of the PNGDF which have 
operational implicat ions in the event of an internal security 
role . 
Further doubt may be cast on cohes ion in the PNGDF because 
of the incidents of disorder that have o ccurred since the 
PIR was re-established . These inc idents have revealed a 
lack of adj ustment to mil itary discipline , ethnic conflic t , 
a react ion to perceived inj ust ices in condit ions of service 
and poor connnunicat ion between off icers and men . Some or all 
of these problems might recur in the future , especially those 
concerned with conditions of service in a t ime of post­
indep endence austerity , and some o f  the more recent d isorders 
which have been more in the charac ter of ' indus trial ac tion ' 
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may provide a ·model for future disorders . The consequences 
of such action would be ser ious if industrial act ion leads 
the Defence Force to recognise it s polit ical strength. The 
suscep t ib il ity of the Defence Force to group d isobed ience 
emphas ises the need for careful and thorough man management , 
so that soldiers ' ' worries ' are talked out and trouble 
averted . It is also important that methods of determining 
pay and preserving pay relativity with the PNG Public 
Service and Police are fair and expedit ious . Whilst the 
formal organisat ion , the indoctrinat ion and socialisat ion 
processes and the strength o f  primary group s within units in 
the Defence Force have produced a well-integrated Force of 
high morale and esprit de corps� there are , nonetheless , 
traditional elements of ethnicity which also permeate the 
Force . Under certain social and polit ical cond it ions in PNG 
which accentuated ethnic issues the cohesion o f  the Defence 
Force could no t ,  therefore , be taken for granted .  
Localisation of the Officer Corps 
Localisation may be seen as a neces sary aspect o f  PNG ' s 
social and polit ical advancement to indep endence ,  enabling 
Papua New Guineans to f ind satisfying employment within 
their own country �d allowing them greater control over 
their own af fairs . 48 In virtually no area of PNG society , 
however ,  could localisation be complete by independence , and 
commerce , industry , the Public Service , Pol ice and Defence 
Force all still require expatriate manpower . 49 In this 
respect the PNGDF is like the defence forces of black African 
states at independence which also relied on manpower 
assistance from the former metropole . And like African 
states PNG ' s  manpower shortage will be greatest in regard 
to officers - the managerial and command element of the 
military - because ,  in all cases , it has been this group 
that was recru ited last into the defence force s .  
Localisation of the PNGDF o ff icer corps involves two 
d istinct aspects : the actual replacement of Aus tralians by 
trained local of ficer s and the consequent effec t s  on the 
48Localisation refers to the employment of Papua New Guineans 
in the place of Australians (and other expatriates ) within 
both the public and private sectors of the economy . 
49 See PNG 1 s Improvement Plan 1 9 73/74., chap ter 3 ;  National 
Times , 19-24 Nov . 1973 ; ' The Stranglehold Australia has -
and will keep on PNG ' ; Report on Po lice Assistance from 
Austra lia . Jan . 197 4 ; and Pito i ,  1973 : 2 2 1-8 . 
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mil itary orgartisation in terms of efficiency , stab il ity and 
professional ism. Although the f irst two PNG officers were 
commissioned as early as 1963 only between 30 and 40 per 
cent of the off icers in the PNGDF at independence will be 
Papua New Guineans and PNG will , therefore , gain independence 
with the Defence Force subj ect to a significant degree o f  
expatriate control . SO 
In regard to black Afric an states the pre-independence 
off icer localisat ion p rogram was characterised by neglect 
and mismanagement followed by a flurry of rap id lo calisation 
in the post-independence period . In no British territory in 
Africa , apart from Kenya , did Africans f ill more than one­
quarter of the officer posts at independence . (Forty-eight 
per cent of Kenya ' s  officer corps was localised at independ­
ence ( see Luckham , 19 7 1 : 163 ; Lee , 1969 : 44 ;  and Guttridge , 
1969 : 2 6 , 3 4) . )  In French colonies the s ituation was somewhat 
better. Because of the dif ferent defence policy pursued by 
France there were , by 1960 , abou t f ive hundred black officers 
in Afrique Noir and this amounted to some two-thirds of the 
to tal requ iremen t . 51 Austral ia ' s  failure in PNG to improve 
on the localisation record o f  the African armies , in spite 
of a relatively early start , may be att ributed to neglect 
and mismanagement as well as the limited number of high 
school graduates that had to be shared amongst a range of  
occupat ion� To some extent the small number of PNG officers 
was , therefore , inevitable . 
As in Af rica , the pace of officer lo calisat ion in PNG 
will accelerate af ter independence as a result of  increasing 
numbers of educationally qual ified cand idates and the estab­
l ishment of the Joint Services College . In January 197 4 
defence plans called for the PNGDF to have a complete 
complement of  indigenous officers by 197 7 -7 8 ,  based on an 
annual output of  eighty officers from the JSC and a wastage 
rate of about 10 per cent per annum. Under current planning , 
however , the rate at which Austral ian officers will be 
5 0In January 1974 there were 7 9 PNG off icers in a to tal 
o ff icer establishment of 356  (22  per cent ) .  It was 
est imated that there would be about 17 0  PNG off icers by 
December 1 9 7 5  and 250 by December 1 9 7 6 .  
5 1  ' Bell (1965 : 8 ) observes that . there were only 55 black 
officers in 1955 and the sub sequent program of o f f icer 
production was primarily des igned to develop French 
mil itary capab ility in Afrique Noir rather than prepare 
ind igenous armed forces for independence . French officers 
remained in virtually all command appointments . 
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replaced is l�ss spectacular . Numbers of  Australians may 
still be required up to the end of  the decade if PNG officers 
are to progress through a range of career appo intments and 
accumulate proper profes s ional experience .  On this basis , 
plans allow for about one hundred Australian officers in 
1978 , f ifty in 1980 , w!2h only a few key spec ialist off icers 
remaining beyond then . It may be doubted whether such 
plans will be p ermit ted to run their course because of  
polit ical and nat ionalist issues , espec ially if African 
experience is any guide . Despite the low levels of  
localisation at independence , African armies rapidly reduced 
the role of European officers within several years of inde­
pendence. As the case of Ghana illustrates ,  a feature of  
the localisat ion proces s has been the telescop ing time frame 
on which planning is based (see Alexander , 1966 : 12-13 , 99 ;  
Lee , 1969 : 44 ) . 
Off icer localisation no t only concerns numbers but also 
involves seniority and experience . In the PNGDF the shortage 
of Papua New Guinean officers is even more evident in the 
senior ranks . Of the seventy-nine local officers serving in 
January 1 9 7 4 , more than half were lieutenants or second 
lieutenants with less than two years commiss ioned service . 
The average years o f  commiss ioned service for each rank in 
January 1974 was : lieutenant-colonel 10 years ; maj or 6 
years ;  cap tain 3 years . (By comparison Austral ian Army 
o fficers have in recent years been promoted to lieutenant­
colonel af ter 14-15 years service , maj or after 7 and captain 
after 3 . )  PNGDF promot ion regulations provide for the 
following promotion requirements : 
Promot ion to lieutenant : 2 years , 3 months as second 
l ieutenant 
Promotion to captain : 1 year , 9 months as lieu tenant 
Promot ion to maj or : 4 years as captain ; promo tion 
by selec tion 
Promot ion to lieutenant- by selection 
colonel : 
Amongst the more sen ior group of PNG officers there were 
only two lieutenant-colonels , e ight maj ors and some twenty­
two captains . Most of these officers will eventually fill 
the senior twenty appo intment s between the ranks of 
l ieutenant-colonel and brigadier and this will create 
vacanc ies in the middle ranks which will be f illed by even 
younger officers . The off icer corps of the PNGDF will , in 
52Personal communicat ion HQ PNGDF , Jan . 19 7 4 .  
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consequence ,  be younger and les s  experienced than the 
Aus tralian Services '  officer corp s in the post-independence 
period . 
Localisat ion policy in the PNGDF may also increasingly 
reflec t tens ions between conservat ive , profess ional argu­
ments for prescribed career patterns , which take account of 
fixed periods of  time in rank and rotation through career 
appo intments to gain experience , and political and social 
pressures for adapt ive career s marked by rapid promo tion . 
As in Africa , the cautious advice of expatriate advisers 
who might tend to place effic iency and stab ility goals 
foremost , is likely to give way to a process of rapid pro­
mot ion . Indeed , rap id promo tion is already under way , 
although the Defence Force , in early 19 74 , lagged behind the 
Public Service and Po lice in regard to senior level lo cal­
isation . Then , seven of the eighteen Public Service depart­
mental head s were Papua New Guineans and there were two 
lo cal As s istant Police Commiss ioner s . 53 In May 1 9 7 4  it was 
announced that a Papua New Guinean Police Commiss ioner would 
be appointed in May 1975 . 5 4 It is probable in the light of 
these developments that pres sure will mount from both the 
PNG el ite and officer corps for more rap id advancement o f  
PNG officers in the De fence Force . In the Public Service 
rapid lo calisation at the senior levels has been j ust if ied 
on the basis that Australians face conflicts of loyalty in 
their deal ings with the PNG political leadership and local 
men are required in o rder to app ly Papua New Guinean , rather 
than Australian policies and solutions . This argument might 
be relevant to the Defence Force also . 
If rapid lo calisation in the senior ranks does occur in 
the Defence Force as predicted , it is l ikely to produce 
s imilar problems to those experienced in the Public Service . 
Reduced effic iency and even p sychological s tresses in those 
who are rapidly promoted may be expected . Luckham has shown 
how rapid local isat ion in the Niger ian Army led to serious 
organ isat ional as well as political consequences . Rap id 
localisation reduced professionalism and produced tensions 
between senior and j unior officers.  Junior officers lacked 
respec t for , and challenged the authority o f ,  their ' senior ' 
53 see Canb erra Times, 16 Nov. 1973  and Post-Courier , 24 
Dec .  1973 . 
54Pos t-Courier , 13 May 1 9 7 4 . Mr Pius Kerep ia became the 
f irst Papua New Guinean to be appo inted as PNG Police 
Commiss ioner in May 197 5 . 
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officers whose formal status d id no t accord with their level 
of expertis e (Luckham , 1971 : 164) . At the same time the high 
rate of pos ting turnover , as a resul t of  rapid promot ion 
between ranks , prevented the development o f  the usual 
pat terns of influence and authority of seniors over j uniors . 
Luckham argues that in the Nigerian case this led to the 
spread of tribal antagonism and breakdown of loyalt ies and , 
ultimately , revolt ( ib id . ) .  Rapid localisat ion in Nigeria 
also led to careerism and inef f iciency . Accelerated pro­
motion o f  of ficers in the first seniority echelon led to 
unrealist ic career expectations . When the top posts were 
f illed the opportunit ies for tho se who followed were greatly 
reduced and officers in j unior posts saw that their advance­
ment would be blocked for many years by another set of  
o fficers in the senior posts . Rapid promo tion also led to a 
sense of  anorrrie in which important appo intments were devalued 
as mere stepping stones on an ascendant career . In the 
Nigerian case , the offic er corps became restless as j unior 
officers sought promo tion but no t necessarily the respons­
ib ilit ies that were entailed . 55  These consequences of rapid 
promot ion suggest s imilar po tential problems in PNG . 
Captains and maj ors in the PNGDF may expect rap id promot ion 
to the senior ranks of colonel and lieu tenant-colonel in a 
per iod o f  only a few years and the present group of lieu t­
enants are likely to reach maj or rank quickly , whereas later 
graduates may see their promotion prosp ects blocked hy young 
incumbents in s enior posts . The PNGDF is aware of this 
problem which might be reduced by a slower lo calisation rate , 
earlier ret irement o f  some officers and secondment or 
trans fer o f  Defence Force o fficers into the Public Service . 
The possib i l ity of employing Defence Force officers in o ther 
government j obs , such as District Commissioners , has been 
the subj t:c t o f  public d iscussion in PNG . 
Rap id local isation may also erode the standards of  
profe s s ionalism in the PNGDF which have been nurtured by the 
presence of large numbers of Au stralian officers . The 
extent to which Papua New Guinean officers have absorbed the 
values and norms of western , military profess ionalism is a 
55 Luckham , 197 1 : 17 0-3 , defines this ' careerist ' anomie as 
follow8 : 
The limit s are unknown between the possible and the 
impo ssible , what is .  j ust and unj ust , legit imate 
claims and hopes and those which are immoderate 
[ thus ] amb ition always exceeds the results and the 
unobtainable goal can give no pleasure . 
152 
matter for spe culat ion . 5 6  The brief careers of most o t  the 
officer corp s  and the short life of the Defence Force as an 
indigenous in st itut ion may render transmitted profess ional 
values unstable , espec ially under political stre s s .  The 
real ity of military professionalism in PNG may prove to 
represen t  little more than a veneer of inchoate , professional 
social isation (Luckham, 1971 : 120) . Luckham has con tra sted 
the observance of officers mess ritual , the image of 
' officer s and gentlemen ' and the ritualised inter-personal 
relat ionships embodied in the military system ,  with the 
subsequent breakdown of these values .  He has suggested tha t 
the local officer corps was , on one level , enthusiasti cally 
adop ting western military values but at the same time under­
go ing a process of antagonis tic reactions to western milita ry 
values in favour of indigenous social norms , racial images 
and nationalism (see also Maz rui , 1973 : 9 ) .  It is possible 
that similar forces are to b e  found within the PNG officer 
co rps and that the po st-independence Defence Force will 
become progressively more lo calised , no t only in per sonal 
terms , but als o in regard to social value s which may be in 
conflic t  with tho se of wes tern profes sionalism and so the 
officer co rps is likely to become more Melanesian and les s 
Australian in outlook. Incompletely d igested professionali sm 
may also lead to the development of naive polit ical belief s 
within the De fence Force based on ' morbidly high self-esteem' 
and a view o f  the mil itary as guard ians o f  the nat ion and o f  
public morality . 57 Professionalism,  rather than perfo rming 
the function o f  keep ing the military out o f  politics , might 
conceivably lead to the opposite effect because of its 
incompl eteness and vulnerabil ity . 5 8 
5 6Huntington (1957 )  has defined military professional ism in 
terms of  three characteris tics : a body of expertise , 
so cial responsib ility and corporate identity .  
57 The morb idly high self-es teem o f  the military has been seen 
as one of the causes of  military involvement in politics 
( see Finer , 19 62 : 7 0 ) . 
5 8Although Hunting ton argues , generally , that high levels o f  
military professionalism produce an apolit ical mil itary , 
incomplete professionalisation may lead to the developmen t 
o f  ' p seudo-intellectualism ' in element s of  the officer 
corp s  based on naive political theorising within the ' hot­
hou se ' officers ' mes s  and headquarters environment .  This 
may be encouraged by polit ical instruction of the mil itary 
in the citizenship training and the tradi tional pro fes sional 
153 
As discussed earlier in the chapter the proport ional 
rep resentation of Papua New Guinean ethnic group s within the 
Defence Force may assume polit ical and organisat ional import­
ance .  The primord ial compo sit ion of the off icer corps is 
po tent ially even more important in view of  its command and 
managerial function and a divided officer corps is likely to 
lead to a similarly divided Defence Force . Furthermore , the 
weight of  emp ir ical evidence in regard to military inter­
vent ion in politics in Africa and elsewhere indicates that 
mil itary politics are largely those of off icer corp s  polit ics. 
The off icer corp s usually contains the more polit ically 
conscious , it provides the ' plo tters ' and leaders of the 
class ical coup d ' etat process and it provides the leaders of  
the new regime . The NCOs and o ther ranks usually perform 
the role of  willing executants of  the officer corps ' 
political plans , although they may exercise a degree of  
influence on  them ( see First , 1 9 7 2 : and Be ' eri , 1970) . 
The ethnic composi tion of  the PNGDF officer corps reflects  
the over-representat ion of  Papuans and under-representation 
of Highlanders that was a feature of the overall Defence 
Force ethnic s tructure . In the senior  group of thirty 
officers of the rank of cap tain or above in the Force in 
January 197 4 ,  5 0 per cent were Papuans and there was only 
one Highlander . ( Seven of the ten officers of maj or and 
above were Papuans . ) 59 Whilst the regional distribution o f  
the more j unior officers  and tho se in training at the JSC 
was more balanced it  would seem that Papuan o f ficers will 
cont inue to predominate at the senior levels on a seniority 
bas is . Future recour se to the preferential promot ion of New 
5 8  (Continued ) 
du ty of the officer to ' keep up ' with politics and current 
affairs . Luckham (19 7 1 : 12 6 ) observes that the January 
1966 Nigerian coup d 'etat was blamed on o ff icer s ' too 
clever by half ' who rea . too many books on polit ics and 
were too clo se to intellectuals and university student s .  
59 sta t i s t ics derived from PNGDF records , Feb . 197 4 .  Among 
the Papuan group of  senior off icers , seven were from the 
Central Dis trict and five of the ten officers above the 
rank of cap tain were from the Central District - all o f  
them from the Rigo Subdistrict . Al though the prominence 
of Papuans in the senior ranks of the Defence Force is 
remarkable , its explanation is  simple . Early recruitment 
o f  officers was virtually limited to the principal source 
of  high school graduates , Sogeri High School , near Port 
Moresb y ,  in which Papuan students were over-represented . 
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Guinean officers might well lead to the development of  
ethnic tens ions within the PNGDF . The over-representat ion 
of Papuans in the senior ranks of the PNGDF is , furthermore , 
apparently mirrored in the PNG Public Service , though no t in 
the Police where they may even be slightly under-represented . 
Given that there are certain ethnic imbalances in the 
Defence Force , there is nevertheless evidence that ethnic 
and regional af filitat ions may no t play so important a role 
within the PNGDF of ficer corps as in other sec tions of the 
PNG polity . Surveys and interviews with De fence Force 
off icers ind icate that the Papua New Guinean of ficer appears 
to be strongly nationalist in his political outlook. Both 
senior and j un ior officers have spoken publicly and privately 
of their will ingne ss to shoot their own wontoks if their 
du ty as servants  of the national government demanded it in 
hypothet ical s ituat ions . The results of a survey of fellow 
PNG officers by a lo cal officer show that there is an 
apparent consensus amongst the officer corp s that , if 
necessary , seces sion should be met with force and , if 
required , the Defence Force should be used for internal 
security duties . 60 The resul ts of two surveys conducted by 
myself also show that the officer corp s at present hold s 
strongly national ist attitudes about the need for unity and 
in ternal order ( see Mench , 19 74 :Vol . 2 ,  append ices) . It 
seems that the PNG Defence Fo rce and its officer leader ship , 
like mo st African armies , wi ll have a built-in incl inat ion 
as nat ionalists to prevent s eparatism and the d ismemberment 
of  the country by secess ionist group s .  
The social funct ioning o f  the PNGDF reveals tensions 
between the tradit ional and modern in PNG society which may 
affect the role of the Defence Force within the PNG pol ity . 
The PNGDF is , os tensibly , a cohes ive nationalis t organisat ion 
who se members are subj ect to intensive socialisation and 
60Personal communicat ion , May 1973 . The survey included 32 
of the 48 PNG officers then serving in the Defence Force . 
All the officers surveyed believed that PNG should s tay 
together in o rder to become a ' s t ron g coun try ' . Only 14 
out of the 32 believed that secessionist issues would no t 
disappear after independence , however , all believed that 
PNG d is tricts which att empted to secede should no t be 
permitted to do so . Thirty o fficers considered that the 
Defence Force would play an important role in hold ing the 
country to gether after indep endence . 
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indoctrination within the environment o f  a total inst itution. 
This organisation is modelled on no tions of western mil itary 
pro fessionalism in which universalistic criteria such as 
ab il ity , effic iency and duty rather than particularist ic 
criteria such as trib e  and language are emphasised . At the 
same t ime , tradit ional values persist in the Defence Force 
The wontok group ing remains relevant , personal relat ions are 
influenced by ethnic origins , and a degree of  traditional 
authority resides in the line-boss system. The PNGDF may , 
therefore , be seen as a transitional organisat ion , not 
traditional , bu t no t yet modern . The persistence o f  the 
tradit ional values of PNG so ciety in the Defence Force is 
almost certainly reflected in a s imilar manner in both the 
PNG Public Service and Police and it would be remarkable if 
it were otherwise . 61 
The key to the future stability and profes sionalism o f  
the Defence Force lies in the officer corp s .  The successful 
development of  the officer corps will largely depend on the 
tempo o f  localisation , the quality of ind ividual sen ior 
officers , and , to some extent , the stab ilising influence of 
a continued Australian presence for several years after 
independence . The s ignificance of traditional ethnic 
loyalties within the PNGDF and its officer corp s  will prim­
arily depend on the importance of these criteria within the 
PNG social and polit ical environment . As the Nigerian case 
shows , an off icer corps may remain substant ially isolated 
from ethnic pres sures unt il these issues escalate beyond a 
cer tain unde finable intensity and this would also seem to 
apply to PNG . The cohesion of the Defence Force under 
certain political conditions in PNG should , therefore , not 
be taken for grant ed . 
61For a detailed comparison o f  the Police and Defence Force 
see Mench , 197 4 a . 
Chap ter 4 
Defence and security problems 
in Papua New Guinea 
National security and the PNGDF : 
questions of relevance 
Papua New Guinea ' s  national security problems are dis­
cus sed in this chapter in the context of the relevance of 
the Defence Force to internal and external threats . ' Threat ' 
is used here to denote a secur ity contingency which might be 
faced by PNG in the future but for which no spec if ic degree 
of probability is as signed unless otherwise st ated . Papua 
New Guinea ' s  national security may be defined as the ab ility 
of PNG to pursue its perceived legitimate nat ional interests  
and t o  establish and maintain it s own political , social and 
economic values , free from either external or internal 
disrup tion . ! This definit ion raises quest ions as to the 
extent to which a small country like PNG is actually capable 
of es tablishing and maintain ing its own nat ional security , 
and the relevance of defence forces to the achievement o f  
national security.  
Probably no state is  able to  ob tain absolute security 
under the present system of world order and it may be argued 
that even in the case of the maj or powers ,  national security 
is a relat ive rather than absolute condit ion - somewhat 
regardless of the defens ive measures that may be taken . In 
the case of PNG it is evident that the definit ion of legit-
1This definit ion may be amplified by the following quo tations 
A nation has security when it does no t have to 
sacrifice its legit imate interes ts to avo id war and 
is able , if challenged , to maintain them by war 
(Lippman , 1943 : 51) ; 
and 
Security , in an obj ect ive sense ,  measures the 
ab sence of threats to acquired values ; in a 
subj ective sense , the ab sence of fear that such 
values will be attacked (Wolfers , 1962 : 150) . 
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imate nat ional interests needs to be more con st rained than 
that o f  a maj o r  power if these interests are capable o f  
being successfully pursued . Whilst a super power may have 
the mil itary and d iplomat ic resources to secur e national 
interests far from its own shores , PNG , as a small state , is 
unlikely to be able to do more than preserve its territor ial 
sovereignty and the sovereignty of its coastal water s .  
It i s  also evident that not all threat s t o  PNG ' s nat ional 
secur ity , according to the def init ion that has been adopted , 
need necessarily have the character of  a threat to phys ical 
secur ity . The ' values ' embodied in PNG ' s nat ional security 
might also be j eopardised by the effec t s  on PNG ' s political , 
economic and social l ife o f  so-called neo-colonialist 
structures and influences (for example see Hayter , 197 1 : 
Chap . 17 ) . Thus , PNG might conceivably suffer a lo ss o f  
national security from the consequences o f  foreign economic 
or cultural dominance .  Whilst these problems may appear 
more acute in the decolonised s tates of the Third World , 
they might also be experienced by developed nat ions , as for 
example by Canada . The point is  that armed force is no t 
usually well-suited as a means o f  dealing with such non­
violent and ins idious threat s to national security , and the 
relat ionship between defence forces and this aspect of 
nat ional secur ity is , therefore , tenuous , excep t in so far 
as a deterrent military capacity is a factor in bargaining 
pro cesses between small and larger states . 2 
As shown in earlier chapters , PNG decided to maintain a 
standing defence force at independence in the belief that 
this would contribute to its secur ity as a nation . This 
dec ision places PNG with the overwhelming maj ority of new 
states which possess their own armed forces . PNG ' s Defence 
Force , l ike the armed forces of other states , may be seen to 
contribute to nat ional secur ity by the exercise of three 
func tions within the PNG polity . The existence of a PNG 
2The actual use of force by PNG against a larger state ( say ,  
Australia) on which PNG was dep endent ,  would probably b e  a 
self-wound ing strategy in most cases because of the severe 
internal effects result ing from disruption of the inter­
dependence - for example , the cut t ing of economic aid and 
the removal o f  skilled manpower . Alternatively , the use of  
a low level of  force against a specific target might be 
helpful in gaining internat ional sympathy and support for 
the under-dog where there was an explo itable grievance .  
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Defence Force will symbolise Papua New Guinea ' s  sovereignty 
as an independent nat ion-state . The no t ion of organ ised 
military force as a neces sary pre-condit ion for political 
independence is as old as the concep t of the nat ion s tate 
( see , e . g .  Bagehot , 1872 : 5 2 ) , and this traditional , whilst 
not und isputed , view has b een accepted in p ract ice by those 
Third World s tates which maintain defence forces , o ften in 
the absence of  a rat ionally def inable external defence 
threat . Secondly , PNG ' s Defence Force constitutes a constab­
ulary external de fence capab ility . 3 PNG leaders have 
reasoned that , although small , their Defence Force is capable 
of  det erring po tent ial acts o f  aggression by removing the 
temptat ion of an undefended ' easy prize ' . PNG has also 
implicitly accepted the view that , in a wo rld character ised 
by armed nation- states and an international so ciety in which 
con flict resolution and p eace-keep ing mechanisms are of 
uncertain reliab ility , a ' tr ip wire ' force was needed so 
that  PNG might earn the right to ass istance from allies or 
internat ional intervention in the event of aggres s ion . 
Thirdly , the Defence Force , to gether with the Police , forms 
the PNG state ' s  legitimate monopoly of phys ical violence -
the government ' s  internal coercive resources - and the 
Defence Force therefore has a cont ingent role in enforcing 
the autho rity of t�e government ,  by the use of force if 
necessary , over internal diss ident group s .  
3 Janowitz (1960 : 4 18 )  has de fined the constabulary concep t  o f  
military forces a s  follows : 
the military es tablishment becomes a constabulary 
force when it is continuously prepared to ac L ,  [ is ]  
committed t o  the minimtnn use of  force and seeks 
viable international relat ions rather than victory. 
The constabulary concep t ,  therefore , emphas ises the deterrent 
effect of an external defence capability rather than the 
successful conduct of military operations in which vic tory 
is the goal . This prevent ive military role has b ecome of 
increasing relevance in modern society becaus e of the 
des truct ivenes s  of warfare , espec ially nuclear weapons ,  and 
changes in socio-polit ical att itudes in many countries where 
warfare is now seen as a potent ial catastrophe . The 
constabulary not ion is readily adap table to the role of  
PNG ' s  armed forces which do  not  have the capability to  gain 
a military vic tory against larger neighbours ,  but rather , 
may deter , or seek a politico-military solut ion in the 
context of ' viable international relat ions ' .  
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In view o f  . the three functions , what type of  defence 
forces does PNG actually require and how big should they be 
in order to carry out these func t ions ? As a working hypoth­
esis it might be argued that PNG ' s present and future 
defence organisation and equipment should bear a rat ionally 
based relationship to its security environment . That is , 
PNG ' s  percep tion of internal and external defence threats 
should provide the basis for determining the s iz e  and 
compos it ion of the PNGDF. Such a rationalis t approach to 
the determinat ion of defence force levels , however , involves 
some form of quantification of defence capability against 
threat and hence a calculation of what is ' enough ' ;  this 
approach contains several problems for a small s tate like 
PNG. 
The f irst difficulty is that what constitutes enough in 
terms o f  defence force capability usually depends on how 
much an opponent has (Art and Waltz , 197 1 : 105) . In an 
adversary or confrontation s ituation b etween maj or powers 
what const itutes enough may to a cons iderable degree be 
calculated , whilst , in this sense , what is enough for PNG 
is not readily calculable .  The actual quantif ication o f  
defence capab il ity i s  also more difficult for a small country 
l ike PNG . In the case of  a nuclear power like the United 
States , the decision to adopt a strategy of mutual assured 
destruction ' of its principal adversary , or the capacity to 
f ight one-and-a-half or two-and-a-half wars s imultaneously , 
calls forth quantif icable requirements in terms o f  numbers 
of  strategic weapons systems , mis sile warhead numbers , 
targetting capac ities and so on in relat ion to the capability 
of the po tential enemy . Calculation of the potential o f  
these high technolo gy weapon systems and o f  convent ional 
ground forces is clearly a vital ingred ient in the central 
strategic balance between the maj or powers ,  but for a small 
state like PNG , who se forces are composed o f  more primitive 
weapon systems , the quantification o f  defence capab ility is , 
by nature , less mathematically meaningful . Unlike missile 
sys tems whose performance may be reliably predicted , the 
capability of small convent ional forces including infantry 
battal ions depends on indeterminate factors o f  morale ,  
training and mobility which render comparisons hazardous·.  
Furthermore , the quant ification of defence capability and 
a determination o f  what is ' enough ' in the mil itary sense 
for a small country is only meaningful in relat ion to 
specif ic defence threats which are within the theoret ical 
resources of the country to deal with . A small state , 
regardless o f  the s trategy of national defence adopted , 
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short of  the use of  nuclear weapons , may no t even possess a 
theoret ical military capac ity to de fend its elf successfully , 
unaided , against larger neighbours or po tential aggres sors . 
That is , the total war e fforts of  a small state may st ill be 
demonst rably inferior , militarily , to an enemy ' s  limited war 
capac it ies - l imited both in terms of the level of mobil is­
ation and weapons employed , but ' to tal ' in its cons equences 
on the small s tate . It  follows that where a small state is 
part of  the region in which there are much more powerful 
states , the small state ' s  external defenc e capabilit ies are 
necessar ily tailored to meet contingencies which are limited 
war op t ion s of the po tential enemy . The small s tate is , 
therefore , faced with the problem o f  ant icipat ing the 
aggres sor ' s  l imited war calculations which involve d ifficult 
and conj ectural quest ions about the relationship of  mil itary 
to polit ical obj ectives . To decide what would const itute a 
credible defence deterrent , the small country has , 
essent ially , to decide what l evel o f  damage or risk the 
enemy would have to sustain b efore his pol itical and 
mil itary lo sses would be  out o f  proport ion to the obj ectives 
under dispute. 4 These are matt ers of  polit ical rather than 
t echnical military j udgement that are highly circumstant ial 
in character and involve as sessments of the trends in inter­
nat ional polit ics and the prospects o f  int erven t ion by 
allies at a certain level of aggression . 
This problem o f  small state strategic vulnerabil ity is 
shared by PNG . PNG ' s particular nat ional s ecur ity problem 
is that it canno t ensure its s ecur ity by military means 
again st the range of reg ional security contingencies which 
depend on an assessment of the capab ility rather than the 
int ent ion of potent ial adversaries . PNG ' s  strategic environ­
ment is asynnnetric . It s neighbours are either many t imes 
more powerful than itself , or ins ignificantly small . PNG 
shares a long frontier with Indone sia who se armed forces 
are , on paper at least , nearly one hundred t imes larger than 
those of PNG and whose manpower resources in a primit ive 
4H . A .  Kis s inger ( in Art and Walt z ,  197 1 : 107 ) argues that : 
' The purpose of  limited war is to in flict lo sses or to pose 
r isks for the enemy out o f  proport ion to the obj ectives 
under dispute ' .  This would be  the problem confronting PNG 
leaders in the event o f  military ag gression .  It follows 
that PNG ' s  strategy would need not only to escalate the 
aggressor ' s  military risks but also to escalate tho se of  a 
polit ical nature - arising from the prospect of PNG gaining. 
or  the aggressor lo sing , all ies and internat ional support . 
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war-fighting environment would , comparatively speaking , be 
limitless .  Indonesia ' s  army of 250 , 000 includes about 100 
infantry battal ions although many of these may not be o f  
combat status . Whilst there would , admittedly , be cons ider­
able lo gistic problems in Indones ia maintaining a large 
force on the Island of New Guinea , it might s t ill prove 
poss ible to deploy a large force over a period of t ime ,  
especially i f  operations were conducted a t  a technologically 
primit ive level Q!he Mi litary Balance 1 9 73-1 9 74 : 51) . And , 
in relat ion t o  Australia , PNG faces a regional power with an 
equally formidable defence potent ial - based not so much on 
formed unit s as on technological and economic s trength , as 
well as small but modern and effic ient forces . 5 On the 
other hand , PNG ' s  own military power dwarfs that of her 
o ther Pacific Ocean neighbours ,  including her principal 
island neighbour , the Solomon Islands , which has no defence 
forces at all . 
PNG ' s  strategic s ituation is significantly d ifferent from 
o ther small s tates which are themselves part o f  a region of 
small s tates in which there is the possib ility of  approximate 
local s trategic parity . For example , in East Africa and 
parts of  Wes t  Africa it is feasible for a small nat ion to 
po ssess armed forces which constitute a military insurance 
against attack by o ther regional s tates , whereas this 
military op tion is clearly beyond PNG ' s  resources . PNG also 
suffers from a second form o f  s trateg ic vulnerability shared 
by small states that are no t o f  great geo-political 
importance and thus unlikely to involve important nat ional 
interests o f  the maj or powers ( as do , for example , small 
states like Singapore , Israel and Cyprus ) .  It is conceivable 
that PNG might become subj ect to military aggression which, 
because it involved no important maj or power interests , 
provoked no effective intervention or support by the maj or 
powers for internat ional act ion . The lack of interest by 
maj or powers in the destiny of PNG might also affect the 
5 rt seems highly improbable that PNG and Australia would 
become involved in mil itary conflict in the short term , 
nonetheless , in the longer term PNG may see Australia as a 
poten t ial aggressor in relat ion to PNG ' s  special interests , 
for example , in the Torres Strait . Even though PNG may be 
militarily weak she may possess cons iderable disrup t ive 
potent ial , for example , by sponsoring , or toleratin g ,  the 
presence of terrorist and /or guerrilla group s in PNG 
operating agains t Australian shipping , o il rigs , etc . , in 
the waters adj acent to PNG. 
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capab ility of PNG ' s  own allies to int ervene on its behalf .  
These are rather theoret ical s tatements o f  strategic 
vulnerab ility which depend , essentially , on a comparison of 
military strength ; there are also o ther factors which 
contribute to an assessment o f  a nation ' s strategic ' risk' . 
The mo s t  obvious of  these is  the existence of  actual source s 
and mot ives for conflic t .  This involves the step from 
asses s ing the defence capab il ity of  other states to determ­
in ing their intentions . The problem for PNG , like most 
s tates , is that whereas capab ilit ies generally take t ime to 
develop , the intent ions of her neighbours may change 
relatively suddenly - by a change of government ,  a radical 
realignment of  world powers or an unexpected and serious 
international inc ident . For this reason , s tates have 
commonly considered it prudent to p lan for contingencies 
involving states which have the capab il ity to attack them 
even though there may be the absence of  a credible intention . 
There is the further important question of the dependab ility 
of allies and the effectiveness of international and 
regional mechanisms for conflict resolution . PNG might 
consider the prospects of  UN assistance in the event o f  
aggress ion t o  be a t  best uncertain .  Although UN intervention 
has generally occurred where the maj or powers have been 
involved and had important nat ional int erests ( e . g . , the 
Middle East , Congo , and Cyprus ) other instances of aggress ion 
in which the maj or powers have not had an interest have 
taken place without effective UN intervent ion ( e . g . , conflict 
between Rwanda and Burund i) . As regards regional mechanisms 
for dispute settlement , it has already b een suggested that 
PNG might form part of a regional group ing with Indones ia ,  
Aus tralia and New Zealand . This body might have a role in 
the resolution o f  regional d isputes through a formal 
mechanism ,  or merely by the good will and understanding the 
association generated . It has also b een suggested that PNG 
might s eek aff iliation with , or membership of ASEAN . At 
present ASEAN does no t have a defence orientat ion although 
quest ions of collect ive security have been rais ed b etween 
the member states , but if PNG was a member of ASEAN its 
security (and rela t ions with Indones ia) would be very likely 
to be of interest  to other member nations . Apart from these 
two possibilities for internat ional conflict management , 
Aus tralia and Indones ia may attempt , as the two dominant 
states in the region , coll ec t ively to ' manage ' PNG security 
problems between themselves in the interests of Australia 
and Indones ia , but no t necessarily in PNG ' s interest s .  For 
this reason PNG may well feel that her security interests 
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were likely to be bet ter met in the future by the ' inter­
nat ionalisat ion ' of  her external s ecurity problems ( see U .  
Sundhaussen in Griffin ,  1 9 7 4 : 105-6 ) . 
Just because PNG ' s  strategic environment is asymmetric it 
does not , therefore,  necessar ily mean that PNG will face the 
pro spect of greater insecurity . What it does entail is that 
the quest ion of PNG defence adequacy - the decision on what 
is ' enough ' - canno t be resolved on rat ional technico­
military grounds but is a mat ter of polit ical and bureau­
cratic value-j ud gemen t .  There is , therefore , an arbitrari­
ness from the military po int o f  view in decid ing whether a 
defence force smaller or larger than at present would 
constitute a credible PNG external defence deterrent when 
the forces against which it is to b e  compared are , in any 
case , many t imes larger than the largest prac tical force 
option for PNG . In pract ice , therefore , the size of  PNG ' s  
defence forces may only b e  meaningfully reckoned in relation 
to specific and limit�d contingencies ; that is , an approp­
riate polit ical defin it ion of the external thrett  that PNG ' s 
forces are des igned to counter . One might conclude that , to 
a cons iderable extent , the actual force level PNG needs in 
order to reta in an external defence credib ility is more a 
matter of polit ical resolve , diplomacy and propaganda than 
of military asses sment . There is in this way an inbu ilt 
circularity of argument about PNG defence adequacy in that 
the credib ility of the PNGDF depends on the sustaining of 
the conf idence of  PNG public opinion and the belief of  
allies and po tential aggressors in the adequacy of its 
force s .  
Because the level o f  force necessary t o  achieve very 
limit ed ext ernal defence obj ect ives , such as those that the 
PNG government has propounded , is so problematic in terms o f  
internat ional polit ics  and d iplomatic consequences (would a 
one-battalion force be s ignificantly less effect ive than two 
battalions in functioning as a trip-wire force ? ) , it would 
appear that the external defence role provides no real force 
structure imperatives b eyond that of  a minimum ' crit ical 
mass ' on land , sea and in the air , in order to be seen as a 
viable defence force . It follows that the s ize of  PNG ' s  
Defence Force in the future is more likely to b e  determined 
in practice by a set of factors which includes the size of  
forces already in existence ,  the accustomed economic burden 
of defence on the national economy , the effects of  bureau­
cratic pol it ics on resources allo cat ion within the PNG 
government and , in part icular , the requirements of collateral 
defence func tion s .  I t  i s  likely that on-going rather than 
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contingent defence funct ions - that is , the provis ion of 
internal security , the maintenance of sovereignty over 
territorial waters , civic act ion and d isaster relief - will 
const itute more persuasive political and bureaucratic j usti­
ficat ion for altering the s ize of  the PNGDF . This is likely 
to be the case even though the existence of the Defence 
Force may continue to be leg itimated in terms of it s nat ional 
territorial defence funct ion . In the p rocess  of establishing 
and developing the PNGDF for these collateral defence tasks , 
a cred ible external defence force will , almost inc identally , 
be achieved . 
Although the special problem which PNG has in relat ing 
the s ize  of  her de fence forces to external defence require­
ment s ( in contrast to maj or powers and small states in a 
region of small states ) has been emphasised , b ecause o f  the 
nexus b etween the defence status qua and future defence 
dec is ions , it is probably true that no country manages it s 
defence policy in a wholly rational way and this will be 
true for PNG 9also . 6 The forces in ex is tence in PNG will , 
however ,  constitute a datum level abou t which argument for 
expanding or reducing PNG ' s  defence capabil ity will have 
practical mean ing and a real life pol it ical and bureaucratic 
setting.  Even if PNG ' s  defence force s ize is not capable of 
being determined on a national military basis , this is not 
to say that the contingencies they are designed to meet and 
the defence preparations taken are no t realist ic.  Emphasis 
by PNG on external defence threats that her forces can deal 
with , such as low-intens ity mil itary operations on the 
border , is realistic in terms of PNG ' s  milit ary capabil it ies . 
Beyond these minor scenario s ,  PNG ' s  defence posture might 
also be seen as realistic in terms of either a publicly 
declared reliance on the a�istance o f  allies in the case of 
more serious eventualit ies , or a more amb iguou s position of 
reliance on the international community , or even the moral 
suasion of a posture of ' strateg ic nakedness ' against 
6The overall conclusion reached in a survey which analysed 
the defence s tatistics of 2 6  African s tates , PNG and Fij i ,  
was that the factors in fluenc ing the s ize o f  a coun try ' s  
forces were , in each case , sui generis.  The s ize  and cost 
of  forces was no t related to parameters such as populat ion , 
land area , GNP or GNP per cap ita in a statist ically 
s ignificant manner , nor was a relat ionship to factors such 
as internal or external security problems or the incidence 
of military rule evident ( see MencJ:\ 19 74a : Appendices) . 
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serious aggression . 7 But , because these options depend on 
the assumption that the political costs of  an aggres sor ' s  
ac t ions increase with the extent o f  the milit ary effort and 
that there is a threshold o f  military force at which inter­
nat ional and/ or allied assistance would be forthcoming , it 
follows from this analys is that PNG ' s external defence 
preparations are only realistic in a broader sens e if the 
aggres sor ' s  limit ed wat intent ions and polit ical co st s ,  as 
well as the respon se of allies , are correctly assessed . 
PNG ' s national s ecurity heritage 
The level of PNG ' s  milit ary forces will , to some extent , 
also be influenced by the perceptions o f  the PNG leadership 
and public in relation to national defence and these per­
cep t ions are , in turn ,  likely to be influenced by PNG ' s  
defence heritage - in particular the extens ive period o f  
Australian colonial rule . This part o f  the chapter discusses 
the circumstances o f  PNG ' s  past which are likely to affect 
the perception of , and policy towards , future internal and 
external security problems . 
In relat ion to external s ecurity , strategic considerat ions 
were ,  from the days of Queensland ' s  illegal annexat ion o f  
Papua , an important component o f  Aust ralian policy in Papua 
New Guinea and it is reasonable to expect that some of these 
Aust ralian preoccupations with security and ' threats ' have 
rubbed off  on Papua New Guineans . More recently in the 
postwar period Papua New Guineans have been exposed to 
Australian att itudes abou t the ' red menace ' and the threat 
of connnunist expansion throughout Southeast Asia . Papua New 
Guineans have also b een aware o f  a tradit ional Aust ralian 
view o f  New Guinea forming Australia ' s  st rategic bulwark 
within a forward defensive framework and , somewhat regardless 
o f  the currency of  these ideas in Australian politics today 
after the Vietnam experience , Papua New Guineans may none-
7 It is no t yet c lear which path PNG will follow. Although 
the Somare government has spoken o f  a neutral opt ion for 
PNG and appears not to want a watertight security pact of 
the ANZUS type with Aus tralia , it s imilarly does no t appear 
to be seeking an option of strategic nakednes s .  Mr Somare 
and Mr Kiki have on several occas ions referred to an expe ct­
at ion of Australian assistance in the face of  aggress ion 
and PNG has expres s ed interest in a regional group ing with 
Australia , New Zealand and Indonesia. 
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theless see themselves as s ituated in an exposed and 
strategically vulnerable pos it ion . 8 
There are also substantial historical reasons that might 
lead PNG to regard the prospect of external aggres sion as a 
realis t ic contingency , even in the absence of  an obvious 
and current defence threat . Apart from the ' peaceful 
invas ion ' of PNG so ciety by the colonial powers ,  PNG has 
experienced the violence of the Japanese military invasion 
o f  1942 and the protracted allied military campaigns of 
reconquest which took place within the lifetime of most o f  
the country ' s  present political leaders . The period o f  
Confrontation , tens ion in Aust ralian-Indones ian relat ions 
under Sukarno and the hand-over of West Irian to Indonesia 
are also relevant to PNG security attitudes . These events 
led to mil itary expans ion in PNG and fears amongst the 
populat ion of Indonesian mil itary intentions . Though 
relat ions with Indonesia are now harmonious , it is no t 
unreasonable to expec t , and there is evidence to show , that 
some suspic ion persists amongst Papua New Guineans . 
Suspicion of ' st rangers ' is , moreover , a salient aspect of  
tradit ional PNG society and this may influence the behaviour 
of PNG leaders in the conduct of their foreign relat ions 
with other countries including Indones ia .  In addit ion to 
these factors ,  PNG shares a frontier with Indones ia and PNG 
leaders would be aware that connnon frontiers have historic­
ally b een one cause of conflict between nations . 
A further important element in PNG ' s  security heritage 
has been the existence of defence forces in PNG - on a 
permanent basis s ince 1951 and of  approximately the present 
s ize since the mid-sixties - and these forces const itute an 
established not ion of  defence adequacy in t imes of peace . 
Another fundamental PNG external defence orientation derives 
from Australia ' s  tradit ional role in providing for PNG ' s  
external defence . Because Australia has been intimately and 
hist orically associated with PNG ' s  external defence and has 
developed PNG ' s  present forces and declared its willingness 
to continue to do so after independence , it might be a 
reasonable and entrenched expectation amongst Papua New 
Guineans that Australian defence assistance would b e  forth­
coming if they were a t tacked . This expectat ion might be 
reinforced by a Papua New Guinean belief that PNG was of 
strateg ic importance to Aust ralia because of it s historical 
prominence in Australian defence thinking as an invasion 
springboard and becaus e of its proximity ,  separated as at 
8For evidence of  this see the att itude surveys in Menc� l9 74a . 
present by only several hundred metres of shallows from 
Australian o ff-shore islands in the Torres Strait . 
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The assumption by PNG that there was some form of tacit 
Aus tralian s trategic commitment to PNG , somewhat in the 
manner of the British defence commitment to her former 
Domin ions , might be tragically misconceived . There are a 
number of areas o f  potential miscalculation . PNG may mis­
j ud ge Australian p erceptions of PNG ' s  strategic importance , 
the extent to which Australia is prepared to accep t the 
internat ional and domestic polit ical burdens of maintaining 
forward strategic int erests and the extent to which 
realpo litik rather than morality suf fuses Australia ' s  
polic ies towards PNG . It would , for instance , require f ine 
polit ical j udgement for PNG leaders to estimate the extent 
to which Australia would be willing to support PNG ' s secur ity 
int erests (even if , on balance , fair and j ust from PNG ' s  
point o f  view) where Australian support for PNG potentially 
threatened Australia ' s  long-term relationships with , say ,  
Indonesia ,  a much larger and more s ignificant state in the 
reg ion . 
Australia could well b e  confronted with the s imilar sort 
uf foreign policy cho ice in regard to PNG and Indonesia as 
she was concerning Dutch Wes t  New Guinea and Indonesia . In 
the ab sence of great power support for the Dutch posit ion 
in the latter cas e ,  Aus tralia had lit tle alternative but to 
accept the outcome of Indones ian d iplomacy and military 
policies . This situation might conceivably recur . PNG 
should therefore be alert to the l imitat ions of  Aust ralian 
support and the possib il it ies o f  policy reversals on the 
part of Indonesia . 
PNG might also have to face the prospect that Australia 
was unable , rather than necessarily unwill ing , to retain her 
trad itional strateg ic int erests in the PNG area . Australid s 
predominant influence might be weakened or become untenable 
as a result of maj or power developments . It is conceivable 
that the Soviet Union , China,  and a Japan who se military 
strength was expanding to meet her economic s trength , might 
each develop interests in PNG. T. B .  Mill ar has commented 
'It  is no t unlikely that both China and the Soviet Union have 
cons idered the prospects for gaining or gaining access to 
maritime facil ities in the area [ Southwest Pacific ] ' (Millar , 
1969 : 181) . Australia might not be capable o f  resisting , or 
alternatively might see its national interests b est served 
by accept ing , the introduction o f  maj or powers into PNG . 
Whilst such a development would seem to nullify Aust ralia ' s  
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long-standing _ strateg ic obj ective of keeping the maj or 
powers ,  exclud ing the United States , out of  PNG , she may be 
incapable of preventing such a development and incapable of 
ful filling any coIIllllitment to PNG in that regard . The United 
States might even see merit , in spite of Australian 
interes ts , in balancing maj or power interests in the region 
(for example , a countervailing Soviet or  Japanese interest 
to that o f  China in Southeast Asia) . Secondly , American 
withdrawal from Asia in the post-Vietnam era might be accel ­
erated , leading to a United S tates acquiescence in other 
maj or power moves in the area . 
This review of Aus tralia ' s  strategic relat ionship to PNG 
suggest s that PNG ' s  own national security in the future may 
importantly depend on the ability of  PNG leaders realist­
ically and accurately to assess the contribution Australia 
is likely to be able to make to PNG ' s  external security , so 
that PNG may adj ust its national security policies accord­
ingly . For instance , in 1974  R. J .  O ' Neill argued that it 
needed to be borne in mind that Australia ' s  military 
capacity to intervene in PNG was d ist inc tly l imited in terms 
of the current size of her armed forces (O ' Neill , 197 4) . 
Papua New Guinean percep tions of int ernal security 
problems are also likely to be influenced by the p ast . The 
colonial era in PNG saw the imposit ion of  the rule of  law ,  
enforced under an extremely centralised bureaucratic system. 
Under this system a high standard of  civil order , relatively 
free from security problems , was established by a colonial 
regime with a virtually unchallenged monopoly of violence . 
If this situation o f  civil peace has been somewhat d isturbed 
in the last years of colonial rule by increasing crime , 
tribal f ight ing and urban rioting , the overall internal 
security situation in PNG remains one of a high standard of 
public order maintenance within a centralised political and 
bureaucrat ic system. Because this has been the tradit ional 
s tandard of public order in PNG , deviat ions from it after 
independence may be seen , both internally and internat ionally, 
as a sign ificant failure of the independent PNG state to 
provide for civil order . A PNG government that could not 
control civil d isorder might risk bo th a collapse of  public 
confidence as well as a loss of internat ional cred ib il ity 
and this might result in serious repercussions in regard to 
commerce , economic development and the flow of  international 
aid .  
A second important tradit ional Aust ralian approach t o  the 
maintenance of civil order in PNG has been the total reliance 
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on civil instruments to keep the peace . Whilst , as recounted 
in Chapter 1 ,  Australia (like Germany and Britain in earlie r 
times)  has relied on cons tabulary forces organised in para­
military formations and using para-military equipment , 
Australia has never , in p eacet ime , employed military units 
to maintain order . The cont ingent internal security role of 
the Defence Force has never been exercised and this situat ion 
is likely to continue until independence .  Even if an inde­
pendent PNG government shared the former Australian view 
that it was undes irable to u se military forces in this way , 
if it d id become necessary to employ military units to 
maintain domestic order , an important and potentially 
destabilising precedent would have been created which would 
emphasise the seriousness of PNG ' s  internal order problem in 
a more dramatic way than had the use of military forces for 
internal order maintenance b een a routine procedure under 
Australian colonial rule . 
The conclus ion which may be drawn from this discus sion is 
that the Aus tralian connect ion has produced expectations 
amongst PNG leaders and citizens which may no t necessarily 
be met in the years of indep endence . PNG may no longer 
continue to loom large in Aus tralian mind s in strategic 
terms and this may reduce the reliab ility of Aus tral ian 
strategic protec tion to PNG . PNG may have to face the 
problem of being made ' of fers that can ' t  be refused ' by 
other maj or powers with strategic interests in the area and 
about which Australia was able to do little . In internal 
security matters , the high standard of civil order in PNG 
and the reliance on civil police during the colonial period 
may provide a problem in terms of the contrast to the post­
indep endence pattern o f  c ivil order . 
External and internal security problems 
External defence 
External threats to PNG security may be cons idered first , 
no t least for the reason that this defence responsib ility has 
b een emphasised by the PNG government .  The need to provide 
defence forces against the contingency of external military 
threat s has been presented as the principal rat ionale for the 
maintenance of armed forces in PNG . Identifying PNG ' s  
external security problems might be regarded by some as an 
unnecessarily pess imistic exercise.  This may be so , none­
theless , the suddenness with which new con flicts erup t and 
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the abrup tness of changes and new trend s in internat ional 
relat ions give little grounds for complacency , as events in 
the Middle East have recently shown . Whils t  the present 
int ernational s ituation in relation to PNG and her region 
may suggest a benign environment this should not preclude 
analysis of some future po ssib ilities . 
There is , firstly , the question o f  maj or power conflic t .  
Like all nat ions , PNG has at least to face the prospect , 
although it can do lit tle about it , of  nuclear war between 
the maj or powers - as unlikely as it may seem in the present 
era of limited de tente . As others have pointed out ,  PNG ' s  
actions , like those of most o f  the world ' s  nations , would be 
irrelevant to the outcome of con flict between the maj or 
powers and PNG would be largely defenceless against the 
physiological effects of a global nuclear war . Beyond the 
prospec t of a Hobbesian world of ' war of all against all ' in 
the aftermath of  global nuclear warfare in which there was 
a removal of international constraints on inter-state 
violence and hence the need for states like PNG to defend 
themselves aginst mil itary attack , super-power conflict has 
little relevance to a discuss ion of PNG defence problems 
(see O ' Neill , 1972 : 194) . 
There is , however ,  the ques t ion of  aggress ion against PNG 
by a maj or power . (Together with the nuclear powers ,  Japan 
and Ind ia might b e  included here . Leaving aside the 
questions concerning Japan ' s  acquisit ion of  nuclear weapons 
and/or conventional forces expansion , Japan , by virtue of 
its growing economic interes ts in the Pacific , deserves to 
be considered as a maj or power in the context of  PNG ' s  
future . )  As O ' Neill (197 2 )  has argued , attack by the maj or 
powers is unfeas ible under the present pattern of inter­
national polit ics because of the enormous political co sts of 
such act ion , nevertheless , there is the les s  drastic prospect 
of d ip lomatic coercion on the part of a maj or power backed 
by the sanction of force - coercion which PNG may find 
dif f icult to resist . As suggested in relation to Aus tralian 
interes ts in PNG , the maj or powers might see the reg ional 
stab ility best served by the establishment of , say , a 
Japanese , Soviet or Chinese sphere o f  interest in PNG . The 
maj or powers may see the survival of the polit ics o f  de tente 
depend ing on acquiescence in such new maj or power interes ts , 
perhap s in the context of a general balanc ing of  maj or power 
influence within Southeas t Asia , the Ind ian and Pacific 
Oceans . It appears to be an open ques t ion whether PNG ' s  
security resources - a small military deterrent , active 
d iplomacy within the Third World and at the United Nat ions 
and the prospects of Australian or Indones ian support -
would , in all cases , guarantee PNG against maj or power 
penetration . 
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Turning from the maj or powers , there are two security 
problems of a less specific nature associated with trends in 
internat ional pol itics . Firstly , there are the security 
problems which PNG might face in relat ion to exercising 
sovereignty over natural resources within territorial seas 
and economic resource zones , if eventually recognised under 
international law.  The legit imate extent of national 
sovereignty in thes e matters is subj ect to oppo s ing views at 
a time when the world ' s  demand for marit ime resources and 
improvements in the technology of extract ion have increased 
the importance of the question . Consequently , the estab­
lishment and /or the polic ing of PNG ' s  cla ims to resources in 
the sea ,  on and under the sea bed may provide the basis for 
future internat ional tension and conflict . Secondly , PNG 
might become a target or an unwilling base for polit ical 
violence and terrorism by extremist group s .  Such a 
po ssibility might be seen in the context of  a continuation 
of a world-wide trend towards the employment of private 
violence in international society , as exemplif ied by groups 
like the Pales tinian Liberat ion Organ isat ion . Extremist 
political group s may seek to subvert the PNG government , or 
influence it s policies , by the employment of teclu1iques of 
private violenc e such as aircraf t highj acking , polit ical 
kidnapping and terrorism. One scenario might be the inter­
vention o f  group s based in Aus tral ia or Indonesia attempting 
to ass ist PNG revolutionaries in their struggle against a 
' corrupt ' or ' repressive ' regime . One might expect the 
sympathies of the extreme Left in Australia to lie with any 
nat ional liberat ion movement should it arise in PNG , although 
there may no t neces sarily be a willingnes s to support such 
a movement by arms and men . 
The external defence problems which have so far been 
discussed - the role o f  the maj or powers and the vague 
threa t s  to nat ional sovereign ty po sed by foreign exp lo itat ion 
of natural resources and terrorism - may be seen as sub­
s idiary to the two cen tral issues of PNG national security . 
These are PNG ' s  future relat ions with Indones ia and with 
Australia . 
It may be assumed that PNG will see the threat po sed by 
Australia in primar ily non-mil itary terms . PNG leaders 
might , however , see a ' neo-colonialist threat ' to their 
country ' s  nat ional s ecurity as an independent nat ion as a 
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result of Au stralian commerc ial and economic dominance and 
influenc e over PNG society brought about by l inkages of an 
economic ,  manpower and aid nature ( see Has t ings , 1969 : 260-2 ). 
A PNG government that decided to pursue a neutral ist or even 
anti-Aus tral ian foreign policy could regard the remnants of 
Austral ia ' s  defence interests - an active role in the PNGDF 
and cont inued use of defence facilities in PNG - as a threat 
to PNG ' s security and an obst acle to the succ ess of PNG 
d iplomacy , espec ially within the Third World . Abrogat ion o f  
defence agreements , a s  occurred soon after independence in 
the case o f  the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement , might 
follow on pressur e from rad ical group s in PNG polit ics . 9 
PNG reac tion to perceived Aus tralian threats to national 
security might also be mot ivated out of a need to f ind 
scapegoat is sues to divert at tent ion from pres s ing domes tic 
polit ical problems and , as a result , cr is is-provoking PNG 
polic ies in regard to PNG/Au s tralian relat ions may become 
part o f  the rhetoric o f  post-independence polit ics , important 
as a means of establishing the myth of nat ionalist struggle ­
a familiar problem to new states which have achieved 
independence with little or no armed strug gle . 
There is also the potent ially diff icult question of the 
Torres Strait border with Austral ia . 10 Apar t from the 
practical diff icult ies  and even inj ustices which PNG may see 
in the p resent border , the readj ustment of the border may 
emerge as an ideal nat ional ist cause celebre - a cause in 
which justice might well be seen by sect ions of the 
Australian public to rest with the PNG claims . If the PNG 
government , or lo cal groups of Papua New Guineans in the 
border area , decided to employ even a low level of violence 
to draw attent ion to their cause in the face of Australian 
int ransigenc e on the i ssue , Austral ia might be confronted 
with a diff icult problem. Int erference with the Australian 
administration of the Torres S trait populat ion and , for 
instance ,  Papua New Guinean occupat ion of off-shore is land s 
at present belonging to Australia , or illegal fishing by PNG 
9 See Phill ip s , 1964 : Chap . II I . The agreement was dropped in 
response to pres sur e from o ther African states though the 
consequences of the abrogat ion were largely symbolic : 
Brit ish defence aid sub sequently cont inued and ,  indeed , 
broadened in scope . This might provide a key to the pattern 
of post-independence PNG-Australian defence relat ions . 
lOF d .  . f h h . . 1 . . f h T or a iscuss ion o t e istorica origins o t e orres 
S trait border and previous readj ustment propo sals see 
Van der Veur , 1966 . 
craft in Aust ralian waters ,  might confront Australia with 
diff icult d iplomatic and military problems . 
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The second and possibly the most difficult general 
strategic problem that PNG may face is that of her relat ion­
ship to Indonesia , and here four types of situation which 
threatened relat ions between PNG and her large neighbour may 
be envisaged . The question of  the border between PNG and 
Indonesia raises several specif ic cont ingenc ies . It is 
conceivable that Indones ian int egrationist policies in Irian 
Jaya may no t b e  succes s ful in deal ing with Ir ianese dissent . 
Although the present extent of  the Ir ianese dissident 
organisat ion , the number of men under arms , the number of  
supporters and the nature o f  its polit ical base are difficu lt 
to gauge , dissent in Ir ian Jaya might in the future grow in 
effectiveness ( see Hastings , 1969 : 218-20 , 267 ) . Pol it ical 
forces in Ir ian Jaya might be able to es tabl ish links with 
PNG groups by espousing irr identis t  causes such as 'one 
is land , one peop le , one na tion ' . In this connection , the 
polit ical role of the Irianese refugee community within PNG 
and its relat ionship to the PNG polit ical leadership would 
be an important determinant o f  PNG government policy on this 
quest ion . 11 The present level of co-operation between the 
PNG and Indones ian governments in the control of  the border 
area and the prevention of the movement of diss idents into 
PNG may be dif f icult to jus t ify in PNG if Indones ian rule in 
Irian Jaya is seen in the future as repres sive and if 
polit ical diss idence increases . 12 
There are also secur ity imp licat ions for PNG arising from 
Indones ia ' s  polit ical future after the present Suharto 
regime . Here there are manifold possib ilities , none of 
which should be totally discounted in the lon ger term future, 
11There are about 500 Irianese refugees living in PNG , 
includ ing a number with tert iary educat ion qualif icat ions 
who occupy posit ions in the PNG Public Service (Nationa l 
Times ., 19-24 Nov . 1973 ) . 
12A border demarkat ion agreement b etween Indones ia and PNG 
was s igned on 12 February 1973  in Dj akarta ; a Border 
Arrangements Agreement was s igned on 13 November 1973 , 
establ ishing principles for the regulat ion and adminis­
trat ion of border secur ity .  It was agreed that ' Govern­
ments on either side of the bo rder agree to cont inue to 
co-operate with one ano ther in order to prevent the use of 
their respective territories in or in the vicinity of the 
border areas for hos t ile act ivit ies against the other • • •  ' 
(Article 7 ) . 
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namely , a rad ical revolutionary strug gle , a process of 
national fragmentation and rebellion on the pattern o f  the 
1958 PRRI and Permesta reg ionalist risings ( see Grant , 1964 : 
31-2 ) , or even the return to  a militant regime with expan­
sionis t foreign policy obj ec tives .  Although Indones ia ' s  
long-term political future may well be one marked more by 
stability and less dramat ic change , any of the above con­
tingencies might well embro il PNG in Indones ia ' s  internal 
affairs as a result of its proximity and common frontier . 
There is , furthermore , the ques tion of how a regime of 
any pe rsuas ion in Indones ia might react , perhap s unilaterally, 
to extreme polit ical in stab il ity , seces sionism and civil 
d isorder in PNG . Faced with such a problem ,  Indones ia might 
fear the risks of ' contagion ' within Irian Jaya and , in the 
emergenc e of a broken-backed s tate in PNG , it might see a 
base for subversion against Indones ia and a danger in terms 
of a ' demonstrat ion eff ect ' on the Indones ian polity . 
Lastly there is the prospect that Indones ia may interpret 
the growth of  a prosperous , s table and democratically 
governed PNG state as an ins idious threat to the security 
and stab ility of Indones ia ' s  own polit ical system -
espec ially a threat to the legit imacy of her cont inued rule 
in Irian Jaya if economic and polit ical development there 
was seen seriously to lag behind that of PNG . Indonesia 
might also pur sue non-violent s trategies in order to gain 
polit ical influence over PNG . Indones ian influence might be 
established by the development of extremely clo se relat ions 
between the two countries and PNG ' unders tanding ' of  
Indones ian national interes t s . Indones ia ' s  present military-­
led government might see merit in establishing clo se 
relat ions with part icular sectors of PNG society - such as 
the Defence Force and Police - in order to influence the 
course of PNG pol it ical change - for example encouraging the 
development of a military role in PNG politics . 
This d iscussion of  potent ial sources of conflict between 
PNG and Indones ia suggests three levels of pos sible military 
action : low- intensity border frict ion and conflict with 
insurgents , confrontat ion with guerrilla and small unit 
forces and , thirdly , convent ional military attack. Border 
fric t ion might arise as a result of PNG ' s  dec iding to 
prevent the use of PNG territory as a sanc tuary for Irianese 
act ions against the Indones ian governmen t .  Dis s idents might 
try to foment d iscontent in the PNG border region or 
terrorise PNG border populations in protest agains t a lack 
of official PNG sympathy for this cause.  Alt ernatively , 
conflict  might arise between PNG and Indones ian security 
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forces as a result of  Indones ian pursuit of Irianes e 
d is s idents into PNG territory in a situat ion where PNG 
sympathies lay with the dis sidents . This type of confront­
at ion might also result in attacks on villages and border 
adminis trative posts and deeper raids into PNG territory . 
The overall conclusion to be drawn from this d iscussion 
of  external defence is that PNG faces a diversity of  
contingencies , mos t  o f  which appear , today , to  be in the 
category of po ssible but unlikely . In the longer-term 
fu ture there are greater uncertainties which are related to 
the nature of polit ical change in Indones ia , Japan ' s  future 
foreign and de fence policies and maj or power relat ions in 
the Pac ific area. Beyond the capacity , based on the present 
defence organisat ion , to deal with a very limited range of 
violence , PNG will need to rely substantially on its 
d iplomacy to avert conflict  and if that strategy fails it 
will need to look for allies and internat ional support . 
Internal secur ity 
U seful speculat ion about PNG ' s  future internal security 
problems involves an analys is of aspects of PNG ' s  so cial , 
economic and political systems as a result of  the inter­
relat ionship of  these factors and civil violence . Although 
PNG may apply the rat ionale of external defence in maintain­
ing the PNGDF , there are ground s for believing that the mos t  
important respons ibil ity o f  the Defence Force will be the 
maintenanc e of internal security . 13 Indeed , PNG polit ical 
ob servers , public servants and indigenous members of the 
PNGDF o fficer corps have commonly assumed that threats to 
PNG ' s  nat ional security are more likely to be internal than 
external . 
PNG ' s  transit ion to  independence has already involved 
considerable public speculat ion concerning the likelihood o f  
13Th d .  . . b . 1 d 1 . e 1st1nc t1on etween 1nterna an externa security 
prob lems is usually made ; however , internal problems in 
PNG are unlikely to oc cur without entailing an inter­
national d imension as well . Oppo sing sides to internal 
conflicts - the government , seces sionists , dissidents of 
one form or another - may be expected to vie for inter­
national support of a d iplomatic , financ ial or logist ic 
nature . Other nations will , therefore , probably be obliged 
to adopt policies of some sort towards serious internal 
prob lems in PNG although these problems might be primarily 
domes tic in origin .  
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political instability and civil disorder after independence 
and this speculation has been fuelled by reports of increased 
urban crime and tribal fight ing , widespread discussion of  
secessionist claims and gloomy predic t ion s of  disorder by 
expatriate and indigenous res idents in PNG . Credence has 
been lent to the predictions of po st-independence troubles 
by what appear to be at leas t plausible comparisons with 
those black African s tates which , at s imilar s tages of 
development , experienced polit ical chao s and /or civil 
disorder .  Apart from the p es s imis ts , there have also b een 
more opt imis tic ob servers who have po inted to PNG ' s own 
emerging polit ical s tyle and the relative polit ical stab il ity 
experienced so far in the pro gress towards independence . 
PNG ' s  future may , therefore , be seen in terms of a debate 
between optimis ts and pessimists . For the pess imist s , the 
problems of polit ical order , seces sionism and reg ionalism, 
cont rolling soc ial change and maintaining c ivil order have 
appeared dauntingly insurmountable . Whereas , for the 
optimists , the apparently unique quality of PNG society , 
PNG ' s  comparat ive economic affluence , the politics of 
Melanes ian Consensus , and , in some quarters , the p rospect of 
the eventual es tablishment of a one-party state , have 
provided grounds for believing in a non-violent and polit ic­
ally stable future .  
Papua New Guinea ' s  internal security appears to depend on 
the stab ility of  the country ' s  polit ical system. Ef fec tive , 
stable government in PNG involves two aspec ts . The govern­
ment o f  the day needs to be able to claim the support of  
signif icant sections of  the country ' s  citizens and , secondly , 
the government needs to be able to command the legit imate 
monopoly of vio lence . Stable government in PNG there fore 
requires the es tablishment of political authority , that is , 
the acceptance by Papua New Guineans of  the legit imacy of  
their government ' s  role in governing over the whole country 
(see Gurr ,  1970 : 183-8 ) . And , apart from the co-operation of  
the c it izens , the PNG state must also be able , if  neces sary , 
to enforce its autho rity over criminals and d issident 
political group s who break the law,  by legal sanctions , 
includ ing the use of force . 
The legit imacy of the PNG government after independence 
may be subj ect to challenge as a result of separatist and 
secessionist pre ssures and also as a result of  polit ical 
dispute over the shape of PNG ' s  polit ical ins titutions . The 
present form of government , which is based on liberal demo­
cratic trad it ions of parliamentary-cabinet government , relies 
on widely accep ted conventions of polit ical behaviour .  
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Experience of  parliamentary rule in other countries , however ,  
point s t o  the ·need for a mature , national political party 
structure in order to sustain this type of government and , 
in PNG , polit ical parties are organisat ionally weak and in 
the main regionally , rather than nationally , based ( see 
Stephen , 1972 : 17 5 ) . The future relevance and serviceability 
of  recent ly introduced political conventions remains 
uncertain and the pro spect has to be faced that PNG may not 
in fact const itute the sort of integrated community that is 
linked by affirmative att itudes to rules , leaders and 
conduct and the necessary degree of consensus which a 
parliamentary system needs in order to survive . If this is 
so , PNG ' s pol it ical system may be subj ect to rad ical 
systemic change after independence and this political change 
might involve widespread political violence . 
The weakness of  the central government in new states like 
PNG has been attribu ted to several factors . The narrow base  
of art iculated and mob ilised public support for the govern­
ment and the dicho tomy between politic s at the centre , which 
are largely ' westernised ' ,  compared to village and regional 
polit ics  which are largely ' traditional ' in nature , are bo th 
c ited as factors contributing to fragile central polit ical 
power (see Zolberg , 1 9 68 : 7 0 ) . Because the distribut ive 
capac ity of  the polit ical sys tem in a country such as PNG is 
low due to the shortage of  economic resources and the 
problems of a new and inexperienced bureaucracy , the central 
government is limited in its ab ility to widen its base of 
polit ical allegiance .  This result s  in an accumulat ion of 
polit ical demands and a tendency for the mo st pres sing 
demand s ,  often those backed by violence , to be met first . 
The limited resources available to the regime may also 
result in an intens ificat ion of the polit ical struggle by 
fair means and foul in order to gain pol itical power -
because many of  the polit ical and economic spoils are to be 
had by those actually holding of fice . These tendencies  may 
all lead to a situation in PNG where violence ,  or the threat 
of it , becomes a useful and neces sary aspect of the pol it ical 
process because it is the mos t  ef fect ive means of achieving 
pol it ical goals . 
Whilst the co-operative and consensual aspects of the 
nat ion-state concep t are frequently emphasised in relat ion 
to the modern , wes tern democratic states which have strong 
liberal parliamentary tradit ions , a benign role for the 
state may no t necessarily be the norm in new states where 
there is a lack of consensus about fundamental quest ions 
such as the compo sit ion and boundaries of the state and the 
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� means o f  resolving polit ical disputes ( see Johnson , 19 66 : 
19-21 and Russell , 1948 : 23 6 ) .  Instead , Lenin ' s  dic tum that 
' every state is founded on force ' ( quo ted in Walter , 
19 64 : 3 5 9)  may be a more realistic and useful way of looking 
at the role of the state in newly independent countries 
where polit ical integrat ion and nat ion-building processes 
are incomplete . The relationship to polit ical authority in 
the state therefore appears to be crucial to the under­
standing of challenges to pol it ical order in PNG . Hunt ington 
( 19 68 : 7 )  has observed that in many modernising countries the 
primary problem of government is no t liberty but the control 
of the �overnment and the creation of a legitimate public 
order . 1 
Vio lence might result from political instab ility in PNG 
in two ways . It might aris e from the use of violence for 
polit ical obj ec tives within an environment of political 
disorder , or it could arise in the form o f  general lawless­
ness and chao s as a consequence o f  the ineffect iveness of 
government and o f  its coerc ive ins trument s .  Civil disorder 
might , therefore , ensue from violence which is polit ically 
motivated and also from violence which is not manifestly 
mot ivated by polit ical causes . Thes e two broad categories 
of  potent ial violence in PNG may be class ified as pol it ical 
and soc ial vio lence.  
The boundaries between polit ical and social violence in 
PNG are no t always likely to be clear . The mot ivat ion for 
violence in PNG may have deep p sycholo gical well-springs and 
no t be art iculated. Furthermore , the consequences of 
violence may be polit ical whereas it s motivat ion may not b e .  
Whilst normal levels of  urban or rural crime may not b e  
polit ically mo tivated , violence d irec ted a t  Europeans , 
other ethnic minorit ies or black elites , arising out o f  a 
sense of relat ive deprivat ionl5 might have a polit ical basis 
14Huntington also ob serves that ' Men may , of course , have 
order without liberty , but they canno t have liberty without 
order . Autho rity has to exis t  before it can be limit ed ' (p . 8 ). 
15 see Gurr , 1970 : 2 4-5 , for a development of the concep t  o f  
relat ive deprivation : ' Relative deprivat ion i s  defined 
as actors ' percep t ion of discrepancy between their value 
expectations and their value capabilities . Value expect­
at ions are the goods and cond itions of life to which peop le 
bel ieve they are right fully entitled . Value capab ilities 
are the goods and cond itions they think they are capable 
of get t ing and keeping ' .  
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and polit ical consequences such as the removal of  social 
inequal it ies . There is also the matter of sporadic , spon­
taneous anorrric violence . This form o f  violence may be 
formally leaderless but political in its effec ts on govern­
ment and identifiable with polit ical causes . 1 6  The future 
pattern of violence in PNG is also likely to reflect 
trad it ion in the way that violence in all societ ies tends to 
take traditional forms . It may be argued that in societies 
which have a high level of traditional violence , violence is 
more eas ily adopted as normative polit ical behaviour than in 
soc iet ies where the incidence of violence is low. Where 
certain forms of violence such as pay-back killings are 
normative behaviour ,  violence may be s een as the only accep t­
able and appropriate way of resolving d ispu tes . The forms 
of  polit ical violence which might occur in PNG are discus sed 
in the context o f  these remarks . 
Polit ical violence already occurs in PNG , particularly in 
the Highlands area , in the form of  tribal f ight ing ( see 
Stand ish , 1973b ) �  between clans and kin group s which may be 
seen as polit ical communities . 17 Warfare therefore 
represents the breakdown of non-violent political relat ions 
and the cont inuat ion o f  a polit ical d ispute by violent means. 
The political nature of tribal conflicts , which may be over 
matters ranging from marriage disputes to compensation for 
vehicle acc ident injuries , is perhaps most sharply drawn in 
relat ion to disputes over land ownership . The last years o f  
the decolonisat ion process have seen an apparent increase 
in tribal f ight ing and this trend may con t inue after inde­
pendence as part of a process of reduced regime authority 
coupled with increased economic j us tif icat ions for conflict 
over land . 
Polit ical v iolence might also result from the act ivit ies 
of seces s ionist or regionalist polit ical group s .  Conflict 
with the central government over failures to meet demands 
for e ither a devolu tion of political power or outright 
secession , or alternat ively , the employment of violent means 
16 see Weiner ,  1962 : 190 . Weiner defines anomic violence as 
a cond ition of lawles snes s  in which participants have no 
explic it ideolo gical rat ionale for the violation o f  the 
law. 
17 see Report of the Comrrrittee Investigating Triba l Fighting 
in the Highlands . Mos t  tribal f ight ing in PNG and 
part icularly in the Highlands is between clans and group s 
of clans . 
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by such group s in order to achieve these obj ectives may lead 
to vio lence . · Polit ical violence from this sour ce has b een a 
common phenomenon in new states which face problems of 
national unity and political integrat ion , and if regionalist s  
see their cause in terms of  absolute value criteria , such a s  
race or religion , rather than in terms of pragmatic issues 
and interests , the scope for resolving these tensions without 
violence would seem to be reduced . In PNG , however ,  
regional is t pressures ( in Papua , Bougainville and the 
Highlands ) seem to be based p artly on problems of inte­
gration - of suspic ion and mistrust b etween comnrunit ies -
and partly on pragmatic issues of  economic development and 
claims for a share in polit ical power . 
Violence as a result of  seces s ion (either to achieve it 
or prevent it) pos its the failure o f  political bargaining 
and compromise between the centre and the regionalis ts . If  
the commitments both to secession and ' national unity ' are 
pragmat ic ally based , as they in part appear to be at present, 
then the prospects of violence may be reduced . It is no t 
clear at present whether ostensibly secessionist group s in 
PNG really want complete political independence or rather 
more economic development and a greater devolut ion o f  
polit ical powers . Nor i s  i t  clear that PNG nationalist 
leaders at the central government level are necessarily 
prepared to guarantee the political cohes ion o f  the nation 
by the use of force in the last resort .  Thes e relative 
probab ilit ies may significantly alter if secessionist is sues 
become engul fed in an atmosphere of  emot ion and appeals to  
the ab solute values of race or  language . 
Polit ical violence might also arise in PNG in the more 
d istant future as a result of the development of rad ical 
polit ical movements based in either rural or urban areas , or 
perhaps a comb inat ion of both .  Such violence might take the 
form of terrorism or armed insur gency by urban , or rural­
based guerrillas , or as a consequence of violent repress ion 
by the regime . This form of extremism probably requires the 
evolut ion of serious political grievances and inequalit ies 
in PNG society of a d imension which is not yet evident and , 
furthermore , it probably calls for sophisticated levels of 
polit ical organisat ion , leadership and ideology as a pre­
condit ion for the introduct ion of revolutionary rather than 
anomic violence in PNG . If it  is s t ill premature to make 
any predict ions about the likelihood of rad ical polit ical 
group s in PNG threatening internal security , it is already 
clear that so cial change as a result o f  economic development, 
educat ion and urbanisation is creating cons iderable problems 
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which may have serious long-term security implicat ions . 
Although the present government economic polic ies are 
based on an eight-point program emphasising equality , rural 
development and economic self-reliance , the long-term 
economic trends may still be in the direction of increased 
rather than diminished soc io-economic inequality . 
One aspect of the economic development problem is the so­
called tide o f  rising expec tat ions which is generated by 
economic change and which , in turn , contributes to high 
rates of  urban migration . Rapid urbanisation , repre sented 
by growing urban squatter communit ies of  rural people seeking 
the ' bright l ight s ' ,  j obs and reputed economic opportunities 
of the towns , is likely to lead to cons iderable problems of 
civil orde r .  Whils t  the integrative effects of  urban 
populat ions may , as argued by Mair (1963 : 19 9 ) , 18 provide the 
vital build ing blocks of national ism, rapid urbanisation may 
also place intolerable loads on government by way of  demand s 
for housing , employment and soc ial services . 19 It would 
not seem unduly pessimistic to pred ic t that within ten to 
twenty years PNG ' s towns and c ities will have large commun­
it ies of unemployed , poorly housed citizens whose economic 
plight will be cast in harsh j uxtapos it ion to the employed , 
comparatively well-housed , affluent memb ers of the bureau­
cracy , police , armed fo rces and bus ines s community . The 
danger is that urbanisat ion may proceed in the future at a 
faster pace than the int egrat ion of the new migrant urban 
dwellers into new life styles and associational relationship� 
The destab ilising influences o f  this type of rapid social 
change , the d iminut ion of trad it ional authority and the lack 
of economic opportunit ies may lead to social frustration and 
increased violence - the sort of process which Johnson (1966)  
calls social d isorientation and which is  manifested by 
increased violence . 
18Ma . h . ·t . . h f h d . . ir argues t at 1 is in t e towns o t e mo ern1s1ng 
soc iet ies where the ' melting pot ' proces s  occurs , where 
new loyalties and polit ical associat ions which span 
primordial l ines spring up and where new att itudes to 
nat ionalism develop . 
19The population of  PNG by 1991  is est imated to reach 4 . 2 94 
million based on a populat ion growth rate of 2 . 7  per cent 
per annum. It is es timated that urban population by 1991 
may be between 750 , 000 and 1 million (New Guinea Research 
Bul le tin , No . 42 ,  Sep . 197 1) . 
182 
As ide from the polit ical p res sures that may t low from 
rap id urbanisation in terms o f  a shortage o f  j ob s ,  housing 
and social amenit ies , there is the spectre of communal 
violence between ethnic group s in urban areas . The belief 
that urbanisat ion provides the foundat ions of  nationalism 
depends on the success of the acculturative process . It is 
assumed that the new town dweller when he leaves his 
tradit ional village society is subj ect to new social 
pres sures and relationships in the town and , al though he may 
ret ain many of his former tradit ional att itudes and loyalt ies, 
some at titudes will change and hi s loyalt ies will broaden 
(Mair , 1963 : 133) . In reality and in the short term, howeve r ,  
urban migrat ion in PNG , rather than lead ing t o  the inte-
grat ion of  tribal group s ,  may merely intensify primordial 
loyalt ies of clan and tribe as a result of  these group s 
becoming polit icised within the p sychologically secure 
boundaries of tribe and clan . 2 0  This intens if icat ion of 
ethnic loyalt ies , if it o ccur s ,  will increase the likelihood 
of connnunally-based violence in PNG towns . 
Two further problems which may af fect PNG ' s internal 
security in the future are land d istribution and ownership 
and the socio-political problems set in train by formal 
we stern educat ion . Apart from trad it ional patterns of con­
flict which may arise over land disputes b etween clans , 
there is also the prospect o f  conflic t over land for economic 
and soc ial reasons . Whil st there is no t an absolute land 
shortage in PNG , there are specific land problems - a local 
shortage of  land in the populous Chimbu District , shortages 
of economically useful land in other parts of the Highlands 
(due princ ipally to the alt itude) and high levels of 
expatr iate alienation of land in the Gazelle peninsula. 
Because land ownership and usu fructuary rights in PNG are , 
by tradit ion , conferred on group s rather than ind·ividuals 
and there are few people in PNG who have no claims to land 
usage , it would initially appear that land quest ions are 
unlikely to give rise to the sorts of conflicts which have 
arisen elsewhere in the world . 2 1  On the other hand , however, 
2 0  1963 G h . . d . See Geertz , • eer tz  argues t at in nat ions un ergo ing 
21 
social and polit ical change , primord ial af f il iat ions are 
prone to become intens if ied in the modernisation proces s .  
Huntington (197 1) argues ,  for in stance , that inequality of 
land distribut ion is  a key factor in the potent ial for 
revolut ion in a country and hence an effec tive strategy 
for aver ting revolution is a socially j ust program of land 
redistribution . 
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there are long-term factors which may lead to conflict , 
includ ing the problem of natural population increase and the 
pressures this will p lace on existing patterns of land use.  
Educat ion may also have a fundamentally destabilising 
effect on rural PNG by challenging tradit ional patterns of 
behaviour and authority and generating expectat ions of 
progress and affluence that will not be fulfilled fo r tho se 
Papua New Guineans who drop out of the school system, cannot 
find j obs in the urban areas , or who are s imply not given 
the opportunity to go to school .  The extension o f  western 
educat ion and literacy has been a tenet of Australian 
colonial pol icy in PNG since the end of World War II but ,  
even though less than half the eligible children receive 
primary level schooling , it is clear that most o f  those who 
do receive educ ation are still des t ined to return to their 
village environment . 22 
Although it is true that this problem is being confront ed 
by PNG government attempts to adapt educat ion to the needs 
of PNG soc iety and by emphasis ing the continued social 
relevance of PNG rural life , it remains to be seen how 
ef fec tive these approaches are in adj usting the expectations 
of those in the education stream, especially those who se 
prospec ts are cut o ff by educat ional and economic limitat ions 
If PNG rural economic development results in dominat ion 
by individuals rather than alternat ive patterns of develop­
ment based on co-operative , participatory economic/polit ical 
organi sat ions on the model o f , say , the Mat aungan Association, 
class t ensions and land d istribution p roblems may provide 
the polit ical grievances around which radical pol it ical 
movement s commit ted to violence could emerge . It might also 
be argued that the semi-educated youth in urban areas will 
provide a po tent ial base among st which revolutionary 
polit ical movement s  might flourish , given the development of 
a structure of ideology , organ isat ion and leadership . Apart 
from economic inequalit ies , educat ion will , itself , generate 
expectations of social change and , for tho se who remain in 
the rural areas and for many who move to the urban areas , 
these expectations are unlikely to be fulf illed . Comparisons 
with the affluence and status of an urban black elite and 
other affluent minorit ies may lead to the development of a 
22 In 1972  only 34 . 3  per cent o f  the 7 -year-old population 
entered school and only 7 . 5  per cent of the relevant age 
cohort entered high school (fNG 's  Improvement Plan� 
1 9 7 3-74 � p . 14 ) . 
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sense of social frustrat ion and radical polit ical act ion to 
give vent to this deprivat ion may result . 23 
Internal security : conclusions and contingencies 
Whil st this discus sion has po inted to a numb er of 
potential causes of internal disorder in PNG af ter indep end­
ence , it has no t b een argued that polit ical change and 
economic development need neces sarily lead to internal 
violence .  Nor has i t  b een argued that PNG i s  necessarily 
bound for a future as a broken-backed state o f  the sort 
envisaged by Hugh Tinker (1964 : Chap . 7 ) . The maintenance of 
civil order in post-independence PNG does appear to depend , 
however ,  on the establishment of  stable , effec t ive govern­
ment at both the nat ional and lo cal levels .  An important 
requisite for such effective government would appear to be 
the maintenance of  equil ibrium between change and tradition 
and a balanc ing of resources and priorit ies between the 
rural areas , which are likely to remain largely based on 
trad it ional economic and soc ial patterns , and the urban 
areas which will be pockets of  modernisat ion and inhab ited 
by Papua New Guineans in a process of more rapid transit ion 
to a westernised type of society . 24 · The challenge to PNG ' s 
political leader s will , in essence ,  be to try to maintain 
what has been des cribed as an homeo stat ic equil ibrium within 
a changing and dual society . 2 5  
The success PNG leaders have in controll ing violence and 
removing it s underlying causes in the future will ult imately 
be affected by a wide range of variables about which l ittle 
may be predic ted with certainty . Thes e variables include 
23 See James C .  Davies in Kelly and Brown , 197 0 : 148-67, for 
a discuss ion of  the relationship of  ris ing expectations 
and internal violence . 
24The continuing importance o f  the village-based sub sistence 
sec to r of PNG soc iety is underlined by the fac1t that in 
197 1 only 2 5  per cent o f  economically active Papua New 
Gu ineans were engaged wholly or mainly in cash earnings 
act ivit ies (PNG 's  Improvement Plan 1 9 ? 3-?4, p . 61 ) . 
2 5For an explanation o f  the concept o f  homeo static equil­
ibrium see Johnson ,  1966 : 53-8 . Broadly speaking , 
homeo static equil ibrium posits co-ordinated social change ­
a moving equilibrium - in which the value structure and 
the environment change in synchronisation with each 
• > ther . 
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the capac ity of the institutions and partic ipants in the 
PNG polit ical . system to resolve conflict by peaceful means , 
allocate resources and claim polit ical allegiances , and how 
wealth actually comes to be distributed within PNG society 
as economic development proceeds � that is , whether the 
trend is towards greater equality or whether inequal it ies 
grow. The future course of PNG politics and civil order 
will also be determined ,  in great measure , by the three 
problems of government postulated by Machiavelli (e . g .  
1950 ed . : 4-94 ) , namely , the skill o f  political leader s ,  human 
fortune and the practical limitat ions placed on human choice. 
Because the actual direct ion o f  const itut ional change 
remains unclear and the possib ility of radical systemic 
change ( inc lud ing one-party government or milit ary rule) 
canno t be discounted , serious civil disorder should also be 
accepted as a possib il ity . The as sertion that consensus 
and compromise , the so-called polit ics  of Melanes ian 
Consensus , provide the effective basis for PNG ' s pol it ical 
culture remains to be tested in s ituations of grave tension 
where seriously competing political interests are at issue 
and these testing situat ions have not yet occurred . Other 
countries such as Indonesia which have claimed to base 
their polit ics on consensual s tyles have exper ienced wide­
spread internal violence when polit ical tensions have moved 
beyond certain limit s and it is , therefore , necessary to 
acknowledge that PNG polit ics may also fail to maintain a 
consensually based unity . 
On the other hand PNG leaders may be able to develop the 
concep ts inherent in Melanes ian Consensus into the basic 
tenet s o f  a political ideolo gy which would have a useful 
integrating role and might be employed in the future to 
legit imise ' tough ' polit ical decisions (which might no t ,  in 
reality , be consensually based ) without the use of  violence .  
There i s  also the prospect that PNG may develop along the 
lines of a Palaver polity in the post-independence period in 
which there is endless political conflict and disputation 
between the regions and the central government and b etween 
political group s at the centre , and a great deal o f  postur ing 
and threatening of violence , but little actual polit ical 
violence ( see Zolb erg , 1973 : 7 2 8-3 9 ) .  For instance , continued 
threats o f  seces sion by regional political group s in PNG may 
largely represent a political technique as a means of  gaining 
polit ical concessions in o ther areas , rather than an actual 
demand for secession . 
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The problem of ethnic diversity and a lack o f  unity which 
at present loom large in a discussion of the prospects of 
internal violence might , alternatively , be overcome by the 
development of a form of consociat ional politics in PNG . 
This concep t , which has been used in relation to other 
pluralistic polities , may take the form in PNG of co­
operation at the central government level between members of  
a national elite who se polit ical support was formally based 
on ethn ic communities (see Lij phart , 196 9 ) . This elite 
might share the common interests of power , affluence and the 
benefits of wes tern society and it might , thus , come to have 
lit tle in common with village society , other than a dimin­
ishing ethnic loyalty . This elite would therefore become 
relatively isolated from the group s it formally ' repre sented ' 
and largely independent of them.  From this pattern of 
politics a workable form of tutelary democracy could emerge 
which might reduce the pro spects of polit ical instab ility 
and vio lence . 2 6  
The above dis cus sion of sources of internal violence in 
PNG so ciety prompts thought s on a number of specific internal 
secur ity contingencies that PNG may face . The danger 
inherent in the contingency or scenario approach is that by 
attemp ting to define a f inite number of specific situations , 
other possible cont ingenc ies are thought to be excluded and 
sub tle variat ions and comb inations of  contingencies may be 
omitted from considerat ion . There is also the problem of  
the in terrelated and complicat ing effects on internal 
problems that may be posed by external developments . Several 
of the more obvious internal security contingencies may , 
nonetheless , be listed . 
Nat ional political cr isis . A cris is of political 
authority might occur in PNG after independence as 
a result of conflict over the constitutional form 
o f  government , radical systemic political change ,  
or as a result o f  a leadership succes sion cris is . 
The collapse o f  po litical authority might lead to 
a serious increase of both social and polit ical 
v iolence.  
Rural warfare and dis turbances . Tribal warfare and 
d isturbances to civil orde r ,  based on tribal 
cleavages in society , seem likely to continue in 
PNG , and the fo cal area of  this problem is likely 
to continue to be in the Highlands .  One scenario 
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shils , 1968 : 60-4 d iscusses the important role of  the 
polit ical elite in a tutelary democrat ic reg ime . 
might be Highlands tribal f ight ing , increas ing in 
frequency and intensity and becoming increasingly 
d irec ted at the agen t s  of the central government 
in the urban areas . This might eventually lead to 
a collapse of admin is trat ion and commerce and a 
polit ical cris is .  
Civil s trife in urban areas . Some o f  the possi­
bilit ies here might be conflict in urban areas 
between immigrant communit ies alon g tribal lines , 
or between immigrants and ind igenous populat ions 
(e . g . Bougainvilleans in conflict with ' Red Skin ' 
outs iders on Bougainville) . Alternatively , strife 
may be based on industrial or ideological grounds : 
trade unionists rebelling against  the government 
or busines s ,  unemployed immigrants seeking bet ter 
condit ions or  student activis t s  protestin g  against 
' black , elit is t '  government .  
Insurrect ion by secessionists . Seces sion is ts in PNG 
may attempt to achieve their goals by the use of 
force . Po ss ibil it ies might be Bougainville , Papua 
(or part o f  what presently forms Papua) , or perhap s 
part o f  the New Guinea islands . Seces sionist 
attemp ts might conceivably receive external 
assistance . 
Mil itary or Police mutiny. The Military or Police , 
or both , may mutiny . This might o ccur because o f  
a breakdown of d iscip line , o r  mutiny might take 
the form of  organ ised corporate act ion as a 
techn ique o f  demand in g  improvements in their 
condit ions of service or resolving other grievances . 
The example of the mutinies of the East African 
armies in 1964 comes to mind here . In the case of 
mutiny the civil government may lack the coercive 
resources to re-establish control over the 
mu t ineers . This may lead to the curtailment of 
the government ' s  authority leading to an outbreak 
of civil disorder . Such a display of governmental 
impo tence might encourage an eventual military or 
police/mil itary takeover of the government .  A 
civil government faced with the mutiny of its 
coercive instruments would , if it could , be likely 
to seek external assistance to re-establish order 
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and save ' democratic institut ions • . 2 7  
Military (or Police/Military) coup d 'etat . The coup 
has b een a connnon technique of polit ical change in 
new states and PNG might no t escape the phenomenon ; 
however ,  the outcome of a coup might dep end on the 
degree of co-operat ion between the PNGDF and Police 
and the cohes ion amongst the o fficers of bo th .  
Further , t o  rule effectively the ' Coupists ' would 
seem to require the ass istance of the PNG 
bureaucracy. (This issue is dis cus sed in the las t chapterJ 
As stated earlier , it is dif ficult to quantify the capa-
bilities of the PNG Defence Force and Police in relation to 
these internal security contingenc ies on a hypothet ical 
basis . The capab ilities of the PNGDF acting with the 
Police have already been discus sed in general terms in 
relat ion to it s internal security roles ; however , some o f  
the broad conclus ions which flow from bo th a cons iderat ion 
o f  military capabilit ies and the nature o f  likely internal 
security problems in PNG may be listed . 
Bes ides factors of size and equipmen t which may be 
measured , there are subj ective fac tors of morale , cohes ion 
and leadership within the Police and PNGDF which will have a 
crucial bear ing on the outcome of any internal security 
problem. Any assessmen t based on numbers alone is , there­
fore , only one of the overall range of factors . Another 
maj or factor is the part which a good intell igence organis­
at ion is likely to play in the maintenance of PNG ' s  internal 
s ecurity . In general , one might predict that internal 
security problems in PNG are likely , for several reasons , to 
be ve ry expen sive in manpower terms . PNG ' s  terrain is 
likely to require larger numbers of men , logis t ic support in 
remo te areas will be co stly in manpower ,  and med iocre 
intell igence in the initial s tages of operations would 
increase the manpower requiremen t .  
While n o t  an incons iderable force the PNGDF could b e  quite 
rap idly and effectively swallowed up either in a s ituation 
o f  widespread c ivil strife in the Highlands , or in a pro­
tracted conflic t with seces sionis ts . In both these types of 
27 see Gu tteridge , 1969 : 24-4 0 .  Australia could find it d iffi­
cult to decline a request by the PNG government to ass ist 
in pu tting down a mutiny which threatened a democrat ically 
elec ted government and public o rder . The problem would be, 
however ,  to distinguish between a mutiny and a situat ion 
that had matured into a coup d 'etat .  
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s ituations it could be dangerously easy to overest imate the 
military capac ity of the PNGDF two-battalion force . Whilst 
in certain circumstances Defence Force intervention in 
localised , poorly organised, unsustained violence might 
result in a dec is ive outcome , this might not be so where an 
insurrect ionary force was well organised and had the support 
of  the people . In extreme circumstances , for example , a 
two-bat talion force might be able to control l ittle more 
than one urban centre and its rural environs .  
Because o f  what a PNG government might cons ider to be 
quite meagre coercive re sources available to it , it may 
tend to see its op tions in the face of internal violence 
largely in terms of bargaining , compromise and concess ions -
a reliance on Melanes ian polit ical styles of  conflict  
resolution . This is quite apar t from other substant ial 
reasons , includ ing humanitarian ones , why such approaches 
might be preferred . It is likely that a PNG government 
would only resort to a use of force , or agree to a signif­
icant escalation in the level of force usually applied in 
Police-type ac tivi ties , where there was the prospect of  a 
dec is ive , rap idly achieved outcome and it seems plausible 
to argue that where the internal use of the PNGDF seemed 
likely to lead to protracted , inconc lusive , nationally 
divis ive operations , the government would prefer to accept 
higher polit ical costs in the form of conces s ion s rather 
than attempt to resolve the problem by violence . 
These may , nonetheless , be very cond it ional observat ions , 
unduly influenced by the ' form '  shown so far by the present 
PNG government . A future PNG government may take a f irmer 
line in rega rd to ' ant i-government group s '  as part o f  the 
proces s which has taken place- elsewhere in newly independent 
s tates and described as the ' ero sion of democracy ' 
(Emerson , 1969 : 27 2-92 ) . Dr Guise (now Sir John Guise , the 
Papua New Guinea Governor-General ) warned on several 
occas ions that separatism and d isunity could be explo ited by 
foreign power s and ' Elements in the Community who attemp t 
to create dis turbances and threaten the peace or security of 
cit izens of this land will be dealt with quickly and very 
firmly by the government ' (Pos t-Courier , 17 Sep . 1973  and 
24  Jan . 197 4) . Assumptions about the u se of  non-violent 
means may also prove unfounded b ecause , in spite of 
government pol icy , PNG ' s security forces might be quit e 
eas ily drawn into a gradually deteriorat ing internal security 
s ituation in a piecemeal fashion . Under such circumstances , 
theoretical opt ions o f  force or no force might b ecome 
ob scured . And under certain c ircumstances the PNG government 
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may not s ee any opt ion available to it other than to u se 
force ; for example , in the case of a mutiny by it s own 
security forces , or where extremists were using terrorist 
tactics . Furthermore , it has b een generally ob served that 
in crisis s ituat ions leader s see the options open to them 
in a restricted way and thus , at the time of a cris is ,  the 
obvious op tion of force may be preferred to less obvious 
ones .  
In s o  far a s  predict ions have any value in these matters , 
it seems more likely than no t that internal security 
problems will arise in po st- independent PNG which will need 
to be met by coercive s trategies as well as government 
policies in soc ial , economic and political spheres .  In the 
short term the threat may come from seces sionists who are 
prepared at some point to use violence , from anomic violence 
in urban areas , and from tribal violence . Pres sures may 
also be placed on the Police as a result of increasing urban 
crime levels and this may lead to serious problems in the 
allo cat ion of scarce f inancial and manpower resources 
between rural and urban Police duties . The decrease in 
adminis trative effic iency as a result o f  rapid lo calisat ion 
of o ff ic ial positions is also  likely to add to rural and 
urban polic ing problems . In the longer term beyond the end 
of the decade , however , trends of populat ion growth , urban 
migration and soc io-economic change point to pressures on 
internal security as a result of bo th urban and rural unrest . 
This discontent may b ecome success fully mobilised by 
pol it ical organ i sat ions prepared to employ techn iques of 
violence . It seems more likely than no t that some o f  
the internal s ecur ity s ituat ions that may eventuate will 
po se problems beyond the cap acity of the PNG Police to deal 
with and , therefore,  the PNGDF will b e  required to assume an 
active internal security role . 
Chapter 5 
Civil-military relations in 
Papua New Guinea : the future 
A Nat ive army running riot could t ie up and take 
control of Papua New Guinea within days . The 
troops have the weapons , the the marine and air 
transport.  They als o  have the benefit of concen­
trated , high standard training . Unles s the 
mil itary planners are very careful , the Native 
troops will also develop the special kind of vanity 
which has made the Nat ive sold iers of other 
developing count ries think he [ sic ] can do a better 
j ob of  government than the c ivilians (Ryan , 1969 : 2 6 6 ) . 
The above quotation from John Ryan ' s  Hot Land presents in 
a popular if sensational way one aspect o f  the problem o f  
PNG ' s  future civil-military relations . So far in this 
monograph the relat ionship between the Defence Force and the 
civil power and the question of the role of the military in 
Papua New Guinea ' s  political system have only been indirectly 
raised . In this f inal chapter the problems and prospects of  
c ivil-military relations in an independent PNG are cons idered 
in the context of some of the literature on the role of the 
military in the politics of new state s .  The central 
question of whether or not the PNGDF might come to play an 
important polit ical role in PNG is tackled . The conclusion 
is prescrip t ive . A pattern of PNG civil-military relat ions 
is suggested which , taking into account the obj ec tive of 
civil ian controlled democrat ic government ,  might contain the 
political role of the military in PNG ' s future political 
l ife . 
Discus sion o f  the role of the mil itary in polit ics is 
bedevilled by the quest ion of polit ical values .  Whilst some 
scholars have evidently b elieved that to discuss military 
politics , its s trengths and weaknesses and how it comes 
about is , somehow , to advocate military rule , the reality is 
that merely to condenm the ' anti-democrat ic ' , ' repressive ' 
or ' corporate ' character o f  military government is unl ikely 
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to prevent its occurrence ,  nor has it , in a success ion of 
Third World states . There is also the troubling fact to be 
faced that c ivilian regimes in the Third World have some­
t imes shown themselves to be equally anti-democratic and in 
some cases equally incapable of dealing with the problems of 
national government .  
Robert P inkney (1973 : 152-6 6 )  has argued , in this 
connection and in relation to the developing coun tries of 
black Africa , that the d ist inction between the performance 
of civil ian and mil itary government may be a dist inc t ion 
without a difference . Pinkney argues that : 
many of the shortcomings attributed to military 
governments would be seen in a less harsh light 
if observers compared military leaders with the 
alternative political talen t  actually available , 
rather than with the ideal type of politician 
whom it might be des irable to have in power (p . 152 ) . 
He concludes that in many African s tates , governments , 
whether civil or military , may be equally limited in their 
capacity to grapple with national problems : 
To criticise military governments for their failure 
to promote ' modernisat ion ' ,  ' so cial mobilisation ' 
or ' development ' is , in mos t  c ases , only to 
crit icise them for po ssessing the same limitations 
as civil governments , few o f  which have impressive 
records in the countries most prone to military 
coup s (p . 166 ) . 
Aris ing out of  this problem o f  political values two 
general schools of thought on milit ary involvement in 
polit ics in develop ing nat ions may be identified . ! One is 
essent ially a negative view shared by writers such as Shils 
( in Johnson , 1962) , Finer and Janowitz (19 64b ; see also 
First ,  1972 ) . This group , whilst recognising that in the 
short run the military may be able to res tore order and 
maintain s tability , argues that in the long run military 
intervent ion in polit ics impedes genuine polit ical develop­
ment . Apart from the ant i-democratic nature o f  military 
rule , writers in this school have focused on the unsuitability 
of the ascribed charac teristics of the military to the task 
1For a s imilar view see review by J . C .  Oh of Se-Siu Keim 
The Politics of Mi litary Revolution in Korea , University of  
North Carolina Pres s , Chapel Hill , 197 1 in American 
Po litica l Science Review,  Vol . 7 ,  No . 2 , June 1973 , pp . 67 4- 5 . 
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of government . It is argued that b ecause of the authorit­
arian , hierarchical struc ture o f  the military , its insens­
it ivity to public opin ion , abhorrence o f  ' political ' com­
promise and a preoccupation with ' honour ' and ' dignity ' ,  
military government is unable to  perform a pol itical role 
satis factorily ; rather , military government attempts to 
rule the nation as though it were a large army camp . The 
second s chool o f  thought about military involvement in the 
pol itics of new states is more positive and approbatory . 
This school , represented by scholars such as Hunt ington , 
Pye and Emerson , has argued that the mil itary is able to 
perform a useful dual role of promoting ' modernisation ' 
whil st at the same time maintain ing political stability in 
the developing nation (see Hun t ington , 1968 ; L . W. Pye in 
Johnson , 1962 ; Emerson , 1969 : Chap . XV ;  Lefever , 1970 ) . 
Other writers have argued , however , that this preference by 
a group of western , principally American scholars , for law,  
order and pol itical stab ility and hence authoritarian 
military regimes in the countries of the Third World , 
reflects their own domes tic political prej udices . Dona! 
Cruise O ' Brien (197 2 )  argues that American political 
scient ists in the early 1960s espoused democracy for the 
Third World as an article of faith , in the context of an 
ideological confrontation with communism. Later , a swing 
to authoritarianism occurred , p artly as a result o f  a 
reflected concern for law ,  order and stab il ity in their own 
country and partly out o f  a concern for political order in 
the new states as the political d imension of anti-communist 
counter-insurgency doctrine.  Yet another group o f  commen­
tators hold that the tendency toward authoritarian military 
rule is in a sense inevitable and may be attributed to 
nothing more than a return to the sort of administrat ive 
regime that func t ioned during the colonial period (see Feit , 
1973 ) . 
If  western scholarship on the benefits of military rule 
in new s tates is fundamentally divided , so too is the 
scholarship on the question of the causes of military inter­
vent ion in polit ics in the new s t ates . But , s ince few ,  if 
any , Papua New Guineans at present advocate military 
government for PNG it will be more pro fitable in this 
chapter to analyse the causes of a military role in politics 
rather than discuss the b enefits of such rule or influence 
should it come about . 
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The proqlem. of civil-military relat ions in PNG 
Before commencing a general analysis of the causes of 
military involvement in polit ics it will be u seful to define 
what is being investigated . Military involvement in pol it ics 
may take many forms . It comprehends involvement by the 
military at four identifiable levels which beg in at 
influence and extend to blackmail , displacement and f inally 
supplantment of the civilian regime. These forms o f  
involvement in polit ics , which are derived from Fine r · s  I'he 
Man on HoPseback (1962 : 140) , may be associated with various 
techniques o f  military involvement in politics , includ ing 
constitut ional means , collusion and competition , int imidation 
and violence . The forms of military involvement and the 
various t echniques of involvement may , in turn , be associated 
wit h different types o f  political regimes . According to 
Finer ' s  class ification , again (p . 166 ) , these range from a 
reg ime where the political power of the military is ind irect 
and limited to a regime in which the political power of the 
military is direct . The complete taxonomy is given here 
with my own examples added : 
Indirect , Limited 
Indire ct , Complete 
Dual 
Direct 
Direct quasi-Civilianised 
(France , May 1958 ) 
(Post-Civil War Spain) 
(Braz il 197 4 )  
(Chile 19 7 3 )  
( Indonesia 19 74)  
This categorisation of the forms and techniques of  
military involvemen t in politics and of  the resultant regimes 
illustrates bo th the complexity and diversity of mil itary 
pol it ics . I t  also shows that the quest ion of the polit ical 
role of the PNGDF is a considerably more sub tle one than a 
simp le d ichotomy between either an apol it ical milit ary , or 
the s i tuation of coup d 'etat and outright military gove rnmen t 
by mil itary officers . 
The term civil-mil itary re lations also requires examin ­
at i on .  Civil-military relations in PNG may b e  seen , 
essent ially , as the power relationships between the milita r y  
and civil ian group s in society . In this context power means 
the ab ility to control the act ions of others within the 
polit ical system .  Power may be possessed as a consequence 
of formally bestowed authority , or as the result o f  the 
informal patterns of influence and the possib ility of  
sanct ions either threatened or implied (see Hunt ington , 1 957 : 
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8 6-7 and Dahl , 1970 : Chap . 3 ) . These relationships will have 
a formal dimens ion manifest in the departmental arrangements 
and constitutionally-provided role o f  the Defence Force ; 
they will also have an informal dimension in terms of the 
relat ionships b etween Defence Force p ersonnel ,  the bureau­
cracy , the political leadership and PNG society at large . 
The polit ical power relationship s b etween the military and 
society in PNG may be seen to operate at three levels : at 
the macro-level b etween the mil itary es tablishment as a 
whole and PNG society ; at the o fficer corp s-national elite 
level ; and thirdly between the s enior military commanders 
and the nation ' s  political leader s .  
By their very existence armed forces generate polit ical 
implications which extend beyond a cons iderat ion of their 
formal national s ecurity role . · The armed forces are a 
' heavy ' inst i tution b ecause of  their special relationship to 
the regime as the principal instrument o f  state vio lence and , 
for this reason , the PNGDF posses ses great potential 
polit ical power which under cer tain c ircumstances may be 
actualised . The political power o f  the military in PNG at 
the present time may be seen as mainly potent ial because 
c ivilian control is maintained by a comb inat ion o f  moral and 
legal author ity . Civilian control is legit imate because it 
carries with it the suasion o f  public op inion ; it is , at 
present , also reinforced by consensus between the government 
and the military leaders on the desirab il ity of civilian 
rather than military government . Nonetheles s the PNGDF ' s  
po tential polit ical power might b e  converted into actual 
power were the relat ionship between the military and c ivilian 
leaders to break down and the military prepared to assume 
polit ical power in it s own corporate interests , or , altern­
atively , at the invitat ion or with the connivance o f  other 
group s in society . 
PNG civil-military relat ions , in addit ion to being 
concerned with the dis tribution of power between civilian 
and mil it ary group s ,  may also b e  seen in terms o f  the 
b alancing of nat ional security n eeds against soc io-political 
values .  In this sense Huntington (1957 : 1-2)  has argued that 
the inst itutional framework of civil-military relat ions 
reflects a compromis e between optimising the nation ' s  
security at the least cost to the nation ' s  values ,  and by 
such a compromis e most s tates are able to achieve an adequate 
level of defence preparedness without j eopardis ing their 
dominant social values . On the other hand , s tates which 
face greater s trategic risks , or when ac tually at war , 
conunonly place greater emphasis on security needs at the 
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cos t  of social values .  There is also a third case where 
national security and social goals are perceived as largely 
compat ible and the cases of  Sparta ,  Switzerland and Israel 
might be c ited here (see D . C .  Rapoport in Huntington , 19 62 : 
7 1-2 ) . 
PNG appears to fall into the category of  a state which , 
in the ab sence of  a pres sing strategic danger or a military 
trad it ion such as that of a nation-in-arms , seeks a 
compromis e  between national security needs and socio-
pol it ical values at the least co st to these values .  Although 
PNG ' s  milit ary security might conceivably be enhanced by 
development along the lines of a garrison state in which 
mil itary imperatives and values predominated over civilian 
ones , such an increase in security would almost .  certainly 
be achieved with the co st of increased military power in PNG 
society ( see H . D .  Lasswell in Huntington , 1962 : 5 1-70) . 
Without a strategic danger or a radical change in national 
politic al ideology away from liberal democracy such an 
increase in military power would appear unl ikely . 
This is the crux o f  the civil-military relations quest ion 
in new s tates like PNG . The balancing of civil-military 
relations in PNG appears to have as its central obj ective 
no t so much the maximisat ion of military security but rather 
the maximisat ion of civilian power and control over the 
Defence Force . This ordering of pr iorities provides a focus 
for the discussion of civil-military relat ions in PNG and 
reflects the concern that leaders of new states including 
PNG have expressed about the dangers of  a coup d 'etat , 
military rule and other forms of mili tary involvement in 
polit ics . 
The formal relat ionship of  the Defence Force to the civil 
power in PNG , as in all s tates which profess to  be constit­
utional democracies , is expressed by the principle of  the 
primacy of the civil power over the mil itary . This principle 
means that the milit ary is required to be an apolitical 
inst itution which act s  in a d isciplined manner as the loyal , 
impartial instrument of tho se who exercise constitut ional 
power. Baldly stated , the PNG Defence Force is expected , on 
every occas ion and in every respect , to obey the civilian 
government of  PNG without attempt ing to influence the 
polit ical , as distinct from technical and bureaucrat ic ,  
decision-making processes in relat ion t o  the Defence Force 
and it s role within society . 
No twithstanding the principle of the primacy o f  the civil 
power , it may be observed that the not ion of a completely 
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apolit ical military is l ikely to be as much a theoret ical 
f iction in PNG as it has proved to be in other states , 
includ ing the developed wes tern democracies . Even in 
countr ies like Britain which have long boas ted a non-political 
army , the interrelat ionship of defence and foreign policies , 
quest ions of defence f inance , and the very nature of defence 
dec is ion-making within a bureaucrat ic system,  have led to a 
sign ificant polit ical role on the part  of the military . To 
a rather greater extent , the military in the Un ited States , 
although formally apolit ical , wields cons iderable polit ical 
power and the so-called military-industrial complex has 
exc ited contemporary con cern , even though there is a s trong 
tradit ion o f  formal c ivil control over the military in the 
United States . And whils t actual military involvement in 
pol it ics may have been , in recent t imes , more common in the 
new s tates it has o ccurred in most countries of the world 
during their his tory , inc luding the older s tates of Europe . 
In the new states the prominent polit ical role of the 
military and the non-observance of the principle of the 
primacy of the c ivil power is a commonplace . In Asia the 
polit ical role of the mil itary has been widespread ( Ind ia 
being the most sign ificant excep t ion ) although the o rigins , 
tradit ions and the character of  the military role in 
politics remain widely disparate . In regard to Indones ia 
and Vietnam the origins of the s tate and the mil itary in 
ant i-colonial s truggles established the Army in politics . 
Whils t the Indones ian military have held power in their own 
right s ince 1965 , the Vietnamese military ' s  polit ical role 
is largely sub sumed wi thin party and state organs somewhat 
similar to the PLA in China ( see Waddell , 1972 : Chap . 13 ) . 
In the Midd le Eas t ,  the central ro le o f  armies and o fficer 
corps in Arab politics has b een a dominant feature of Arab 
nationalism. And in Latin America , military polit ics , 
endemic since the days of the Caudi l lo , has more recently 
tended to expand from the role of cons titutional guardian , 
arb iter and intermittent part ic ipant in politics to that o f  
long-term agent o f  political control , soc ial change and 
modernisat ion . 
This brief review o f  the military in polit ics may be 
completed by turning to  black Africa , a region which appears 
to of fer the mos t  suitable comparisons with PNG . To be 
sure , the mil itary have no t risen to power in every one of 
the states in post-colonial black Africa ; nevertheless the 
phenomenon of military polit ics, in s tatistical terms alon e ,  
lays claim t o  b eing the mo st p ervas ive and dominant polit ical 
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trend in the region . 2 Given that there are dangers in an 
overly s implis t ic comparison b etween the experience of 
military pol itics in black Africa and PNG , arising out of 
real cultural , historical and geopol itical d ifferences , 
there are , nonetheles s ,  s imilarities which may have a bear ing 
on the future cour se of civil-military relat ions in PNG . 
The princ ipal difficulty in a dispass ionate comparison 
between PNG and black Africa in regard to civil-military 
relat ions is the fact that the African parallel ,  with 
relatively few exceptions , is so compellingly pes s imis tic in 
terms o f  the prospects for cons titutional democracy and an 
apolitical military . For this reason the comparison is seen 
by many Papua New Guineans and others to be of itself 
prej udic ial ( see Colebatch and Sco t t  in Scott , 19 70 : 166-70 ) . 
The fundamental point to be made in a comparison between 
black Africa and PNG is that in t erms of political and 
mil itary development , PNG is more closely s imilar to African 
states than to the S tates of Lat in  America and Asia - the 
other maj or regions of deco lonisation . S imilarities between 
black Africa and PNG lie in the nature o f  the co lon ial back­
ground , the course of pol it ical change towards independence 
and the development of nat ional defence forces . Unl ike the 
colonial per iod els ewhere in the world , the period of 
colonial contact and development in black Africa and PNG 
has b een relatively short . In both cases colonial regimes 
were established where there had b een in most cases in black 
Africa and in PNG no extensive central polit ical units beyond 
the tribe and where state boundaries were arb it rarily determ­
ined , frequently cutting acro ss ethnic d ivisions . In both 
black Africa and PNG the final s tages of colonial ism saw the 
rapid development of polit ical ins t itut ions largely based 
on the liberal democratic tradit ions of the coloniser ' s  own 
political sys tem. These transplanted in st itutions , by which 
the new s tates were expected to govern themselves , contrasted 
with both the authoritarian colonial system by which the 
metropoles had previously governed and the lack of ind igenous 
polit ical institutions at the nat ional level readily capable 
of adaptation in the independence period . In both regions 
the transit ion to independence has also b een similar in tha� 
unl ike La tin America , As ia and par t s  of North Afr ica , 
2of the 3 4  independent s tates in black Africa in January 
1974 , 16 (47 per cent)  had experienced a successful coup 
d 'etat and a to tal of 24 (70  per cent of the total ) had at 
least one recorded inc ident of military involvement in 
pol itics s ince independence ( see Mench , 19 74a: Appendix I) . 
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independence has gener ally been won without violent and 
pro tracted political struggle . The nat ionalist polit ical 
forces have , as a result , b een weaker , less well organised , 
and fewer of the population have b een mobilised into the 
political sys tem .  
The s imilar road to  indep endence has also resulted in a 
similarity in the origins o f  the defence forces . The armies 
of  black Africa , like that o f  PNG , were ' colonial gifts ' ,  
developed by the colonial power . In both cases they played 
no s ignificant active part in their nations ' nationalist 
movement s  and they po ssessed no revolut ionary trad ition . 
They were , and in most cases still are , small infantry-
based forces , dependent on a metropolitan country in logist ic , 
financial and training matters . 3 The significant po int 
here is that it has no t only been s trong,  relatively large 
armies , active in the struggle for national independence , 
that have assumed political roles . Whilst the leadership 
groups of revolutionary ' people ' s  armies ' have moved easily 
and naturally into the political vacuums created by the 
disappearance o f  the old colonial regime , it has also been 
the small previously apolitical black African armies , like 
the 2 00-man Togo army , which have taken a dec isive polit ical 
role . The manner in which the military rapidly assumed an 
important political role in many of  the nations of black 
Africa after indep endence had no t b een widely predic ted and 
surpris ed many cormnentators . 
If  there are similarities between PNG and the s tates of  
black Africa,  what may be learnt from the experience of  
military polit ics in Africa ? Cons iderable research has been 
conducted into the causes of military intervent ion in 
African polit ics  and whil st some writers have tended to 
emphas ise external factors in the polity , others have placed 
emphasis on factors within the military institut ion it self . 
Depending on the emphas is placed on these two broad causal 
categories , typologies have been cons tructed in order to 
class ify different types of mil itary intervent ion in 
pol it ic s . I t  is , however a ' revis ionist ' analys is of 
military in tervent ion which app ears to offer the mo st satis­
factory explanat ion . As argued by Luckham (19 7la : 7 ) , 
3 
The military role [ in politics ] • • •  is not the 
product of any s ingle factor or set of fac tors . 
There is a complex interplay of  changing pres sures 
from the political and social environment ; the 
This argument is drawn from Welch , 1967 : 306-9 . 
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profes sional do ctrine and polit ical ideas of the 
officer corps ; and the coherence of  the military 
Allowing that the sources of civil-mil itary conflict lie 
both in the military and in society and in the interrelation­
ship between the groups , the discussion now turns to some o f  
the potential causes of  civil-military conflict in PNG. 
These causes are discussed under three broad heads : 
corporate causes , ethnic and regional causes and polit ical 
causes . 
The corporate caus es of civil-military conflict may be 
cons idered in two parts , professional causes and tho se of  
corporate self-interest . Conflict between the military and 
the government has commonly arisen elsewhere in relat ion to 
pro fessional j ud gements by the military , especially where 
the ability o f  the mil itary to carry out its mission or 
adequately provide for national security is perceived by 
the military leadership to be threatened . Conflict might , 
for example , arise over the future size of  the PNG Defence 
Force , the typ es of  units in it , their equipment and train­
ing .  There might be profess ional res is tance to the roles 
given to the Force by the PNG government espec ially if they 
are non-traditional ones . It is po ssible that tensions may 
develop between the polit ical leadership ' s  view of  the PNGDF 
primarily as an agent of  improvis ed modernisation and that 
of the PNGDF commanders who may pref er to see their primary 
role as a guarantor of national security and as an internal 
secur ity reserve of force . Profes sional conflict with the 
pol itical leadership may be expected to ar ise almost 
inevitably as a result of  the military ' s  ' conservative 
real ism ' in secur ity affairs and their demonstrated 
t endency to prepare for the wors t (Huntington , 1957 : 62-7 9 ) . 
This will only rarely accord with the polit ical leadership ' s  
as sessments of  secur ity problems , condit ioned by bo th the 
pressing and competing demands for resources in non-defence 
areas and a dispos ition to look toward ' pol itical ' solut ions , 
involving compromise and bargaining . 
Polit ical conflict  between the military and the c ivil ian 
regime may be generated by military reques ts for newer , 
bet ter (and probably more expens ive ) mater i el .  Su ch demands 
may be seen by PNG politicians to j eopardise more important 
national priorit ies and may be attributed to the military 
j ust wanting new toys to play with . The military may well 
be prone to seeing their demands in the narrow context of  
nat ional security imerpatives without cons idering broader 
nat ional priorit ies . The risk would appear to be increased 
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because the PNGDF have , in the past , generally been accus t­
omed to . receiving modern equipment from Australia on a 
fairly lavish scale . 4 
Political tensions might develop over government attempt s  
t o  diversify the sources o f  internat ional defence ass istance . 
Although this policy may be bas ed on sound foreign policy 
obj ectives it could be resisted by the military leadership 
bo th for lo gical reasons of  uniformity in defence materiel 
and pro cedures and also out o f  a sense of loyalty on the 
part of the military leadership to their colonial military 
heritage . The attempt by President Nkrumah o f  Ghana , for 
example , to have his defence force o fficers trained in the 
USSR provoked a strong react ion from Brit ish-trained 
Ghanaian o f ficers who were opposed on ideolo gical as well as 
purely pro fessional grounds to the change . 
Several causes o f  civil-military conflict may b e  consid­
ered under the heading of co rporate self-interest ,  a 
familiar theme o f  writers on the subj ect o f  military involve­
ment in polit ics . PNGDF personnel are likely to be sensitive 
about the standard and relativity of their pay and conditions 
in relation to other groups in society . The transit ion to 
independence and beyond may involve some deflation of these 
standards and this may be ,resisted by the military leaders 
under pressure from the members of the Defence Force who 
might see the issue as a test o f  the competence o f  their new 
local leaders . The Defence Force , as argued earlier , has 
occupied a pos ition o f  privilege within PNG society and it 
has been the las t institution to be placed under the control 
of lo cal polit ical ins titutions . It may resent and attempt 
to res is t  attempts  by national leaders to reduce resource 
allo cations to defence in favour o f  other developmental 
prio rities . The PNG military may see their present ' slice 
of  the cake ' as an irreducible minimum and fight strongly 
for it to be retained . 5 The Defence Force might also 
4rt is of course not necessarily only the military who might 
want new ' toys ' but on o ccas ions the polit ical leadership ·­
for reasons of national or personal prest ige . President 
Nkrumah ' s  des ire for an expens ive modern navy equipped with 
frigates as a symbol o f  his nat ion ' s  independence is a case 
in point (see First , 19 7 2 ) . 
5 As argued in Chapter 3 ,  political debate in PNG about the 
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promot e  the need for expansion after independence both for 
lo gically argued pro fessional reasons and for corporate 
reasons connected with the career amb itions of senior 
o f ficers and the need to satisfy the promotion expectat ions 
o f  the second echelon o f  local o f ficers . 
The central point about the potential o f  corporate and 
pro fess ional interests to cause strain on civil-military 
relations in PNG is that , whils t  most o f  these interests are 
also present in a mature democracy , PNG is more vulnerable 
because the constitutional convent ions and institutional 
restraints on military act ion are , relat ively speakin g ,  
llll.tested . The extent t o  which the PNGDF i s  willing to 
pursue its corporate interests  polit ically in the future 
depends to some extent on its own perception o f  it s power as 
an institut ion , and here past experience o f  success or 
failure will weigh heavily . I f  the Defence Force does , at 
some point , exceed the bollll.daries of const itutional action 
in order to achieve its goals then there would seem to be a 
s ignificant chance that it will be encouraged to do so again 
in the future . As First (19 72 )  has remarked , the ' polit ical 
virginity ' o f  an army once assailed is probably never 
regained unless there is a radical change in the pro fess ional 
and polit ical environment . 
The experience o f  black African states has illustrated 
the significance of ethnic and regional tensions as a cause 
of  civil-military con flict and they may also be important in 
PNG. Issues o f  ethnicity and regionalism in PNG are int im­
ately connected with national policies concerning economic 
development , the distribution o f  resources and the preser­
vation of law and order . If such issues do become intensely 
polit icised and charged with emotion there is a cons iderable 
danger that they might spill over into the military also . 
Alt ernatively , the PNGDF leadership might feel compelled to 
involve it self in the pol it ical resolut ion of these quest ions 
out of a concern for the preservation Of it s own organis-
5 ( cont inued) 
s ize  of the defence budget may be distorted for several 
years after independence because the full extent o f  defence 
costs  will be dis guised by Australian defence aid .  I f  
fo reign defence aid diminishes o r  foreign aid i s  not 
specifically t ied to defence , the polit ical debate. on 
de fence spending is likely to become more int ense as the 
defence burden comes to be . seen more clearly in terms o f  
alternat ive costs . 
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at ional cohes ion . The Defence Force is likely to see the 
parochial explo itation of the politics of tribe or region 
as  a threat both to national unity and to the unity of the 
PNGDF . A specific problem here is how the Defence Force 
might react to the imposit ion of ascriptive promot ion 
criteria (based on ethnic origin )  which may form part of 
government policy to even up the representation of  various 
regions in nat ional organisat ions . 6 
A further cons equence of ethnic and reg ional ist polit ical 
issues in PNG may be an increas ing tendency by the PNGDF to 
foster its own form of elitist ' tribalism' as a means of  
insulating the Defence Force from external d ivisive pressures . 
The resultant isolat ion o f  the Defence Force and its 
adherence to profess ional , wes tern military values entailed 
in the build ing up of mil itary in-group loyalt ies and 
esprit de corps might well bring the PNGDF into conflict 
with aspects of government pol icy which sought , for example , 
to reduce urban elitism and privilege . 
A third more diverse category of  civil-military conflict 
may be subsumed under the head of political causes . The 
Defence Force might in the future be drawn into pol it ics as 
a result of it s involvement in internal mil itary operat ions 
in PNG. Should the PNGDF be needed to res tore internal 
security in a part of the coun try , it will already , by 
implicat ion , have assumed a de facto political role . Once 
the military do assume an order maintenance role they become 
involved in the political as well as military aspects of  the 
s ituat ion . The nature of such operat ions invariably involves 
issues concerning the c ivil law and the government ' s  social 
and economic policies . The internal security doctrines of  
the PNGDF , which have b een inf luenced by the Australian 
Services ' counter-revolut ionary warfare experience , emphasise 
the importance of ' winning the hearts and minds ' of  the 
populat ion and , consequently , a purely 'military ' approach 
to these operat ions would be s een by the military as 
6
The p rominence of Papuan o f f icer s at the more senior rank 
level in the PNGDF , which was observed in Chap ter 3 ,  
provides a po tent ial parallel with the Niger ian army and 
the Ibo . In that cas e ,  as tribalism increas ingly became a 
polit ical issue , the preponderence of Ibo off icers in the 
senior ranks was widely interpreted as indicating favouritism 
in the promot ion system, whereas it was in fact the conse­
quence of the earlier pattern of recruitment , as is the 
case with the prominence of Papuan officers in the 
PNGDF . 
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nugatory . 
Quite apart from the de facto polit ical role o f  the PNGDF 
if it b ecame engaged on internal security op erations , there 
are two further ways in which such a s ituation may precipitate 
deeper polit ical involvement by the Defence Force .  Increased 
rel iance by the c ivilian regime on the Defence Force to 
suppress political dissent  and d isorder would , of itself , 
indicate that the government was lo s ing polit ical author ity 
(see Arendt , 1970 : 53 ) . That is , the more the c ivilian 
government came to rely on violence , the more it would be 
obvious that it was dependent for its survival on the 
ins trument s  of violence - the Defence Force and Police . This 
might eas ily lead to the explo itation of this power relation­
ship by the Defence Force in terms of polit ical demand s on 
the civil regime . Second ly , there is always a greater 
po ssib ility when the military are ordered to use force 
against their fellow countrymen that the military also 
becomes d is satisfied with the government . If the PNGDF was 
seriously involved in internal operat ions to keep the peace , 
element s  within it might come to believe that the government 
was ineffective , unj ust or in some other way not fulfill ing 
the people ' s  needs . The dil.emma which a PNG government 
faces here is , on the one hand , to contain mil itary influence 
in polit ics , but , on the other , to ident ify and associate 
the Defence Force with PNG ' s  polit ical problems from the 
outset so that the Defence Force leaders are able to develop 
real ist ic assessments of the problems of government rather 
than a naive belief in simple panaceas which a military 
government might want to implement . 
Attempts by the civil ian government to balance other 
organ ised ins truments of force such as the Police , or a form 
of mil it ia , against  the Defence Force , in an attemp t to 
neutralise its polit ical power might also lead to civil­
mil itary conflict rather than the resolution of it . It may 
lead to the settin g  up of dan gerous rivalries and consp iracy 
bases for polit ical factions , apart from the proliferation 
of organisations and financ ial waste . The presen t  policy of 
the PNG government has been , however ,  to preserve a parity 
between the Police and Defence Force , and provided that it 
is generally maintained this problem is unlikely to 
eventuate . 
A key area of pos s ible c ivil-military ·conflic t and of 
mil itary intervention in PNG polit ics is that aris in g  out of 
a national political cris is . It  is conceivable that as a 
result o f  deadlo ck or conflict b etween the PNG Parliament 
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and the Cabinet , or between fac tions o f  the Cabinet , the 
government (or elements of it)  may attemp t to employ the 
Defence Force under cons titut ional provis ions either to 
maintain the status quo , or to unseat an allegedly illegal 
government ( see Luckham, 197la : 23 7-8) . The po ssib ility of 
this type of military involvement in PNG depends to some 
extent on the distribut ion of const itutional powers between 
a head of state (if there is  to be one) and the head of 
government and in whom commander-in-chief powers are to be 
ves ted and , at the t ime of  writing,  these issues have not 
been resolved . But ,  no twithstanding the provis ions of the 
constitut ion , a polit ical crisis may see one of the parties 
or external groups such as the bureaucracy or trade union 
movement invite the Defence Force to intervene to resolve it 
by force . A severe economic crisis induced by polit ical 
caus es might also precip itate military involvement . 7 
It  is possible that conflic t and military involvement in 
PNG polit ics may arise out o f  the formal struc ture of  c ivil­
mil itary relat ionships entrenched in the country ' s  const it­
ution or adopted by legislation . Pos t- independence PNG 
institutional civil-military relat ionships , involving the 
power relationships between military officers and pub lic 
servant s within the PNG Defence organisat ion and the overall 
d is tribut ion o f  power between the political leadership 
( inc luding the Defence Minister ) , the mil itary and public 
s ervant o fficials , are unl ikely to meet the apolit ical 
expectations o f  Australian defence planners , nor to conform 
in practice to Australian patterns of c ivil-mil itary 
relat ions . The presently intended equal distribution o f  
power in the PNG Defence organisat ion between the military 
commander and c ivilian secretary has been consciously 
modelled on Aus tralian pract ice . The fact is , however ,  that 
the Aust ralian p attern of civil-military relations has 
evolved in an his torical context ; convent ions of civilian 
control over the milit ary have developed after considerable 
experience in both war and p eace and there are establ ished 
attitudes within Aus tralian society to the military 
pro fess ion which are unlikely to be shared exactly by PNG 
society . Furthermore , c ivilian control in Australia is 
effected w ithin a mature defence bureaucracy rather than one 
only now being es tabl ished , and the appropriateness or 
otherwise of the Aus tralian model for PNG may only b e  tested 
with t ime . One o f  the situat ions which might lead to con-
7As occurred , for example , in Dahomey (see Rotburg and 
Mazrui , 1970 : chap ter by Le Vine ) . 
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flict  in PNG is the development of personal antagonism and 
rivalries between minister , public s ervant and senior 
military officer within the Defence Organisation , with 
possible polit ical consequences . 
There are two themes that emerge from this review .  
Firstly , there i s  the danger that the corporate isolation o f  
the Defence Force a s  a result o f  i t s  d istinc tive ins t itutional 
ident ity and values might lead it to take independent 
polit ical act ion . Secondly , there is the danger , also 
arising from the Defence Force ' s  corporate identity , that 
d ivergent political att itudes and values may develop within 
the military and in c ivilian leadership group s in PNG . 
The future o f  c ivil-military relations in PNG 
It was earlier argued that the Defence Force might , 
conceivably , become involved in politics at four identif iable 
levels , following Finer , ranging from polit ical influence to 
the supplantment of the c ivilian regime by a military one . 
Although the p resent pos it ion of  the PNGDF is formally 
apolit ical it may already be said to be capable o f  exerc ising 
pol it ical in fluence . The PNGDF ' s  influence on pol it ical 
decis ions in relat ion to the development and role of the 
Defence Force emerged dur ing the transfer of mil itary power 
and this influence is l ikely to increase as local officers 
assume senior appointments in the PNGDF and work more clo sely 
with their peers in the senior levels of the PNG Pub lic 
Service , and with politic ians , after independence . On the 
other hand , the pre sently l imited integrat ion of the PNGDF 
within the government , advocated and practised by the Somare 
government , may no t go as far as some PNGDF officers might 
l ike , and claims for a more extensive polit ical role by 
senior officers have already been art iculated . 
In Sep tember 1973 one senior PNG officer wrote , in advoc-
ating a more active involvement o f  the PNGDF in PNG , that : 
it can clearly be seen that the government must 
expect the senior Service officers to be involved 
in po lit ical ma t ters and allow them to speak ou t 
when and where necessary accepting the fact that 
what is to be spoken may not be in keeping with 
government views • • • Experience has indicated that 
the ethos and rules governing the conduct  of Service 
officers has b een a direct take from the Australian 
concep t • • •  PNG , therefore , should disregard this 
princ iple of to tal c ivilian supremacy over the 
Mil itary and clearly recognise and appreciate the 
contribution Service officers can offer in the 
development o f  the country . 
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Earl ier , in May 1973 , at a round-table seminar on defence 
in Port Moresby , another s enior local o f f icer in discussing 
future problems of  civil-military relations wondered about 
the future loyalty of  the members o f  the PNGDF in the case 
of harsh unpopular dec is ions by a c ivil ian government .  He 
thought that the solut ion to this problem was military 
representat ion at a polit ical level.  ' Having a mil itary man 
as min is ter of  defence would be a step in the r ight direc t ion '. 
The same officer pointed out that the problem o f  harmonious 
c ivil-military relations extended throughout the officer 
corp s .  In this connect ion he volunteered the view that a 
successful coup d 'etat might initially be launched in Port 
Moresby by a force as small as one platoon .  
Beyond the question o f  greater polit ical influence b y  the 
mil itary within a cons titutional framework there is also the 
prospect of forms of political blackmail , such as , for 
example , mutiny .  I f  the likelihood o f  some form o f  corporate 
act ion canno t be pred ic ted , it should not be altogether 
dismissed as impo ss ible . Both the PNGDF and the Police have 
in the pas t  experienced inc idents of unrest involving a 
refusal to work and some of  the Defence Force incident s have 
b een in the nature o f  industrial act ion with some elements 
of organisation , leadership and spec ific claims . These 
typ es of incidents , or more serious ones , might recur and , 
in an independent PNG which had no other coercive organisation 
to fall back on , their pol it ical potent iality would be 
unmistakable . Government austerity measures or economic 
problems might lead to the pres en tly favourable condit ions 
of service in the PNGDF and Pol ice deteriorat ing,  restraint 
on pol itical action might diminish as the result of the 
widespread politicisation of PNG society and the Austral ian 
presence may be no more e ffec tive than that o f  the Brit ish 
in o ther c irctuns t ances in keep ing the PNGDF out of polit ics . 
Furthermore , Papua New Guinean Defence Force o f f icers may , 
themselves , be unable to prevent certain forms o f  corporate 
act ion and some local o fficers may even elect to lead it . 
The prospects of  a coup d ' etat at some time in the future 
in PNG were briefly ment ioned in Chap ter 4 in the context of  
threats to  internal security .  It  has , in the past , b een 
argued that the PNGDF is too small to conduct a successful 
coup and that the officer corp s lacks adequate pol itical 
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mo tivat ion , but both these obs ervations may be misleading . 
In operational terms the coup d 'etat - the seizure of 
pol it ical power by the military - may be seen as a problem 
of urban politics . To be success ful in the first instance , 
a coup in PNG would need to b e  effective in the principal 
urban areas where the centres o f  political power - ' the 
commanding heights ' - are located . Once the ' commanding 
heights '  had been seized includ ing the pol itical leaders , 
parl iament , principal government offices and rad·io stations ) 
and the c ivil government toppled , the process of consolidation 
and extension of power to the rural areas might take p lace 
more gradually . The point here is that in the init ial 
seizure of power a small force may well be adequate , perhaps 
ac ting without the act ive support of  other group s .  It is in 
the second s tage , the extens ion and consolidat ion o f  power , 
that a coup would need to broaden its political base. At 
this stage the support o f  the PNG Public Service (or signif­
icant elements of it) and of the Police would probably be of 
great importance in order to es tablish a viable pattern of 
administrat ion over the country in the wake of the coup . 
Although support by the Pol ice and Public Service might 
be the sine qua non for a su ccess ful mil itary takeover in 
PNG , it is relevan t that this support has almo st invariably 
been forthcoming in the black African exper ience and the 
reasons why this has been so may also apply in the PNG case.  
It  is  argued that the bureaucracy and police in black Africa 
have b een will ing to co-op erate , or at least no t ob struct 
the mil itary in their involvement in polit ics because these 
three group s represent a sub s tantial community of interest -
in terms of their status as members of an urban elite and in 
their perception of  modernisation and nationalism as key 
political issues . In addit ion , in the eyes of  the bureaucrat s, 
a military coup is often seen as resul ting in the promo t ion 
o f  ' administration above politics ' ;  that is , increased power 
and opportunit ies for the Public Service to exercise its 
' rational ' skills of administration and planning , replac ing 
the polit ic ians and their political compromises and deals . 
Apart from the question of how the PNG Public Service 
might respond to pol it ical intervent ion by the military , 
there is the po ssib ility that , under cer tain circumstances , 
the Publ ic Service might actually encourage or incite military 
intervention . That is , in terms of Janowit z ' s  dis t inc tion 
between des igned and reactive mil itary intervent ion , the 
PNGDF leaders might be led to perceive the pol itical s ituation 
in such a way that intervention was required for the good o f  
the country a s  well a s  being called for by the Public Service 
209 
and o ther group s .  Further , on the basis of the experience 
of the African armies , one might argue that a coup d 'etat in 
PNG may no t necessarily require a highly pol it icised or 
pol it ically sophisticated officer corps . Junior officers in 
command o f  units and politically naive officers have led 
takeover b ids merely out o f  a sense of ' national du ty ' or 
from simpl istic mo t ivations of wanting to ' clean up the 
count ry ' ,  rid it of ' corrup t ' pol it icians , or even out of a 
naked sel f-interes t  in achieving power . The coup in PNG 
might require only a relat ively small cabal o f  polit ically 
motivated officers who were able , at the cruc ial moment , to 
claim the loyalty of their less ' political ' fellow off icers 
and men . The key group of officers in any planning would 
probably be the troop connnanders who controlled the 
'bayonets ' and personal loyal ty o f  the troop s .  As the 
examples in Nigeria , Ghana and els ewhere illustrate , the 
most senior echelon of military commanders may even be 
bypassed in any plo tting because of a belie f  that they are 
too close to the politic ians or unsympathetic to the cause 
of  the j unior officers . In regard to the actual polit ical 
at titudes of the PNGDF officer corps it has been as serted , 
for instance , that whils t ' Papua New Guinean l ieutenants 
will admit over their second b eer their contemp t for most 
politic ians • • •  the Army is no t yet anyway - a polit ical 
force ' . 8 It is implicit in this sort o f  observat ion , 
however , that the evolution of  political att itudes in the 
mil itary may be both rapid and sudden in response to develop­
ments in the political environment .  There is , moreover,  
considerable evidence that the process of polit icisat ion in 
the PNGDF , especially amongst the officer co rps , is further 
advanced than the above quo tat ion ind icates and that this 
process is accelerating.  
The survey conducted by a senior PNG officer amongs t 
thirty-two of  his fellow Papua New Guinean o ff icers in late 
19 72 , referred to in Chap ter 3 ,  yielded some in terest ing 
results in this connection . 9 Twenty-eight officers agreed 
that the mil itary should intervene in politics in the 
interests of the nation if a polit ical impasse developed . 
8
National Times ,  5 Nov . 19 73 : Christopher Ashton , ' Special 
Report - Papua New Guinea , The End of Australia ' s Empire ' .  
9Personal comm�nicat ion , May 1 9 73 . The off icer tested 32 of  
the 4 8  PNG officers then serving with the PNGDF . He  st ated 
that the remainder were either serving in a remo te area , or 
not available becaus e of o ther dut ie s .  
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Thir ty officers believed that the military should intervene 
as the guardian o f  the nat ion if the nat ion suffered at the 
hands o f  politicians .  Twenty-six o ff icers believed that 
PNG was no t suited to a democrat ic form o f  government . 
Thirty-one o fficers believed that a military o fficer should 
represent the Defence Force in the Parliament . Thirty 
respondents believed that the Army would play an important 
part after independenc e ,  espec ially in enforcing law and 
order . And s ignificantly , thirty o f  the officers believed 
that the Defence Force would p lay an important role in 
holding the country together after independence . One 
specific implicat ion of these results , if they are to be 
taken as generally representat ive of the PNGDF indigenous 
leadership , is that the polit ical dismemberment of PNG after 
independence would severely tes t the cohes ion and loyalty o f  
the PNGDF to a national government which tolerated such 
developments without an attempt to use force . 
Surveys conducted by this writer also reveal the develop­
ment of polit ical att itudes amongst the PNGDF officer corp s 
and those abou t to become o fficers (Mench , 1974 : Appendices ) .  
Although , in a survey conducted in January 19 74 ,  a maj ority 
of those questioned in the PNGDF firmly rej ected the propos­
it ion that the Defence Force cons tituted a threat to 
c ivil ian supremacy in government ,  there was widespread 
support for the expansion of the military role in PNG 
society. Tho se quest ioned wished to see military men 
employed in non-mil itary areas o f  governmen t in PNG and , 
specif ically , in the op eration o f  a nat ional service scheme . 
More than hal f ,  in what would be a mos t  s ign if icant 
deviat ion from an apolit ical role , wished to see the PNGDF 
repres ented by its own member in the nat ional Parl iament . 
Given that it was unlikely that PNGDF o fficers and o fficer 
cadets would be completely frank in these matters , espec ially 
where their att itudes were in conflict with their training 
and indoctrinat ion , the overall p icture that emerges from 
these surveys is that of considerable doub t about the 
persis tence of apolitical norms in the PNGDF . It would also 
appear from the two surveys that attitudes within the PNGDF 
and amongst the PNG c ivilian elite about questions of c ivil­
mil itary relat ions are in a process of evolution and this 
process may intensify , making any pred ic tions on the subj ect 
a hazardous undertaking.  
Like Papua New Guinea , the development o f  armed forces in 
black Africa dur ing the colonial period was based on what 
now seems to be an incorrect premise , namely , that armies 
in these s tates would naturally assume an apolit ical 
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relat ionship to the c ivil power and so remain outs ide 
pol itics . - such an assumption overlooked the historical 
evolution of the s tate in western soc iety and the relation­
ship of force to the state . In the absence of a developed 
polit ical culture which establ ished convent ions and political 
trad it ions within the polity and concep ts of professionalism 
within the mil itary , it was unrealist ic to place the mil itary 
outs ide the polit ical processes of the nation - as much as 
it might have been a very desirable philo sophical obj ec tive . 
The recent political history in Africa and elsewhere in 
developing nat ions has pointed to the likely failure of this 
policy in PNG . The struc ture of relationships between the 
civil government and the military within any given s tate are 
largely determined by his torical evolution . The pres cription 
of  rules alone , where they have no foundat ion in established 
conventions of legit imate political behaviour within the 
soc iety , is unlikely to be respected when under stress . As 
argued by Rapoport , military and polit ical institutions 
should not be regarded in isolat ion . Rather , they have an 
inter-dependent relat ionship and it is lo gical that the 
funct ion the mil itary performs within the state will affect 
its relationship to the c ivil power (Huntington , 1962 : 9 7 ) . 
The princ ipal funct ion o f  defence forces in mo st developed 
countries is their employment as instruments of foreign 
policy and for external nat ional defence , whereas in the new 
states they have been more prominently involved in internal 
secur ity and in nation-build ing tasks , either as a cons equence 
of their general administrative resources or through physical 
developmen tal tasks such as road build ing . This involvement 
o f  the mil itary in day-to-day activit ies within the nat ion , 
rather than emphas is on a cont ingent role of  national defence 
against an external threat , appear s likely to be the case in 
PNG also , and this will in all probability contribu te to the 
proj ect ion o f  the mil itary into PNG polit ical affairs . One 
might conclude that if the military in the new states are 
destined to continue to play an ac tive polit ical role , 
cont inued formal adherence to the concept of  c ivil-military 
relat ions based on an apolitical military in a country like 
PNG is dangerously unrealis tic . 
In the developed s tates civil control over the military 
and the development o f  apo Zitisme has been achieved by one 
of two broad strategies ; in Huntington ' s  terms (1957 : 80-9 7 ) , 
by either the subj ective or obj ec tive civil ian control of  
the mil itary . The suitability of these two strategies as a 
means of limiting the political role of Papua New Guinea ' s  
Defence Force is d iscussed b elow. 
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Huntington . argues that under a system of obj ec tive 
c ivilian control the maximisat ion of military effect ivenes s 
may b e  achieved by a combination o f  a low , def ined degree 
of military pol it ical power and a high degree of military 
profess ionalism. Huntington cites as examples Britain and 
the United S tates s ince World War I I .  Aus tralia also fits 
this model . On the o ther hand , Huntington argues that 
subj ec tive c ivilian control is achieved by the maximisat ion 
o f  c ivil ian polit ical power over the military professionalism 
and mil itary values .  The s tates in the communist blo c may 
be seen generally to follow this form of civilian control 
over the military . 
In PNG , c ivil ian control over the mil itary is at present 
based on the obj ective model following Australian pract ice , 
but obj ective control would appear to depend on two pre­
cond it ions which may no t apply to PNG . These are , f irst , 
the existence of mature , stable polit ical institutions 
through which civil ian power over the military may effect­
ively be exerc ised and , second , attitudes of profess ional ism 
within the mil itary which impose normative restraints on 
polit ical involvement .  If the web o f  polit ical inst itutions 
or the tradit ion of pro fessional ism are no t well established 
within the pol ity , as would appear to be the case in PNG , it 
is unreal is t ic to expect tha t obj ective c ivilian control 
will become reliably established . 
For this reason , hopes for effective civilian control 
over the military in the new s tates and in PNG might be 
bet ter placed with subj ec tive control.  The polit ical 
domination of the De fence Force by the pol itical leadership 
in PNG would require that the leadership be able to retain 
the loyal ty and allegiance of the Force by a pervasive 
ideology , or by dependence on the char isma of a leader . 
This would have to be backed up in either case by a control 
apparatus such as a network of political officers in the 
Defence Force and courses of political indoctrination . 
Because o f  this s tructure of political ideology , charismatic 
leadership and controls , it would be d ifficult to envisage 
such a system operating succes s fully in o ther than a s ingle 
party state . PNG has no t yet moved in that d irect ion 
(although it has been advocated by some) and , therefore , 
subj ec tive control does no t s eem to be a pract ical option 
in the immediate future . But even under a system of 
subj ec tive civil ian control o f  the military , as in Tanzania , 
the danger of  military intervent ion in politics is no t 
removed . The non-political role o f  the military under such 
a system still ult imately depends on the pervasivenes s  o f  
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the dominant s tate ideolo gy and the control apparatus in 
ensuring military loyalty . Although the integration of  the 
military into the political system in Tanzania (by the 
appo intment of a pol it ical commissar , by party membership 
for military leaders and par ty indoctrinat ion ) has so far 
averted mil itary intervent ion in the political proces s ,  the 
armed forces in Tanzania s t ill provide a potential source of  
oppos it ion to  Pres ident Nyerere and they apparently cont inue 
to occupy an el ite status . 
It appears , therefore , that there is no simple answer to 
the problem of c ivilian control over the mil itary in PNG , 
by either so-called subj ect ive or obj ective patterns of 
control , and there is a case for looking at an alternat ive 
pat tern of  civil-mil itary relations in PNG . 
The containment pol icy 
of civil-milit ary relations in PNG 
The central problem of mil itary politics in PNG may be 
stated not so much in terms of keep ing the mil itary out o f  
pol it ic s and apol it ical but rather of containing the 
military ' s  polit ical role so that it does no t dominate all 
other polit ical group s in society . To the extent that some 
degree of  military involvement in pol itics is inevitable 
(as is argued here ) a solution might be found in channelling 
involvement so that it contributes to PNG ' s  pol it ical life 
in a manner that does no t wreck civilian polit ical inst it­
utions . This approach might be described as a policy of 
containment of  the military roles in politics . lo 
The containment approach to the problem of  polit ic al 
involvement would b egin by accep ting the PNGDF as a centre 
of po tential pol it ical power and then pro ceed to place the 
military within the polit ical system with a defined role , 
in much the same way that other group s such as the trade 
unions and polit ical part ies have legit imate polit ical 
roles . The pol icy would seek to reduce the Defence Force ' s  
corporate isolation and thus improve civil-military 
communicat ions . In this way the potent ial for unilateral 
pol it ical act ion by the mil itary might be significantly 
reduced . S imilarly , there would seem to be a d iminished 
lOThe con tainment policy employs Sundhaussen ' s concept  of 
polit ico-mil it ary integration ( Sundhaussen ,  1973b : 4  
e t  passim . 
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l ikelihood o f  .polit ical act ion by the military if their 
pol it ical outlook and percep t ions accorded more clo sely with 
tho se of  the c ivil ian leadersh ip . This would be more likely 
if there were , in addit ion to an integrat ion o f  leadership 
elites , legit imate and prescribed channels of  polit ical 
act ivity through which the military were able to articulate 
polit ical demands in a s imilar manner to other group s 
posses s ing pol it ical power . Legit imate pol it ical act ivity 
by the Defence Force might also  s erve the added purpose of 
pol it ical educat ion . In this process , the mil itary leader­
ship would be able to develop an awareness of the overall 
problems of government .  It would , hopefully , thereby develop 
realist ic expec tations of what lay within the resources of  
government to  change , of what was poss ible and what was 
impo ssible to achieve . 
In practical terms the containment policy would involve 
the expansion of  the present role and formal powers of  the 
Defence Force and it would follow on from the present l imited 
policy of int egrating the PNGDF leadership with the govern­
ment . The changes entailed in a containment policy might 
include the following sorts of proposals . The Defence Force 
would be consulted and act ively involved in the development 
of nat ional pol ic ies beyond narrow defence spheres . Thus , 
senior Defence Force officers might participate as advisers 
on Departmental and even Cab inet commit tees concerned with 
economic , social and foreign af fairs pol icy quest ions . 
Defence Force leaders might also be associated with the 
c ivil government by other measures such as the rotat ion of 
PNGDF off icers in senior Public Service appo intment s ,  
includ ing District Commis s ioner ship s (or their post­
independence equivalent s ) . So as to provide for a suitable 
pattern of promo t ion and turn-over of officers and as a 
means of  more clos ely associating the mil itary with the 
c ivil community , off icers could be permitted to retire early 
and be ab sorbed int o the Public Service , commerce and 
industry under the provis ions of special re-employment 
schemes . 
The present system of dual headship within the higher 
defence organisation is probably inappropriate to the 
containment policy of civil-mil itary relations , which accepts 
the military as a polit ical force ; it would therefore have 
to be modif ied . The military head of the PNGDF might be 
placed in a superior relationship to the senior civilian 
either by law or under a de facto arrangement . The question 
of whether or no t the Defenc e Minister should be a mil itary 
man is a more difficult one . In one sense the Defence Force 
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has the potent ial pol itical power of veto over a c ivilian 
Cab inet regardless of whether or not the military is 
represented in the Cab inet and so the argument that a 
mil itary Defence Minister would b e  able to  br ing down the 
government is no t a key issue . On the other hand the 
Defence Minister in PNG , under a system of cabinet govern­
ment , is involved in a range of non-defence pol itical issues 
and he belongs to a political party , and for these reasons 
it may no t be desirable to have an officer as Defence 
Minister . One po ssible solution could be to appo int either 
a serving or recently ret ired off icer as Ass istant Defence 
Minister . He would report and represent the views of the 
Defence Forces and it s Commander on profes sional quest ions 
within the Cab inet and to the Defence Minister as required . 
The Ass istant Defence Minister would be available to 
represent the Defence Force on Departmental and Cab inet 
committees as necessary and he would also have the task, 
with the Defence Minister , of presenting the Defence Force 
budget proposals to Cab inet and arguing for them. He might , 
or might no t ,  have · a nominated seat in the Parliament . The 
relationship , in this proposal , b etween the Assis tant 
Defence Minister and the De fence Force Commander would need 
to be carefully specified to minimise conflict ; however ,  
the Commander would probably have t o  remain as the principal 
source of profess ional military advice to the government ,  
although the government would also b e  able to draw advice 
from the As sistant Minis ter , who might well be retired and 
thus somewhat independent of the Defence Force . 11 
PNG is confronted with a dilennna in it s civil-military 
relations . It may seek either to achieve civilian domination 
of the military , or it may adopt policies of civil-mil itary 
integrat ion . Civil ian dominat ion in an underdeveloped s tate 
probably po int s towards subj ective c ivilian control and 
whilst subj ective control broadly preserves the principle of 
a non-polit ical mil itary it does no t appear to be a practical 
option for PNG . Integrat ion of the military and polit ical 
leadership in PNG , as proposed in the containment pol icy o f  
civil-military relations , neces sar ily discards the no tion 
o f  military apo Zitisme by its recognition of the mil itary 
as a centre o. pol it ical power . It therefore of fends 
against concepts of liberal democracy in which power is 
11The concept of nominated off icials hold ing appo intments 
as Ass istant Minis ters might also be extended to the 
Police and Public Service . 
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held to be derived from the electoral mandate o f  the people . 
(Military pol itical power is representative only of the 
people within it s organisation . )  On the other hand it has 
been argued here that the integrat ion of the PNGDF within 
the PNG polit ical system, the sharing of pol it ical power 
and the conferral o f  def ined pol itical roles on the military 
might of fer a b etter prospect of l imit ing military inter­
vention within PNG by developing closer co-operation 
between the c ivilian and military leader ship groups .  Limited 
part ic ipation in polit ics by the Defence Force might also 
be expected to lead to a commitment to the pol itical system, 
the development of a common ideology amongst the mil itary 
and civil elites and the emergence of conventions of 
military res traint in the political sphere . 
It might be argued that opening the door to a political 
role by the PNGDF in this way would , in fact , lead to 
milita�y domination of PNG pol itic s  and that to ass ert other­
wise is j ust wishful thinking.  If  it  is true that adoption 
of the containment pol icy does have an element of hopeful 
thinking in it , it may be compared to the pro spects for 
civil-military relations in PNG based on an apolit ical 
military , which indeed offers lit tle grounds for hope . 
The history of the black African s tates shows that the 
leadership of new states commonly places national priorities 
in the d irection of build ing a unified nat ion by means of 
strong central government . In this task of forging nat ional 
unity and consensus the military , as the coercive bas is o f  
state power , occupies a key role , espec ially i f  political 
compromise with dis senters fails . The history of the new 
states also shows that the creat ion o f  consensus and the 
development of viable polit ical inst itutions is seldom 
without its procrustean aspect , as democrat ic values fall 
prey to expediency and neces sity .  In this phase of develop­
ment the mil itary is unques t ionably a potential polit ical 
force . When consensus is developed , institutions mature and 
norms o f  pol it ical behaviour b ecome established , the military 
role in politics may be expected to d iminish and c ivilian 
cpntrol over the military will become feas ible . Unt il this 
occurs the pol it ical po tential of the military is an at 
t imes unpalatable reality which should b e  faced . The threat 
posed by military intervent ion to the demo cratic values and 
ins titu tions of PNG canno t be met effec tively merely by the 
wording of cons titutions or by the espousal of s ent iment s 
of democratic theory . 
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Papua New Guinea has so far and like almo st all new 
states regarded it s Defence Force as bo th an indispensable 
symbol of  national sovereignty and , more pract ically , as the 
guarantor of state power . Because of the decision to main­
tain a Defence Force , PNG will also be faced with the 
problem of es tablishing a pattern of c ivil military relat ions 
which reflects the real dis tribution of pol itical power . 
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force po ssesses a l imited 
military capacity , but a rather greater political capab ility . 
The PNGDF is a national organisation which will seek to 
establish its own nat ionalist etho s within the independent 
state of Papua New Guinea .  This proces s is likely to 
involve adj ustment from its present formally apolit ical 
status , based on its Aus tralian heritage , to a polit ical 
role as an important part ic ipant in PNG government .  The 
expans ion of the Defence Force role may result either from 
conscious polit ical dec isions to involve the military more 
deeply in politics , as advocated under the containment 
pol icy , or from the force of events . 
The overall conclusion o f  this  s tudy is that Papua New 
Guinea ' s  Defence Force will emerge as a significant polit ical 
force which will probably come to share polit ical power in 
PNG with civilian pol it ic ians and other groups including the 
Public Service , Police , trade unions and students . If the 
Defence Force is granted a legit imate polit ical role , as 
advocated , then it seems likely that it will be a force for 
stabilisation , national integration and development and it 
will contribute to the es tablishment of a stronger ins tit­
utional order in PNG. If , on the other hand , civil-military 
relations cont inue to be based formally and in subs tance on 
the imported model of  an apolitical military then the future 
may bring mil itary intervent ion in politics which is 
destructive of c ivilian pol it ical ins titutions and which 
leads to serious polit ical ins tab ility in Papua New Guinea. 
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